IP: Military Perspective on Afghanistan

[David Farber <dave () farber net>]

> From: "Fred Bothwell" <fredboth () texas net>
> To: "David Farber" <dave () farber net>
> Subject: Military Perspective on Afghanistan
> Date: Thu, 27 Sep 2001 21:19:22 -0500
>
>
>
>  The following post was forwarded to me by the Assoc. of Graduates, USMA.
> It was written by a West Point graduate stationed in Afganistan
>  from 1998-1999 as part of the UN mine clearing operation.
>
>
>   __________________________
>   [written by Richard Kidd, West Point '86]
>   Many of you are probably not aware that I was one of the last
>   American citizens to have spent a great deal of time in Afghanistan.
>   I was first there in 1993 providing relief and assistance to refugees
>   along the Tajik border and in this capacity have traveled all along
>   the border region between the two countries. In 1998 and 1999 I was
>   the Deputy Program Manager for the UN's mine action program in
>   Afghanistan. This program is the largest civilian employer in the
>   country with over 5,000 persons clearing mines and UXO. In this later
>   capacity, I was somewhat ironically engaged in a "Holy War" as
>   decreed by the Taliban, against the evil of landmines, and by a
>   special proclamation of Mullah Omar, all those who might have died in
>   this effort were considered to "martyrs" even an "infidel" like
>   myself. The mine action program is the most respected relief effort
>   in the country and because of this I had the opportunity to travel
>   extensively, without too much interference or restriction. I still
>   have extensive contacts in the area and among the Afghan community
>   and read a great deal on the subject.
>
>   I had wanted to write earlier and share some of my perspectives, but
>   quite frankly I have been a bit too popular in DC this past week and
>   have not had time. Dr. Tony Kern's comments were excellent and I
>   would like to use them as a basis for sharing some observations.
>
>   First, he is absolutely correct. This war is about will, resolve and
>   character. I want to touch on that later, but first I want to share
>   some comments about our "enemy."
>
>   Our enemy is not the people of Afghanistan. The country is devastated
>   beyond what most of us can imagine. The vast majority of the people
>   live day-to-day, hand to mouth in abject conditions of poverty,
>   misery and deprivation. Less than 30% of the men are literate, the
>   women even less. The country is exhausted, and desperately wants
>   something like peace. They know very little of the world at large,
>   and have no access to information or knowledge that would counter
>   what they are being told by the Taliban. They have nothing left,
>   nothing that is except for their pride.
>
>   Who is our enemy? Well, our enemy is a group of non-Afghans, often
>   referred to by the Afghans as "Arabs" and a fanatical group of
>   religious leaders and their military cohort, the Taliban. The
>   non-Afghan contingent came from all over the Islamic world to fight
>   in the war against the Russians. Many came using a covert network
>   created with assistance by our own government. OBL (as Osama bin
>   Laden was referred to by us in the country at the time) restored this
>   network to bring in more fighters, this time to support the Taliban
>   in their civil war against the former Mujehdeen. Over time this
>   military support along with financial support has allowed OBL and his
>   "Arabs" to co-opt significant government activities and leaders. OBL
>   is the "inspector general" of Taliban armed forces, his bodyguards
>   protect senior Talib leaders and he has built a system of deep
>   bunkers for the Taliban, which were designed to withstand cruise
>   missile strikes (uhm, where did he learn to do that?). His forces
>   basically rule the southern city of Kandahar. This high-profile
>   presence of OBL and his "Arabs" has, in the last 2 years or so,
>   started to generate a great deal of resentment on the part of the
>   local Afghans. At the same time the legitimacy of the Taliban regime
>   has started to decrease as it has failed to end the war, as local
>   humanitarian conditions have worsened and as "cultural" restrictions
>   have become even harsher. It is my assessment that most Afghans no
>   longer support the Taliban. Indeed the Taliban have recently had a
>   very difficult time getting recruits for their forces and have had to
>   rely more and more on non-Afghans, either from Pushtun tribes in
>   Pakistan or from OBL. OBL and the Taliban, absent any US action were
>   probably on their way to sharing the same fate that all other
>   outsiders and outside doctrines have experienced in
>   Afghanistan-defeat and dismemberment. During the Afghan war with the
>   Soviets much attention was paid to the martial prowess of the
>   Afghans. We were all at West Point at the time and most of us had
>   high-minded idealistic thoughts about how we would all want to go
>   help the brave "freedom fighters" in their struggle against the
>   Soviets. Those concepts were naive to the extreme. The Afghans, while
>   never conquered as a nation, are not invincible in battle. A "good"
>
>   Afghan battle is one that makes a lot of noise and light. Basic
>   military skills are rudimentary and clouded by cultural constraints
>   that no matter what, a warrior should never lose his honor. Indeed,
>   firing from the prone is considered distasteful (but still done).
>   Traditionally, the Afghan order of battle is very feudal in nature,
>   with fighters owing allegiance to a "commander" and this person owing
>   allegiance upwards and so on and so on. Often such allegiance is
>   secured by payment. And while the Taliban forces have changed this
>   somewhat, many of the units in the Taliban army are there because
>   they are being paid to be there. All such groups have very strong
>   loyalties along ethnic and tribal lines. Again, the concept of having
>   a place of "honor" and "respect" is of paramount importance and blood
>   feuds between families and tribes can last for generations over a
>   perceived or actual slight. That is one reason why there were 7
>   groups of Mujehdeen fighting the Russians. It is a very difficult
>   task to form and keep united a large bunch of Afghans into a military
>   formation. The "real" stories that have come out of the war against
>   the Soviets are very enlightening and a lot different from our
>   fantastic visions as cadets. When the first batch of Stingers came in
>   and were given to one Mujehdeen group, another group-supposedly on
>   the same side, attacked the first group and stole the Stingers, not
>   so much because they wanted to use them, but because having them was
>   a matter of prestige. Many larger coordinated attacks that advisers
>   tried to conduct failed when all the various Afghan fighting groups
>   would give up their assigned tasks (such as blocking or overwatch)
>   and instead would join the assault group in order to seek glory. In
>   comparison to Vietnam, the intensity of combat and the rate of
>   fatalities were lower for all involved.
>
>   As you can tell from above, it is my assessment that these guys are
>   not THAT good in a purely military sense and the "Arabs" probably
>   even less so than the Afghans. So why is it that they have never been
>   conquered? It goes back to Dr. Kern's point about will. During their
>   history the only events that have managed to form any semblance of
>   unity among the Afghans, is the desire to fight foreign invaders. And
>   in doing this the Afghans have been fanatical. The Afghans' greatest
>   military strength is the ability to endure hardships that would, in
>   all probability, kill most Americans and enervate the resolve of all
>   but the most elite military units. The physical difficulties of
>   fighting in Afghanistan, the terrain, the weather and the harshness
>   are all weapons that our enemies will use to their advantage and use
>   well. (NOTE: For you military planner types and armchair
>   generals--around November 1st most road movement is impossible, in
>   part because all the roads used by the Russians have been destroyed
>   and air movement will be problematic at best). Also, those fighting
>   us are not afraid to fight. OBL and others do not think the US has
>   the will or the stomach for a fight. Indeed after the absolutely
>   inane missile strikes of 1998, the overwhelming consensus was that we
>   were cowards, who would not risk one life in face to face combat.
>   Rather than demonstrating our might and acting as a deterrent, that
>   action and others of the not so recent past, have reinforced the
>   perception that the US does not have any "will" and that were are
>   morally and spiritually corrupt.
>
>   Our challenge is to play to the weaknesses of our enemy, notably
>   their propensity for internal struggles, the distrust between the
>   extremists/Arabs and the majority of Afghans, their limited ability
>   to fight coordinated battles and their lack of external support. More
>   importantly though is that we have to take steps not to play to their
>   strengths, which would be to unite the entire population against us
>   by increasing their suffering or killing innocents, to get bogged
>   down trying to hold terrain, or to get into a battle of attrition
>   chasing up and down mountain valleys.
>
>   I have been asked how I would fight the war. This is a big question
>   and well beyond my pay grade or expertise. And while I do not want to
>   second guess current plans or start an academic debate I would share
>   the following from what I know about Afghanistan and the Afghans.
>   First, I would give the Northern Alliance a big wad of cash so that
>   they can buy off a chunk of the Taliban army before winter. Second,
>   also with this cash I would pay some guys to kill some of the Taliban
>   leadership making it look like an inside job to spread distrust and
>   build on existing discord. Third I would support the Northern
>   alliance with military assets, but not take it over or adopt so high
>   a profile as to undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of most Afghans.
>   Fourth would be to give massive amounts of humanitarian aid and
>   assistance to the Afghans in Pakistan in order to demonstrate our
>   goodwill and to give these guys a reason to live rather than the
>   choice between dying of starvation or dying fighting the "infidel."
>   Fifth, start a series of public works projects in areas of the
>   country not under Taliban control (these are much more than the press
>   reports) again to demonstrate goodwill and that improvements come
>   with peace. Sixth, I would consider vary carefully putting any female
>   service members into Afghanistan proper-sorry to the females of our
>   class but within that culture a man who allows a women to fight for
>   him has zero respect, and we will need respect to gain the
>   cooperation of Afghan allies. No Afghan will work with a man who
>   fights with women. I would hold off from doing anything too dramatic
>   in the near term, keeping a low level of covert action and pressure
>   up over the winter, allowing this pressure to force open the fissions
>   around the Taliban that were already developing. I expect that they
>   will quickly turn on themselves and on OBL. We can pick up the pieces
>   next summer, or the summer after. When we do "pick-up" the pieces I
>   would make sure that we do so on the ground, "man to man." While I
>   would never want to advocate American causalities, it is essential
>   that we communicate to OBL and all others watching that we can and
>   will "engage and destroy the enemy in close combat." As mentioned
>   above, we should not try to gain or hold terrain, but Infantry
>   operations against the enemy are essential. There can be no excuses
>   after the defeat or lingering doubts in the minds of our enemies
>   regarding American resolve and nothing, nothing will communicate this
>   except for ground combat. And once this is all over, unlike in 1989
>   the US must provide continued long-term economic assistance to
>   rebuild the country.
>
>  While I have written too much already, I think it is also important
>
>  to share a few things on the subject of brutality. Our opponents will
>  not abide by the Geneva conventions. There will be no prisoners
>  unless there is a chance that they can be ransomed or made part of a
>  local prisoner exchange. During the war with the Soviets, videotapes
>  were made of communist prisoners having their throats slit. Indeed,
>  there did exist a "trade" in prisoners so that souvenir videos could
>  be made by outsiders to take home with them. This practice has spread
>   to the Philippines, Bosnia and Chechnya were similar videos are being
>   made today and can be found on the web for those so inclined. We can
>   expect our soldiers to be treated the same way.
>
>   Sometime during this war I expect that we will see videos of US
>   prisoners having their heads cut off. Our enemies will do this not
>   only to demonstrate their "strength" to their followers, but also to
>   cause us to overreact, to seek wholesale revenge against civilian
>   populations and to turn this into the world wide religious war that
>   they desperately want. This will be a test of our will and of our
>   character. (For further collaboration of this type of activity please
>   read Kipling).
>
>   This will not be a pretty war; it will be a war of wills, of resolve
>   and somewhat conversely of compassion and of a character. Towards our
>   enemies, we must show a level of ruthlessness that has not been part
>   of our military character for a long time. But to those who are not
>   our enemies we must show a level of compassion probably unheard of
>   during war. We should do this not for humanitarian reasons, even
>   though there are many, but for shrewd military logic. For anyone who
>   is still reading this way to long note, thanks for your patience. I
>   will try to answer any questions that may arise in a more concise
>   manner.
>
>   Thanks, Richard Kidd
>
>  ---



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