IP: [ worth thinking about djf]SIMSON SAYS - FAKE SECURITY

[David Farber <dave () farber net>]

> Date: Fri, 21 Dec 2001 09:53:38 -0700
> From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah () shipwright com>
>
>
> --- begin forwarded text
>
>
> Status:  U
> Delivered-To: simsoft () nitroba com
> From: "Simson Garfinkel" <slg () ex com>
> To: <simsoft () nitroba com>
> Subject: [SIMSOFT] SIMSON SAYS - FAKE SECURITY
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> List-Id: Stories and Articles by Simson Garfinkel <simsoft.nitroba.com>
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> Date: Thu, 20 Dec 2001 20:11:34 -0500
>
> [Normally I send out messages to this list consisting of articles that have
> appeared elsewhere. But after spending more than a month trying to place
> this column, I've come up empty. So please enjoy it and feel free to forward
> it around; it's important.]
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Like many Americans, I have generally avoided flying since the terrorist
> attacks. It's not that I'm worried about becoming another hijack victim;
> even when you consider September's fatalities, flying is still dramatically
> safer than driving. No, I've avoided the skies because I simply don't want
> to deal with the so-called security measures that have been put into place
> since 9/11 --- measures that are tremendously inconvenient for travelers and
> the airlines alike, but which do very little to actually decrease the chance
> of future attacks.
>
>
>
> Last month, however, circumstances forced me to take a short flight on Cape
> Air, the commuter airline that serves Martha's Vineyard, Nantucket and
> Boston. The trip was even worse than I expected, as if someone had decided
> to stage some kind of aviation security parody.
>
>
>
> I've flown Cape Air for years. It's a small, folksy airline that exclusively
> flies 9-seater Cessna 404s. The view from the twin-engine prop aircraft is
> phenomenal, and the first passenger on the aircraft usually gets to sit in
> the co-pilot's seat.  Because of its small size, Cape Air was also fast and
> efficient: in the many times I've flown with the airline, I had frequently
> gone from curbside to my seat in less than five minutes.
>
>
>
> September 11th changed everything, we're told, and one of them was certainly
> the convenience of air travel. When I arrived at the Martha's Vineyard
> Regional Airport, a new multi-million dollar facility that has been in
> operation for less than two years, the first thing I noticed was that the
> airport's new parking lot is now closed.  The reason for this closure a new
> FAA security regulation, enacted in the wake of 9/11, which prohibits any
> parking with 300 feet of a passenger terminal.
>
>
>
> The FAA's limitation of airport parking, presumably designed to protect
> airport terminals from truck bombs, has disrupted parking at airports
> throughout the country. At Logan airport in Boston, for instance, more than
> 2000 parking spots built as part of Logan's billion-dollar expansion are now
> unusable. And in Augusta, Maine, the Hilltop Family Restaurant at the
> Augusta State Airport, was forced to close when it lost all of its 23
> reserved parking spaces located outside the terminal building.
>
>
>
> The friend who dropped me off, looked at the sign closing the parking lot
> and shook his head. Clearly, the closure was the result of some bureaucratic
> edict out of Washington that simply made no sense here. It's hard to
> conceive how the Martha's Vineyard airport could ever be the target of a
> truck bomb attack. After all, any truck bomb set off at the airport would
> have to be brought over on the ferry --- a ferry that itself would probably
> make a much better target for any would-be terrorist. But the FAA's new
> security measures don't allow airports any discretion in their enforcement;
> the airport manager in Augusta had obtained a three-week waiver for the
> Hilltop Restaurant, rolling back the parking restriction from 300 feet to
> 220, but that waiver expired on September 27th and the FAA refused to extend
> it. (Today the parking has finally been restored, but I'm told that the
> restaurant is still closed.)
>
>
>
> The terminal of the Martha' Vineyard Regional Airport felt like the set of a
> low-budget, understaffed movie. The only people I could see were a single
> clerk behind the Cape Air counter, a baggage checker, and the two soldiers
> dressed in fatigues. Because I had taken the bus down to the Vineyard the
> night before, I didn't have any bags to check. This turned out to be a huge
> problem---because I was carrying two laptop computers, four laptop
> batteries, a handheld PDA computer, a keyboard for the PDA, and a Swiss Army
> knife.
>
>
>
> Realizing that I couldn't take the knife onboard the aircraft, I surrendered
> it when I walked up to the inspection station. The ticket clerk came over to
> the security area and told me that she could hold it for a few days if I was
> going to be coming back. "If you want, we can also seal it in an envelope
> and ask the pilot if he will carry it for you," she offered.
>
>
>
> The electronics were another matter entirely. First I was made to turn on
> each laptop --- presumably to demonstrate that they were actually consumer
> electronics and not bombs. Then the laptops were x-rayed. Finally, the
> baggage inspector scrubbed down each of my laptops and the batteries with a
> white piece of fabric, then put the swatch into one of those fancy new
> machines that can somehow sniff out the nitrogen-containing compounds that
> are indicative of high explosives.
>
>
>
> I suppose that I'm glad that US airlines are now analyzing laptop batteries,
> which after all are a pretty easy place to hide C4 and other plastic
> explosives. On the other hand, the explosive devices that Ramzi Yousef had
> planed to use for his attacks against a dozen US airliners over the Pacific
> were to have been made without any nitrogen at all: according to reports,
> Yousef planned to use flashbulbs as the detonators, digital watches for
> timers, and a can of pressurized solvent vapor mixed with air for the
> explosive charge. There are also reports that the Semtex has been
> reformulated so that it is "odorless" to these mechanical sniffers --- and
> Czechoslovakia now admits that its Communist government sold 1,000 tons of
> Semtex to Libya's Col. Moammar Gadhafi, enough to bring down 5 million
> aircraft. All of these thoughts went through my mind; I nevertheless wisely
> decided to say nothing about the futility of sniffing for explosives.
>
>
>
> The laptop, batteries and my PDA made it through the inspections okay, but
> the guard was really nervous about the fold-up keyboard for my Palm. You
> see, the guard had orders that every piece of electronics had to be turned
> on; the keyboard has no switch or display. "I'm not sure that I can let you
> take this," the guard said. But after conferring with the ticket clerk and
> the two soldiers, he decided that it would be sufficient to x-ray the
> keyboard twice and test it several times with that fancy nitrogen-sniffing
> machine.
>
>
>
> The whole search took 30 minutes. When it was done, I joined the other two
> passengers out on the tarmac. We boarded the plane, and one of the other
> passengers sat in the co-pilot's seat. Had that passenger wanted, he could
> easily have crashed the Cessna 404 into a Boston office building on the
> approach to Logan. I've sat in the co-pilot's seat myself many times: the
> seat is so cramped that it's an effort not to touch the control yoke with
> your hands or knees! Presumably, the only thing that prevented the
> terrorists from hijacking the Cape Air flights is that there isn't a whole
> lot of damage you can do with a Cessna 404: they don't weigh that much and
> they don't carry a lot of fuel.
>
>
>
> * * *
>
>
>
> In the time that's passed since the September 11th attacks on New York and
> Washington, government and business leaders alike have been under tremendous
> pressure to improve security. Yet most of the security professionals that I
> have spoken with since the attacks have complained that the majority of
> these new measures --- while being tremendously inconvenient --- actually do
> little to improve security. What makes these measures all the more
> frustrating is the near universal unwillingness to discuss their
> appropriateness or the reasoning behind them.
>
>
>
> For example, shortly after the attacks Amtrak adopted a new policy requiring
> passengers to present a photo ID before purchasing a ticket or checking
> baggage. The policy seems better suited to combating credit-card fraud than
> finding actual terrorists. After all, Amtrak is only demanding to see photo
> IDs when tickets are purchased --- not when a rider actually gets on the
> train. Amtrak says that it has been provided by the FBI with a "watch list"
> of terrorist suspects, but nothing prevents a person who is not under
> surveillance from purchasing a dozen tickets and then giving these tickets
> to her terrorist friends. An Amtrak spokesperson said that the railroad is
> aware of the "loophole," but refused to comment any further.
>
>
>
> Government agencies are not the only organizations that are putting forth
> security rules that on their face seem impressive, but which actually do
> little to protect the nation.
>
>
>
> Some office buildings, for instance, have locked their unattended entrances
> and now require visitors to sign in --- some buildings even require visitors
> to show photo IDs. While these measures probably cut down on office theft,
> they won't deter terrorists, who are more likely to park truck bombs in
> basement garages or send biowarfare agents through the ventilation.
>
>
>
> And then there is the little matter of the guards themselves. "Guards never
> used to ask you to open your bag. Now they ask you to open your bag," says
> Howard Frank, an international security consultant based in Boca Raton,
> Florida. "The only thing is this --- I don't believe that they know what
> they are looking for."
>
>
>
> The typical security guard could spot a gun or a large knife --- assuming
> that the weapon was in plain view. But Frank, who oversaw the security
> planning at the Miami Dolphins' Pro Player's Stadium, says that the majority
> of security guards have no training in anti-terrorism. They wouldn't know
> how to recognize a concealed weapon, let alone a plastic explosive like
> Semtex. "I never call them guards; I call them gate openers. The true
> security guard is really hard to find."
>
>
>
> The inability to find the "true security guard" might be behind the closing
> of one of the most popular tourist destinations in Boston: the John Hancock
> Observatory, on the 60th floor of the John Hancock Tower in Boston's Back
> Bay. John Hancock Financial Services closed the facility on September 14th.
> ""Every year, more than 400,000 people, virtually all of them unknown to us,
> visit the Observatory," said John Heavey, Hancock General Director of
> Security. "Unfortunately, once they are inside, it is very difficult to
> control or limit their access to other parts of the building. That creates a
> significant security concern for our employees, tenants, and the
> public-at-large. Since there is no feasible way to fix this problem, the
> prudent thing to do is to close the Observatory."
>
>
>
> Frank says that many of the new security policies stem from officials'
> desire to present themselves as being in control of the situation and taking
> affirmative steps to protect the public --- even though the steps themselves
> are probably ineffectual.
>
>
>
> Consider again the FAA's ban on parking near terminals. After the flight
> from Martha's Vineyard to Boston, I called the FAA and asked spokesperson
> Paul Takemoto about the parking ban. Is the ban permanent? "Hard to say,"
> said Takemoto. "I would say [that it would be in force] for the foreseeable
> future."
>
>
>
> I asked Takemoto why the FAA had chosen 300 feet for its security radius,
> rather than 200 feet or 500 feet. Was 300 feet the standard in Europe? But
> Takemoto refused to comment on the rationale. "There is a lot about security
> that we can't discuss," he said. "The more people know about these measures,
> the more they can take steps to get around them."
>
>
>
> The FAA's parking ban affects literally millions of travelers. And the FAA's
> assertion that an informed public discussion on its security practices will
> weaken them is itself uninformed and possibly disingenuous. For more than a
> decade the US government made similar arguments over the need for secrecy in
> establishing policy of cryptographic technology, wiretaps, and other
> security-related matters. Yet every academic panel, policy making body and
> court that has examined these issues has concluded that an informed
> discussion can take place without jeopardizing national security --- indeed,
> our democratic system demands that such discussions occur.
>
>
>
> Clearly, the FAA is attempting to clamp down on airport security because
> airplanes were the instrumentality of the September 11th attacks. But it's
> important to remember that the 9/11 terrorists weren't trying to shut down
> the nation's aviation system --- that was merely a byproduct of their
> decision to use commercial airliners are flying bombs. The real targets were
> office buildings.
>
>
>
> "An airport terminal wouldn't be the highest priority target" of a terrorist
> with a truck bomb, says Christopher T. Marquet, a senior managing director
> with Kroll, one of the world's leading security companies. Instead,
> terrorists with truck bombs would probably take their weapons to more
> vulnerable targets --- like the basement garages of high-rises, as was done
> in the previous attack against the World Trade Center. And let's face it: if
> a terrorist really wants to set off a truck bomb at an airport terminal, the
> FAA's parking ban isn't going to make much of a difference. A terrorist bent
> on using a truck bomb to destroy an airline terminal can simply drive up
> their vehicle and detonate it, even though it means parking in a "no
>  parking" zone.
>
>
>
> Likewise, the soldiers in the airport terminal look impressive, but what
> good do they really do? The September 11th hijackings took place onboard
> aircraft, not at security checkpoints or waiting lounges. Had those soldiers
> been present in the airports on September 11th, they would have allowed the
> terrorists to board their planes: after all, the terrorists were paying
> passengers.
>
>
>
> So what security measures should people be taking? Security consultant Frank
> recently planned the security for an international exposition for the Miami
> World Trade Center: he hired a pair of certified bomb-sniffing dogs to check
> out the banquet halls before the guests were seated. He also arranged for
> the conference organizers to park their own cars next to the conference
> center, rather than leaving the spaces open to the public.
>
>
>
> Neil Drawas, a managing director of security at Kroll, says that many
> companies are locking the doors to their roofs, "shutting off ground level
> intakes and redirecting duct work up to the rooftops," he says. Such
> measures prevent a terrorist from throwing an open cylinder of chlorine gas
> into the air ducts, forcing the evacuation of the building (but probably not
> killing everybody inside).
>
>
>
> Most important, Drawas says, is employee training. "In the old days, the
> alarm would go off and people would say 'that's just a fire drill, I'm going
> to stay here and work.' "These days in New York there isn't a day that goes
> by when there aren't 30 or 40 fire drills. People are being evacuated and
> assembling at off-site locations and nobody is complaining about it."
>
>
>
> Before I left Martha's Vineyard, I asked the soldiers who were stationed at
> the airport how they liked their assignment. Overall, they said, it was
> okay. The government had rented them an apartment on the island. They didn't
> expect to see much action.
>
>
>
> Personally, I wish they were guarding the ferry.
>
>
>
>
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> --- end forwarded text
>
>
> --
> -----------------
> R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah () ibuc com>
> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
> "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
> [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
> experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
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