IP: Missile Defense Delusion Washpost

[David Farber <dave () farber net>]

Missile Defense Delusion

By Joseph R. Biden Jr.

Wednesday, December 19, 2001; Page A39

Washington being what it is, the idea that politics and ideology should be 
set aside for a higher purpose may seem a quaint, naive sentiment. But few 
would argue with the statement that the ultimate test in deciding to scrap 
a treaty that has helped keep the peace for 30 years is whether it makes 
the United States more or less secure. In that light, President Bush's 
decision to unilaterally walk away from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
is a serious mistake.

No one doubts we live in a dangerous world and that our enemies are 
ruthless. But a "Star Wars" defense, assuming it could be made to work, 
would address only what the Joint Chiefs of Staff argue is the least likely 
threat to our national security.

One of the lessons we should have learned from the devastating attack of 
Sept. 11 is that terrorists determined to do this nation harm can employ a 
wide variety of means, and that weapons of mass destruction -- chemical, 
biological or even nuclear -- need not arrive on the tip of an 
intercontinental ballistic missile with a return address. That's why the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff argue that an ICBM launch ranks last on the "Threat 
Spectrum," while terrorist attacks constitute the greatest potential threat 
to our national security.

The administration's obsession with missile defense -- with a price tag in 
excess of a quarter-trillion dollars for the layered program on the 
president's wish list -- is doubly troubling because of the attention and 
resources being diverted from critical efforts to address genuine threats. 
While the president says nonproliferation is a high priority, his actions 
speak louder. Notwithstanding promises of new efforts, the fiscal year 2002 
budget that he requested would have cut more than $100 million out of 
programs designed to corral Russia's "loose nukes," provide help that 
Russia has requested to destroy its chemical weapons stockpile and prevent 
unemployed Russian scientists from selling their services to terrorist 
organizations.

Only when it comes to missile defense is the administration pushing hard. 
But nothing could be more damaging to global nonproliferation efforts than 
to go forward with Star Wars. Russia has enough offensive weapons to 
overwhelm any system we could devise, so the real issue is what happens in 
China and throughout Asia.

China currently possesses no more than two dozen ICBMs. Our own 
intelligence services estimate that moving forward with national missile 
defense could trigger a tenfold increase in China's expansion of its 
nuclear capability. And that doesn't take into account likely Chinese 
behavior if an arms race ensues, something many experts argue is inevitable 
when both India and Pakistan respond as expected by ratcheting up their 
nuclear programs.

Thus, the cost of unilaterally walking away from the ABM Treaty and forging 
ahead with national missile defense includes not only dangerous neglect of 
the real threats we face but the likelihood that we will unleash a new arms 
race that will create a nuclearized Asia.

Finally, Sept. 11 clarified the fact that the world is in transition from 
old Cold War alignments to new patterns of conflict and cooperation. 
Managing such a transition wisely will determine whether we take advantage 
of new opportunities or whether we allow ideological zealotry to control 
strategic doctrine.

Al Qaeda's eager search for weapons of mass destruction highlights the 
importance of broad nonproliferation efforts and our need to work in 
concert with like-minded partners. The president skillfully worked to build 
a coalition to fight international terrorism. That success has created an 
environment for a changed world with the potential for old enemies to come 
together. Out of the Sept. 11 tragedy we have opportunities to pivot toward 
promising new relationships, following up on the cooperation of the moment 
with a realignment of forces for decades to come.

Indeed, there is some cause for hope. The United States and Russia are 
making real progress to reduce strategic offensive forces. Secretary of 
State Colin Powell has indicated we are relatively close to a formal 
agreement in this regard -- presumably one that binds our countries and 
provides for verification and transparency.

So far, the administration's conduct of the war on terrorism has shown 
discipline, perseverance and an ability to forge international consensus. 
But the war is only three months old, and the new patterns of cooperation 
and support are young and fragile. We must nourish them and build on them, 
rather than taking unilateral foreign policy moves that will make us less 
secure.

Today the doors to international cooperation and American leadership are 
wide open. But if we slam them shut too often, we will lose the best chance 
in a generation to work with allies to build a more secure future.

The writer is a Democratic senator from Delaware and chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee.

© 2001 The Washington Post Company

For archives see:
http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/