IP: Re: If we had key escrow, Scarfo wouldn't be a problem

[David Farber <dave () farber net>]

> Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2001 16:31:42 -0500
> To: Declan McCullagh <declan () well com>, cryptography () wasabisystems com
> From: Rick Smith at Secure Computing <rick_smith () securecomputing com>
>
>
> Declan McCullagh quoted the Post article:
>
> > http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A55606-2001Aug9.html
> > "...Although agreeing that surveillance should be done under strict 
> > guidelines, Baker said that "to a degree, the privacy groups got us into 
> > this by arguing that there should be no limits on encryption, and the 
> > police have to deal with it."
>
> I suppose it's true that "privacy groups," or perhaps our culturally and 
> legally acknowledged right to privacy, drove the police to use keystroke 
> monitoring by eliminating key escrow. But it seems obvious to me, a 
> non-lawyer, that keystroke monitoring is very similar in behavior and 
> result to planting a tape recorder, and I assume that requires a wiretap 
> order, too. Besides, I don't think we would have eliminated a court case 
> by using key escrow: at best, we'd exchange one case for a different one.
>
> While people only mentioned it occasionally, this alternative to key 
> escrow always seemed blindingly obvious. When documents like the NRC's 
> CRISIS report recommended that police and intel organizations rely on 
> something other than key escrow or weak crypto, the only other way to go 
> was to compromise the privacy of the endpoints. As they say: "First, look 
> for the plaintext." And that's where the plaintext shows up.
>
> I hope Baker wasn't thinking that this troublesome (for some folks) court 
> battle could have been avoided by using key escrow. It's likely that the 
> first use of evidence collected through a key escrow activated wiretap 
> would have also led to some sort of courtroom test.
>
> Personally, I think things are moving in the right direction for two 
> reasons. First, the technical reason: despite flashy demos and partial 
> deployments, I seriously doubt that elaborate systems like the Escrowed 
> Encryption Standard are viable. The engineering is costly and tricky, and 
> it's piggy-backed atop technology that we barely understand anyway. (For 
> those of you who think cryptographic protocols are a solved problem in 
> practice, check out the current discussions on the IPSEC mailing list 
> about replacing IKE, or check out well-known attacks on DVDs, GSM, PPTP, 
> etc.). So we've saved ourselves a world of engineering hurt by dodging the 
> key escrow bullet. We have enough trouble making the simpler things work well.
>
> The second reason this is a good direction is because it's best for 
> society at large to have strong crypto. <preaching to the choir mode 
> enabled> Yes, it increases the risks and costs of legally accepted data 
> interception by driving it to the endpoints. It makes police work harder, 
> the same way the Miranda warnings and various other civil liberties 
> actions have done so. On the other hand, it makes the information 
> superhighway safer overall, by reducing the opportunities for sniffing and 
> fraud, which will lower costs and free up resources for other things. 
> Maybe it's just a philosophical quirk of mine, but I generally think it's 
> better for everyone when things cost less.
>
> Rick.
> smith () securecomputing com
> Pre-order "Authentication" at Amazon, see http://www.visi.com/crypto/
>
>
>
>
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