IP: dns document from the House Web Site

[Dave Farber <farber () cis upenn edu>]

http://www.house.gov/science/hearing.htm#Basic_Research


http://www.house.gov/science/charter_br_03-31.htm


The Domain Name System: Where Do We Go From Here? March 31, 1998


COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BASIC RESEARCH
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY
HEARING CHARTER


The Domain Name System:
Where Do We Go From Here?
Tuesday, March 31, 1998
2:00 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.
2318 Rayburn House Office Building




PURPOSE


On Tuesday, March 31, 1998, the Subcommittee on Basic Research and the
Subcommittee on Technology will hold a joint hearing on the Domain Name
System (DNS). The focus of this hearing will be an examination the
Clinton Administration$B%f(Js "Green Paper" proposal concerning the
transition of the Internet$B%f(Js Domain Name System to private sector
control.


BACKGROUND


Today$B%f(Js Internet is an outgrowth of U.S. government investment in
packet-switching technology and communications networks carried out
under agreements with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) and the National Science Foundation (NSF). As a legacy, major
components of the Internet$B%f(Js Domain Name System are still performed by
or subject to agreements with agencies of the U.S. government. Due to
the explosive commercial growth of the Internet, a consensus has
emerged that further government involvement with the gay-to-day
operations of the Internet is inappropriate and that the DNS should be
transferred to the private sector. Adding urgency to this situation is
the fact that the two major government agreements that are critical to
the Internet are near expiration.


The Administration has published a proposal, known as the "Green Paper"
which outlines a process for transferring the DNS to the private sector
before these contracts expire. In addition, a group of Internet users,
known as CORE, has also published its own proposal.


How the Domain Name System Works


Computers on the Internet are identified through a numbering scheme
that designates their location on the network. To provide users with an
easy-to-use addressing convention that corresponds to the specific
location numbers, the Domain Name System (DNS) was created. Domain
names are broken into layers. Top level domains (TLDs) represent either
an individual country (e.g. jp = Japan) or a generic grouping (gTLDs),
(i.e., .com, .gov, .edu, .net, .org, and .mil). The second level domain
name that appears to the left of the gTLD in the address provides the
specific name of the entity (e.g., cnn.com).


Initially, the Department of Defense was responsible for the early
versions of the Internet and the Defense Information Systems Agency$B%f(Js
Network Information Center (DISA NIC) registered domain names.
Subsequently, non-military registration was supported by NSF because of
their role in the civilian NSFNET and related Internet activities. In
1992, NSF put out a solicitation for network information services


managers for the NSFNET, including provision of registration services.
The result was a five year cooperative agreement between NSF and
Network Solutions Inc. (NSI), a Herndon, Virginia-based engineering and
management consulting firm. The cooperative agreement between NSF and
NSI is due to expire at the end of March 1998, although it can, and
probably will be extended up to the end of September of 1998.


NSI registers all the second level domain names under .com, .edu, .org,
and .net. It does this by matching each domain name to a specific IP
number. The IP numbers are provided by the Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (IANA) which currently is funded by DARPA through a contract
with the University of Southern California's Information Science
Institute.


IANA controls the allocation of all of the Internet$B%f(Js IP numbers. The
IP number and the domain name are maintained in nameserver computers
located at various points throughout the Internet. A set of nine master
root servers provide daily updates to the data base and serve as the
pointers to nameserver computers in the seeking the location of an
address contained in the data base.


IANA$B%f(Js duties also include coordinating the assignment and use of
various Internet protocol parameters, managing the IP address space,
and managing specific domain names issues. Its specific role in domain
names involves making technical decisions on the location of root
servers, assessing the qualifications of applicants to manage country
code top level domains, and evaluating additions to established top
level domains that may be proposed. The contract between DARPA and IANA
expires at the end of September 1998.


Moving DNS to the Private Sector


The fact that both the NSI contract and the IANA contract are near
expiration has caused a great deal of concern about the overall
management and stability of the Internet. In September of 1997 the
Subcommittee on Basic Research held two hearings which focused on this
problem.


Prior to the September 1997 hearings, a group of Internet users had
been meeting in an attempt to draft a proposal on how to transfer the
DNS to the private sector. The goal of this self-generated group$B%`(Jknown
as the International Ad Hoc Committee (IHAC)$B%`(Jwas to write a proposal
that would gain the support of the entire Internet community. IHAC
eventually renamed itself as the Policy Oversight Committee (POC) of
the Internet Council of Registrars (CORE), and published the proposal
now known as the CORE proposal.


However, when it became clear that their proposal had not gained wide-
spread support among the Internet Community, the Administration set up
an Inter-Agency Working Group, which, in time, published the Green
Paper in an attempt to build consensus on this issue.


TWO PROPOSALS FOR MOVING DNS TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR


It is important to note that the Administration and CORE plans are
similar in many aspects. For example, a priority of both plans is
maintaining the stability of the Internet. The main differences between
the two plans concern (1) how the new DNS should be governed, and (2)
whether the domain name registries should be controlled by a single


non-profit entity or by a set of competing for-profit corporations.


It is also important to keep in mind that these two proposals are only
proposals and that the final plan may well contain elements of both the
Administration$B%f(Js Green Paper and the CORE proposal.


The following is a brief explanation of the domain name governance
issue and the issue concerning the coporate nature of the DNS
registries. Following that explanation is a description of the
Administration$B%f(Js Green Paper proposal and a description of the CORE
proposal.


Internet Governance:


Two of the main concerns of DNS governance are (1) how to ensure that
the governance of the DNS can evolve as the Internet evolves, and (2)
how to ensure that all the key stakeholders in the Internet have a seat
at the table. Proponents of the Green Paper argue that the governing
body established its terms would be more open than that established
under the CORE proposal. The Green Paper$B%f(Js governing body would have a
board of directors that includes individuals from the regional IP
Registries, members of the Internet Architecture Board, several members
from an Internet users association, and the CEO of the new governing
entity. This new non-profit organization would handle all aspects of
Internet$B%f(Js Domain Name System, including the functions of IANA.


Critics of the Green Paper argue that appropriately representative
bodies already exist and that those institutions have already
established consensus-based mechanisms to ensure diverse and
international input on decisions concerning the Internet. Under the
CORE proposal, the registries of the DNS would be governed by a Policy
Oversight Committee (POC) made up of various Internet organizations.
However, the one criticism of the CORE proposal is that the POC is too
exclusive and does not properly represent all the key players in terms
of governing the Internet. An additional complaint is that the CORE
proposal does not address the functions of IANA.


The Registry Issue:


To understand the differences between the two proposals on registries,
it should be kept in mind that the Internet$B%f(Js Domain Name System is
hierarchical. At the base are registrars$B%`(Jfor-profit companies which
register domain names for clients. Above the registrars are the actual
registries, such as .com, .edu, and all the national domain names.
These registries are the actual files of domain names. Presently NSI is
a registrar of domain names and also controls the registries of .com,
.edu and .org. Right now, anyone who wants a .com, .edu or .org domain
name must go through NSI.


One of the major differences between the two plans is who or what
organization will control the registries once the DNS is transferred to
the private sector. The Administration$B%f(Js Green Paper would allow
several separate for-profit companies to control an individual registry
in the same way that NSI controls .com, .edu, and .org today. Under the
Green Paper proposal, NSI and several other companies would have
natural monopolies over their registries and would compete amongst
themselves for customers. The customers would be the various


registering companies. As a precaution against favoritism, the
companies managing the registries would have to create a fire-wall
between their registry functions and their registrar functions.


The CORE proposal, however, would establish one non-profit shared
registry containing all the individual registries. Under their
proposal, NSI would lose the .com, .edu and .org registries (these
registries would become part of the non-profit shared-registry) and NSI
would compete, as a registrar, for business against all the other
registrars (approx. 100) without the benefit of controlling a registry.
The CORE group argues that registries are largely administrative, back-
office operations that offer little in added-value for customers, and
therefore there is no need for competition at the registry level. The
Green Paper argues that only through the profit-motive and competition
among various for-profit companies will the money be generated to
maintain the registries that will allow the Internet to succeed.


The Administration acknowledges that under its registry-scheme,
"switching costs and lock-in issues" could arise in instances in which
users wish to change from one registry company to another. Once it
becomes widely known, for example, that a certain business can be found
under the .store Domain Name, the operator of that register could
increase the price charged to the locked-in company. Moreover, the cost
of switching to a different company may lead to a situation in which it
is difficult to move from one registry to another. On balance, however,
the Administration believes that the benefits of competition among the
registries outweigh the possible burdens caused by this issue. The
Federal Trade Commission is working on this issue and has submitted
comments to the Commerce Department on this topic.


Details of the Administration$B%f(Js "Green Paper" Proposal:


On February 20, 1998, the Administration published in the Federal
Register a proposed rule and request for comment on a proposal to
transfer the DNS to the private sector. The public comment period
concludes on March 23, 1998.


In brief, the "Green Paper" proposes the following:


  1. The US government should gradually end its role in the Internet
and transfer the role of managing the domain name system to a not-for-
profit corporation controlled by a board of directors comprised of
members representing various Internet interest groups.


  1. Five new Top Level Domains (TLDs), comparable to .com or .edu,
should be established.


  1. The business of registering domain names should be market-driven.
This would be accomplished by having several for-profit companies
competing among themselves at the Registry level. Under this plan NSI
would continue to control .com, .org. and .edu, and a set of other
companies would individually control competing new registries, such as
.law, .firm or .shop. As for NSF$B%f(Js agreement with NSI, the Green Paper
suggests it phasing out by the end of September, 1998.


The Green Paper states that any changes to the Domain Name System must
ensure the following four principles:




  1. Stability: The transfer to the private sector must not disrupt
current operations. The stability of the Internet must be the highest
priority.


  1. Competition: The Internet succeeds because it is decentralized.
Where possible, market mechanisms that support competition and consumer
choice should drive the technical management of the Internet.


  1. Private, Bottom-up Coordination: Certain technical management
functions require coordination. In these cases, responsible private
sector action is preferable to government control.


  1. Representation: Management of the Internet should reflect the
diversity of its users and their needs.


Concerning the new governing corporation, the report proposes the
establishment of a not-for-profit entity that would, in effect, take
the place of IANA, and have the following authority to:


  1. set policy for the assignments of IP numbers and Internet
addresses,


  1. oversee the operation of the root server system;


  1. oversee the addition of new TLDs; and


  1. ensure universal connectivity on the Internet.


More information about the "Green Paper" can be found on the web at
www.ntia.doc.gov" under the "New" section.


Although the Green paper has found supporters, it has also its critics.
They complain that the time-frame under the Green Paper is too long and
that the Green Paper$B%f(Js registry scheme would, in effect, create a set
of government-backed for-profit monopolies. In addition, various
Internet interest groups, especially European users, complain that
there is not sufficient international control of the Internet. Although
they concede that the Internet was initially funded by U.S. taxpayers,
they argue that the explosive growth of the Internet is due to the
World Wide Web, which was developed in Europe. In turn, they argue that
the "international Internet" should be governed by an international
body.


Details of the CORE Proposal:


A group of international users published their own proposal for the
administration and management of TLDs in February of 1997. Their
proposal recommends, among other things, the creation of seven new TLDs
and would create a Council of Registrars (CORE), a nonprofit
organization incorporated in Geneva, Switzerland. The location of CORE
has been criticized.


CORE has already signed a contract with a services company to build and
operate a new Internet Domain Name Shared Registry. The CORE proposal
recommends that all TLDs, including those maintained by NSI, be shared
and that all existing registrars join CORE. In sharp contrast to the
Green Paper, the main registry under the CORE plan would be a single
non-profit entity and would control .com, .firm and all other TLD$B%f(Js.
The non-profit would, in turn, be governed by the Policy Oversight
Committee.


In developing this proposal, CORE$B%f(Js major concern was limiting the
influence the US will have over an international Internet. They argue
that only CORE can accomplish the goals outlined in the Green Paper,
and they further argue that adding up to 100 new TLDs would not
overwhelm the system. The idea of establishing a large number of new
TLDs, however, has raised serious trademark issues. More information


about the CORE proposal can be found on the Internet at "www.gtld- mou.org.
mou.org."


ADDITIONAL ISSUES:


Trademarks:


Another major issue concerns trademark disputes over domain names.
Domain name registrations are available on a first-come, first-served
basis. The fastest growing number of registered domain names is in .com
because of the explosion of businesses offering products and services
on the Internet. The situation has been aggravated by some people
registering certain domain names in the hope that they might be able to
sell them to companies that place a high value on them, and certain
companies registering the names of all their product lines as
protection against others registering them. Many trademark owners are
concerned about the impact that new gTLD$B%f(Js would have on their
trademarks. Some trademark owners worry that they would have to
register their name under every gTLD in order to protect their
trademark rights.


NSI Intellectual Infrastructure Fund Issue:


In 1995, NSI was authorized through an amendment to the cooperative
agreement to charge $100 to register a domain name and $50 a year to
maintain it in the database. The continued high growth rate of domain
registration requests has raised questions about the funds NSI is
collecting on the basis of this agreement. Seventy percent of the
monies collected was retained by NSI to cover its costs; the remaining
30 percent was deposited in an government account for the purpose of
investing in the "Intellectual Infrastructure" of the Internet.


As the number of domain name registrations has exploded well beyond
expectation, projections of the amount in the account were well below
the actual level, which may reach $60 million by mid-1998. In the FY
1999 NSF appropriations bill, the Congress allocated $23 million from
this fund to the Next Generation Internet Program. A lawsuit was filed
based on the argument that the 30 percent of the fee that was set aside
was an unauthorized tax on Internet users. As a result, the $23 million
cannot be allocated until the suit is settled. Recently the decision
was made to discontinue collecting this fee as of April 1, 1998.
However, the question of what to do with this money remains unanswered.


WITNESSES


Witnesses for the hearing include: Mr. Ira Magaziner, Senior Advisor to
the President for Policy Development, Department of Commerce; Mr. Jim
Courter, President, IDT Corporation and Spokesman for the Internet
Council of Registrars (CORE); Ms. Barbara Dooley, Executive Director,
Commercial Internet Exchange Association; Dr. Robert E. Kahn, President
and CEO, Corporation for National Research Initiatives; and Professor
David Farber, The Alfred Fitler Moore Professor of Telecommunication
Systems, Director, Distributed Computer Laboratory, University of
Pennsylvania.


END