THE POLITICAL VICTORY OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY... part 2 of 2

[David Farber <farber () central cis upenn edu>]

October Kosyrev signaled a dramatic change in the
rhetoric of Russian foreign policy by stating that Russia
would strive to create effective peacekeeping forces as a
means of dealing with regional conflicts in the former
Soviet Union as well as in other parts of the world.
Kozyrev said Russia was particularly interested in using
such forces in the "near abroad", highlighting the danger
of "losing geopolitical positions that took centuries to
conquer."(17)


     Under the political realm of the doctrine, a number
of key responsibilities of the state are articulated.  It
is important to note that a strong chain of command is
emphasized, but that there is no guarantee of civilian
authority over the armed forces.(18)  Yet the state is
obligated to fulfill a number of tasks.  According to the
doctrine, this includes:  maintaining the country's
defense potential at a level appropriate to existing and
potential military threats with consideration for the
economic potential of the country and the availability of
manpower resources;  to qualitatively improve the armed
forces and other troops and ensure their combat and
mobilization readiness guaranteeing the country's
military security;  allocate as a priority appropriations
for the most promising defense, scientific, and
technological development projects in terms of ensuring
the security and developing the economy of the country;
ensuring the rational conversion of military production;
and ensuring the readiness of organs of state
administration and the country's economy to mobilize
forces and weapons during a period of threat and wartime.


     The doctrine maintains that the armed forces cannot
be used in the interests of separate groups and
individuals, parties, and public associations.  However,
it qualifies this by asserting that the armed forces will
interdict possible provocations and encroachments on the
security of citizens and the sovereignty, territorial
integrity, and other vital interests of the Russian
Federation.(19)  This aspect of the doctrine was the
result of a controversial last-minute amendment to the
draft.  It gives the military a legal right to intervene
in the domestic political affairs of the Russian
Federation in conjunction with troops from the Ministry
of Internal Affairs.  It is very important to note that
this amendment came into force at almost the exact same
time as did an amendment to the draft Constitution
(approved by Yeltsin on 3 November) forbidding the right
of secession of regions from the Russian Federation.(20)


     The final responsibility of the state is to assure
the social protection of the armed forces.  The doctrine
requires the government to provide adequate funding for
the protection of the serviceman as an individual and of
their families.  As this is a very sensitive area in
which the government may not be able to deliver as
promised, the doctrine leaves the stipulation for this
open to interpretations of laws of the Russian Federation
to be adopted by the new parliament elected on 12
December.  The doctrine also charges the state with the
implementation of measures to raise the prestige of
military service.  This includes the creation and
improvement of a system of military-patriotic upbringing
and pre-draft training; the shaping in citizens of moral
and psychological readiness to protect the fatherland;
the creation and improvement of a system for the
upbringing of armed forces servicemen and other troops;
and cooperation between military command and control
organs and state organs and social and religious
organizations.  These stipulations are designed to
encourage propaganda efforts on the part of the state to
address the manpower problem in the armed forces.  It is
worth noting that while this sounds dogmatic, such
efforts will be necessary if the armed forces are to move
successfully toward a mixed system of conscripts and
professional soldiers.


     The military foundations of the doctrine provide for
the organizational development of the armed forces to be
implemented through the year 2000.  This section draws
attention to the possible nature of military conflicts in
present-day conditions, the strategic aims of the use of
military force, the tasks of the state in the defense
sphere, and the procedures for - and the main aims and
principles behind - the organizational development
of the armed forces and other troops.  The doctrine views
the likelihood of a world nuclear or conventional war,
although not eliminated completely, as having lessened
considerably.  Rather, local wars and armed conflicts
based on social, political, territorial, religious,
national-ethnic, and other conflicts pose the main danger
to stability and peace.(21)  Thus the main aim
for the use of Russian Federation armed forces in armed
conflicts and local wars is the prompt localization of a
conflict and the suppression of military operations at
the earliest possible stage.  The operational goal would
be to create the preconditions for settling a conflict
peacefully on conditions that accord with the interests
of the Russian Federation.  In the unlikely case of
large-scale wars the doctrine notes the need to train the
armed forces to conduct both defensive and offensive
operations through the massive use of present and future
weapons in any scenario where war is conducted.


     The doctrine does not specify any one category or
method of waging combat operations.  Rather, it gears
command personnel and staffs to choosing, when repulsing
aggression, precisely those forms, methods, and means of
armed struggle that accord with its laws and the
conditions of the prevailing situation.  The Russian
Federation places a high priority on the organization and
development of mobile military elements capable of being
rapidly redeployed to certain regions within the shortest
possible time.  They are designed to reinforce peacetime
groups of troops in strategic regions and theaters of
military operations, perform with them tasks in local and
regional conflicts, and also ensure the deployment of
reserves.(22)


     There is no specification of manpower aside from a
goal of establishing an organized deployment for the
Russian armed forces by the end of 1996.  The doctrine
does assert that the reduction of the numerical strength
of the armed forces should proceed within sensible limits
and with an objective toward attaining a workable mixed
system of conscripts and volunteers.  The current
manpower is about 2.3 million or more.  According to
numerous reports, 1.5 million is the goal for a mixed
system of staffing the military.  However, on 10 June
1994, President Yeltsin felt it necessary to criticize
publicly the military for not moving fast enough to
reduce manpower during a major Kremlin news
conference.(23)  The doctrine specifies that details for
implementing the manpower and military elements of the
doctrine are to be worked out and implemented through the
year 2000 and should be adapted with respect to the
current military, political, and economic situation at
the given time.


     The final aspect of the doctrine addresses the
military technical sphere of the armed forces.  The main
aim of this aspect is to equip and supply the armed
forces and other troops in a timely fashion with
effective arms systems, military and special equipment,
and property in quantities necessary and adequate for the
guaranteed defense of the vital interests of society and
state.  This section also establishes the main avenues
for the development of defense industry potential and
military technical cooperation with foreign countries
including supplying foreign countries with export of
weapons and military hardware, military technologies,
etc, in accordance with the interests of the Russian
Federation.  This includes maintaining the country's
expert potential in the sphere of conventional weapons
and military hardware at the necessary level.


THE STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE FOR THE WEST


     The new Russian Military Doctrine corresponds with a
number of foreign and domestic policy changes since the
events of 3-4 October 1993 to confirm a renewed stature
of the military within Russian politics.  The two main
principles behind current foreign policy objectives -
stressing Russia's global stature as a "great power"  and
reasserting Russian influence into its "near abroad" -
are both key elements of the doctrine.  However, this
stature is not commensurate to its capabilities of the
armed forces and is not currently a substantive threat to
the West or to the Yeltsin regime.  Yeltsin will likely
find himself having to balance military interests with
the reality that the armed forces of Russia remain in
disarray and that the new military doctrine is not a
panacea.  The Russian military has the capacity
to attain all of the long-term improvements it seeks.
Yet like the rest of Russian society, that will depend
largely on the improvement of the economic, political,
and social situation in the country.


     The challenge facing the West is to help the Russian
Federation and its armed forces confront problems through
western institutions of democracy, the free-market, the
peaceful resolution of disputes, civilian authority over
the armed forces, etc,.  The strategic imperative is to
help Russia and its armed forces solve internal problems
in a way that keeps them facing peacefully West.  This
can be done by increasing cooperation and partnership
with the Russian military at multiple levels and -
where appropriate - granting direct assistance with
social problems confronting servicemen such as in the
area of housing construction.  Most of the more public
confrontational views toward the West on issues ranging
from NATO expansion to joint U.S.\Russian military
maneuvers have come from the Parliament and not the
military.  However, so long as the military remains in
social disarray, it remains susceptible to appeals from
the more zealous members of Yeltsin's opposition.


     It is of paramount importance that the West act
quickly to ensure Russian participation in qualitative
applications of cooperation and partnership at all levels
of the political, economic, and military spheres.
Russia's signing of NATO's Partnership for Peace is a
very positive step in the right direction.  However, it
may be necessary for the West to articulate very clear
standards for acceptable Russian behavior in the near
abroad.  In doing so, the West must maintain a level
of humility and understanding with regard to the culture
of Russia and particularly its armed forces which is a
proud one and continues to view itself as a major power
despite its economic catastrophe.  By emphasizing the
benefits of cooperation at all levels with the West, it
is probable that Russia will continue to remain a
comfortable partner if not ally.  Should these steps
fail in conjunction with a continued decline of the
social conditions within the armed forces then it is
possible that the end military and political result may
be far removed from the democratic and peaceful Russia
that the West hopes to encourage.






NOTES


1.Moscow Russian Television and Dubl Networks.  17
October 1993. In FBIS-SOV-93-201.  Page 48.


2.Krasnaya Zvezda.  19 August 1993.  In FBIS-SOV-93-160.
Page 27.


3.The New York Times.  28 November 1993.  Page 19.
According to an Interfax report on 23 November 1993, in
Moscow, only 32.5% of the required number of conscripts
were inducted.  RFE\RL Daily Reports.  24 November 1993.


4.Moscow Russian Television Network.  7 August 1993.  In
FBIS-SOV-93-155.  Page 24.


5.IBID.  In a 27 November interview with Le Figaro,
Deputy Defense Minister Andrei Kokoshin observed that
currently the military is building more housing units
than were built in the last years of the USSR.  However
of the 80 000 homes initially planned for 1993, only 65
000 have been built.  In the interview Kokoshin asserted
that "...special attention must be paid to the armed
forces.  Otherwise the army is likely to be transformed
from a factor of stability into a factor of instability."
Le Figaro.  27 November 1993.  In FBIS-SOV-93-228. Page
43.


6.Krasnaya Zvezda.  10 August 1993.  In FBIS-SOV-93-153.
Page 31.


7.Rossiyskiye Vesti.  31 August 1993.  In
FBIS-SOV-93-168.  Page 25.


8.Rossiyskaya Gazeta.  11 August 1993.  In
FBIS-SOV-93-154.  Page 30.


9.Nezavisimaya Gazeta.  7 August 1993.  In
FBIS-SOV-93-151.  Page 34.


10.During the visit, Yeltsin observed a number of key
elite forces.  he viewed exercises conducted by the
Kantemir Tank Division and familiarized himself with its
300 tanks and 250 armored vehicles.  He also visited the
119th Parachute and Air Assault Regiment, which had been
withdrawn from Lithuania in December 1992.  According to
Moscow Television, the special weapons and training of
the air assault troops were shown to Yeltsin in "all
their diversity."  After viewing the demonstration by the
air assault forces, Yeltsin said:  "Excellent marks for
the display, and I would ask you not to argue with the
president, especially not with the supreme
commander-in-chief."  Yeltsin also promised to make a
monthly visit to a military facility in order to increase
his understanding of the concerns of the armed forces.
Moscow Russian Television Network.  31 August 1993.  In
FBIS-SOV-93-168. Pages 21-22.


11.See Grachev, Pavel (1993) "Drafting a New Russian
Military Doctrine:  Guidelines for the Establishment of
the Russian Armed Forces."  NATO's Sixteen Nations.  Vol.
38, No. 2; 1993.  Also see Voyennaia mysl, no. 6.  RFE/RL
Daily Report.  20 July 1993. According to Col. General
Valeriy Mironov during the course of the drafting
process, the various working groups received
approximately 11 000 proposals.  Krasnaya Zvezda.  26
November 1993.  In FBIS-SOV-93-228.


12.Felgengauer, Pavel (1993) "Military Doctrine:  The
Defense Ministry Wins a Closed Contest."  Moscow
Segodnya.  9 October 1993.  In FBIS-SOV-93-195.  Pages
60-61.


13.In Moscow Segodnya.  9 October 1993.  In
FBIS-SOV-93-195.  Pages 60-61.  Indeed Felgengauer
asserts that the previous draft, "according to the
authors, has value merely as literary material."


14.Kommersant-Daily.  19 October 1993.  In
FBIS-SOV-93-201.  Page 49.


15.Rossiyskiye Vesti.  18 November 1993.  In
FBIS-SOV-92-222-S. Pages 1-11.


16.The doctrine does articulate specific guidelines for
the maintenance and command and control of nuclear
weapons.  Any attempt to interfere with this process
would be considered a direct military threat to Russia.


17.Izvestia.  8 October 1993.  RFE/RL Daily Report.  9
October 1993.


18.The failure to assure that the Minister of Defense
will be a civilian appointed by the President and
approved by the Parliament is designed to assure the
hierarchy of "one man command" within the armed forces.
With a general in the top post, there can be no question
of military command and control.  However, there is a
danger that the only civilian check against the Minister
of Defense is the President under the new constitution.
Article 83 section (h) of the new Constitution of
the Russian Federation approved on 12 December 1993
guarantees that only the President approves the military
doctrine of the Russian Federation.  Section (k) of
Article 83 states that it is the responsibility of the
President to appoint and remove the high command of the
armed forces and that in a time of conflict the President
can introduce martial law.  According to the new
constitution the powers of the Federal
Assembly-Parliament of the Russian Federation are limited
to confirming the edicts of the President in these areas
in a non-binding way.  Rossiyskaya Gazeta.  10 November
1993.  FBIS-SOV-93-216.  Pages 18-32.


19.  The doctrine identifies the main internal sources of
military threats as being illegal activity by
nationalists, separatists, or other organizations which
is aimed at destabilizing the situation in the Russian
Federation or violating its territorial integrity;
attempts to overthrow the constitutional system by force;
attacks on nuclear power, chemical or biological
production facilities; the creation of illegal armed
formations; the growth of organized crime; attacks
on military facilities; and the illegal distribution of
weapons inside the territory of the Russian Federation.


20.In his press conference, Defense Minister Grachev
asserted that this aspect of the doctrine was not a last
minute amendment and that recent events had only
confirmed that the drafting process had been proven
right.  Grachev did not specify who decides that armed
forces need to be used inside the Russian Federation or
to stop mass disturbances.  Indeed his response to
the question of who decides was a terse "not me."


21.In his press conference Defense Minister Grachev
pointed to current conflicts in the Balkans,
Nagorno-Karabakh, the Dniester Region of Moldova,
Abkhazia, and Tajikistan as specific examples.


22.It is likely that implementation of this element of
the doctrine would result in violations or pressures to
rework the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe by the
Russian Federation especially in the Caucasus.


23.At this news conference, President Yeltsin asserted
that the size of the military was 3 million though
Grachev has maintained that it is around 2.3 million.  On
the same day, Interfax reported that by 1 October 1994
the military would be reduced to 1.0 million.  In his
press conference, Yeltsin suggested that if 40 trillion
roubles (20 billion dollars) expenditure for the armed
forces was not sufficient, that the military could make
more assertive cutbacks of its own.








                 -------------------------


Sean Kay is a specialist in European security, NATO
policy, and post-Soviet affairs at the University of
Massachusetts at Amherst.  He has been a Research
Assistant at the North Atlantic Assembly and has written
and published a number of articles addressing the future
of NATO and on Russian foreign and military policy.


Sean Kay
Department of Political Science
University of Massachusetts at Amherst
Amherst MA
01003
Tel:  (413) 545-0410
Fax:  (413) 545-3349
EMAIL:  SKAY () POLSCI UMASS EDU


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