THE POLITICAL VICTORY OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY... part 1 of 2 [I found this very

[David Farber <farber () central cis upenn edu>]

Stan Przybylinski, Senior Member of the Technical Staff
Industrial Technology Institute, P.O. Box 1485, Ann Arbor, MI 48106
Internet: smp () iti org  (313) 769-4517   FAX: (313) 769-4064






     THE POLITICAL VICTORY OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY:
    ASSESSING THE IMPACT ON THE NEW MILITARY DOCTRINE


                       by Sean Kay
             Department of Political Science
          University of Massachusetts - Amherst


         (copywrite December 1993 and June 1994)


   * This article does not necessarily represent official
     opinion or policy of member governments or NATO.


YELTSIN'S DEBT TO THE MILITARY


     The decision by the Russian armed forces to back
Boris Yeltsin against the Parliament in October 1993 was
not a show of support for democracy and economic reform.
It was a political decision to side with the forces in
Russia that could manipulate power and address a
multitude of foreign policy frustrations and internal
disarray in the military.  Shortly after the October
crisis ended, the Russian government approved a new
military doctrine.  It is a highly political document
which establishes the guidelines through which the
military will receive its payback for their tenuous
support for President Yeltsin.  In trying to satisfy the
needs of the military, Yeltsin must strike a careful
balance between their increasing demands for authority,
influence, respect, and a limited economic capacity to
alter the status of an armed forces which is largely in
disarray.


     At all levels, the Russian military is suffering
from extremely poor social conditions, low morale, high
levels of absenteeism and low conscription, corruption,
inadequate funding, and a general loss of purpose.  The
inability of the government to address these problems was
a prime reason that the armed forces gave their support
to Yeltsin and attained promises from the Russian
President that their concerns would be addressed.
The desire to reap political benefit from the October
events was summarized well by Maj. General V. M. Dudnik,
who told Moscow Television on 17 October that:


     The army never was, cannot be, and never will be
     outside politics...army policy is determined by the
     events taking place within and the actions of the
     leadership echelons.  I would put it this way:  the
     army never supports the weak; the army always
     supports real power.  That is why it currently
     supports the authority and those structures which
     found they had the real levers of power.  Second, it
     will support the power which shows a real readiness
     to raise its status third, it will support the power
     which is ready to implement a moral cleansing away
     of the dead weight it has inherited.  Today, this
     function is being carried out by the President and
     his team.(1)


Support for Yeltsin in the armed forces is limited and
will depend on his ability to meet their increasing
demands.  Thus the Russian President must walk a fine
line between meeting the needs of the armed forces within
an extremely constrained economic environment while not
alienating its neighbors and partners in the West.


DEFEAT WITHOUT A BATTLE:  SOURCES OF DISARRAY IN THE
RUSSIAN MILITARY


     For the armed forces, almost all of their problems
relate to the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the
Soviet Union.  The end of the conflict between East and
West was as welcome in the Soviet Union as it was in the
West.  However, the end result was the return of Soviet
troops from Afghanistan, Eastern Europe, and Cuba to a
country that was ill-prepared to adapt to their needs.
Mikhail Gorbachev's unilateral force reductions and
acceptance of troop limits under the Treaty on
Conventional Forces in Europe to enhance "reasonable
sufficiency" in defence planning, contributed to this
problem.  These decisions precipitated an unforeseen
crisis in the Soviet Union in which there was
insufficient housing, pension-funding, or adequate
retraining programs for demobilized officers.  The
collapse of the Soviet Union, the failure of the
Commonwealth of Independent states, and the continued
presence of Russian armed forces and strategic nuclear
assets in what are now considered the "near abroad"
former republics of the Soviet Union exacerbated these
problems.  Thus the Russian military which came into
existence on 16 March 1992 by a presidential decree would
not be the same immense power that was the Soviet
military.  Rather its first and current Minister of
Defense General Pavel Grachev would be tasked with
starting anew with demoralized and imploding armed
forces.


     To the average officer or conscript, the most
serious problems facing the armed forces are the social
status of servicemen and a desire to attain adequate
funding for the military.  If living standards for
officers and their families continues to fall criminal,
nationalist, or communist activity is possible at
multiple levels in the military.  The image of
undisciplined, unpaid, lawless, hungry, and well armed
individuals is not a pleasant prospect to the Russian
central command.


     These problems were detailed by Col. General Valeriy
Mironov (Deputy Defense Minister for Personnel) in
Krasnaya Zvezda on 19 August 1993.  According to Mironov,
there were over 125 000 servicemen without apartments.
Moreover, some 77 000 officers, ensigns, and warrant
officers who have been discharged into the reserve or
retired, were waiting for apartments.  "Given that
troops are being withdrawn from the Baltic, the
Transcaucauses, Moldova, and distant foreign countries
and returning to Russia", wrote Mironov, "the number of
people needing a roof over their heads may reach 400 000
families."(2)  These housing problems are compounded by
the fact that the current ratio of officer to enlisted
servicemen is nearly 1:1.  This image of a military in
disarray has resulted in a very high level of absenteeism
and draft evasion.  According to a recent public opinion
poll, 80% of draft-age men do not want to serve in the
military.(3)


     The Russian Finance Ministry is widely viewed by the
military as the central obstacle to resolving a number of
the social problems of the armed forces.  According to a
Vesti newscast on 7 August 1993, the Finance Ministry has
not been "allocating money to the military construction
workers, and the figure of 120 000 homeless servicemen
threatens to rise to 400 000 due to troops returning from
abroad, graduates from military academies, and contract
servicemen, plus 120 000 released from the army, without
housing.(4)  Vesti quoted N. Chekov, (the Russian
Federation Armed Forces chief for construction and
housing of troops) saying that "there has been no
improvement on the most important issue - funding of
capital construction.  Our debts are rising and have
already topped 200 billion roubles."(5)  The problem is
circular as the Finance Ministry does not have the
funds to allocate to the military despite its promises to
do so.  The defense budget for the Soviet Union has
fallen from around 17% during the Cold War to 5% for
Russia in 1994.


     The housing problem is compounded by the fact that
many units have gone without pay for months at a time.
According to Army General Konstantine Kobets (the first
Deputy Minister of Defence):


     The Finance Ministry is allocating the Defense
     Ministry just one twelfth of the funds needed and is
     delaying its debt payments, 60 percent of servicemen
     have not received their July pay, and there are even
     units where people were paid last May.  As a result
     there is growing social tension in the army and
     declining confidence in the government.(6)


The Finance Ministry owes about 2 trillion rubles for
maintaining the army, including some 200 billion rubles
in wages to civilian personnel.(7)  The problems of the
average Lieutenant grade officer personifies this
dilemma.  An average Lieutenant receives 20 000 rubles
(R) for his post plus (R)26 000 for his rank, yet
it costs about (R)40 000 to rent an apartment.  This
leaves this officer with (R)6000 for the remaining
necessities of life.  Yet even these small wages are paid
with a delay of often two or three months.(8)


     The inability of the executive branch to attain a
compromise with the Russian parliament during the summer
of 1993 led a number of military representatives to urge
Yeltsin to take an authoritative stand to break the
gridlock.  In early August 1993, representatives of two
main military unions - the "Military Men for Democracy"
and the "Shchit" movement - called on Boris Yeltsin to
assume not only personal responsibility for the
constitutional process, but also to take power.  At a
press conference the respective representatives (Maj.
General Vladimir Dudnik and Nikolay Moskovchenko)
insisted that Yeltsin lift the country out of crisis.
Their formal statement asserted that:


     The military are following with anguish and unease
     the sharpening confrontation between the executive
     and legislative branches.  The armed forces, torn by
     political differences and enmeshed in political
     battles, are losing their combat readiness and are
     in a process of disintegration.  The army, like all
     of Russian society is weary of the protracted
     rivalry.(9)


With these concerns in mind, Yeltsin made a landmark
visit to the Taman and Kantemir divisions of the Moscow
Military District outside of the Russian capital in late
August.  The event was designed by the military to draw
his attention to their concerns and by the government to
demonstrate Yeltsin's solidarity with the military's
problems.(10)


     These troops were the primary elements of the
military assault on the parliament on 3-4 October.
Almost within hours of the end of the crisis at the
Russian parliament, the military began to receive a
number of immediate debt returns from the Yeltsin
government.  The most important was a statement by
Yeltsin that he favored the rapid adoption of the Draft
Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation - without
public debate or constitutional provisions - by 15
October.


REDRAFTING THE DRAFT DOCTRINE:  THE MILITARY WINS A
CLOSED CONTEST


     The Russian Ministry of Defense began intensive work
on the draft military doctrine in early summer 1993.
Much of this work was done in confidential working groups
with only an occasional press leak by a high level figure
such as Defense Minister Grachev.(11)  The draft doctrine
was the primary agenda item of special meetings of the
Russian Security Council held on 3 and 6 October 1993 and
continued to be debated in the council through October.
The most significant information regarding the Security
Council discussions was released through a high level
defence analyst Pavel Felgengauer on 9 October.(12)
Felgengauer stressed that the debate over the doctrine
was occurring behind closed doors and would remain the
decision of a narrow circle of permanent members of the
Security Council.  According to Felgengauer, the impact
of the events of October 3-4 had a profound impact on the
nature and tone of the doctrine.  Apparently a draft had
been approved by the Defence Ministry in early September
which the Security Council was to have signed in
October and then sent to the parliament for final
approval.  After the events of October 3-4, Felgengauer
wrote that:  "Today, everything is different."(13)


     Felgengauer disclosed that an amendment had been
inserted into the draft in its final stages allowing for
the use of armed forces to maintain internal security and
the territorial integrity of Russia.  The attachment of
last minute amendments to the draft doctrine delayed the
initial goal of 15 October as the date for its
completion.  According to a Kommersant-Daily report on 19
October, the seed of discord between the Defense Ministry
and the top political leadership was the military's
position on the use of armed forces to restore and
maintain internal security.  The report suggested that
both the supreme command and the bulk of the officer
corps categorically rejected the use of the military for
internal purposes.(14)  Because the armed forces
had already demonstrated their willingness to act in
internal conflicts and to maintain order, this dispute
might have been an attempt by the military to restore
some public sense of neutrality.  However, this precedent
would be but one of a number of problematic elements of
the new Russian Military Doctrine approved without public
debate on 2 November 1993.


ASSESSING THE BASIC PROVISIONS OF THE MILITARY DOCTRINE
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION


     The new Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation
is designed to resolve the problems facing the Russian
military.  First, it defines the basic security concept
of the Russian Federation as being purely defensive.
Second, it is designed to restore armed forces stature,
social standing, funding, and a general sense of purpose.
This could only be assured by stressing the third
element, that Russia must have a renewed status as a
major regional power and that it must be prepared to
use its armed forces to exert such influence and defend
the interests of the Russian Federation.  It is important
to note that there are many positive elements in the
doctrine - particularly with regard to arms reduction,
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc,.
However, the second and third elements serve to qualify
these positive elements.  No longer is reasonable
sufficiency in defense the primary element of deterrence.
Rather, the general purpose is to enhance the stature and
capability of the armed forces to fight aggressive
offensive and defensive wars and to intervene in areas of
conflict that effect the interests of the Russian
Federation.


     The most authoritative comment on the doctrine came
on 3 November by Defense Minister Grachev who held an
extensive meeting with Russian and foreign press at the
Ministry of Defense.  Since Grachev's press conference,
numerous articles and commentary provided insight into
the key aspects of the doctrine and on 18 November, the
main text was published in Rossiyskiye Vesti.(15)  The
detailed elements of the doctrine are divided into
political, military, and technical foundations.


     The political foundations of the Russian Military
Doctrine reflect the views of Russia's general approach
to the use of military force, to armed conflict and wars,
sources of military danger, and the causes of military
conflicts.  The document begins with a declaration that
the Russian Federation does not regard any state as its
enemy.  Thus, the Russian Federation will not use
military force against any state except for individual or
collective self-defense.  However, this statement is
qualified with a stipulation that the non-use of force is
in conjunction with guarantees of the non-use of nuclear
weapons against states party to the 1968 Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty which do not possess nuclear
weapons.


     The assertion of this clause regarding the possible
use of conventional or nuclear force against states that
continue to possess nuclear weapons and have not signed
the NPT treaty is a veiled threat against the Ukraine
which continues to possess nuclear weapons claimed by
Russia.  This would also apply to any other state which
might pose a similar threat to the Russian Federation.
At his 3 November press conference, Defense Minister
Grachev asserted that Russia would consider use of
nuclear weapons against countries that joined an alliance
linked by agreements with nuclear states.  This statement
is also a threat against those states in Central and
Eastern Europe which have expressed a desire to join the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).


     The doctrine stresses that nuclear weapons are
regarded primarily not as a means of conducting military
operations, but as a political means of deterrence
against aggression.  The document places a high priority
on arms control, arms reduction, and nuclear
non-proliferation.  However, Russia reserves the right to
use all of its resources if attacked - including nuclear
weapons.  This reconsideration of nuclear deterrence was
given considerable media attention in the West as it is a
formal departure from past Soviet doctrine that the USSR
would never be the first to use nuclear weapons.  This
policy was never taken seriously in western military
planning and therefore should not have caused the
commotion that it did.  The new policy on the first use
of nuclear weapons is much closer to the American
understanding of deterrence that a nuclear weapon is only
as good as its deterrent value and that requires an
assertion of willingness to utilize the device.(16)


     Alongside tasks of deterrence and defense, the
Russian armed forces and other troops are authorized to
conduct peacekeeping or peacemaking operations.
According to the doctrine, these operations can be
carried out by a decision of the UN Security Council,
other organs of collective security or in accordance
with international commitments within the CIS - provided
that this does not contravene the interests of the
Russian Federation.  To prepare for this possibility, the
doctrine maintains that it may be necessary to site
Russian Federation troops and weapons outside Russian
territory.


     At his 3 November press conference, Defense Minister
Grachev suggested that the intervention and removal of
such troops could depend on the status and treatment of
Russian minorities living within a particular region.
Grachev emphasized that this could apply as a condition
for the continued withdrawal of Russian troops from
Latvia and Estonia.  Depending on how Russian or CIS
peacekeeping was carried out under a United Nations or
CSCE mandate, such activity might not be discouraged in
the West.  The litmus test would have to be the degree to
which the Russian Federation made peacekeeping an
operational activity according to internationally
accepted standards and did not represent intervention to
favor one side or another in a given dispute.


     In the  "near abroad" countries, this element of the
doctrine is a prescription for renewed Russian
imperialism.  Indeed such fears have been given credence
by one of the most liberal individuals in the foreign
policy apparatus, Foreign Minister Andrei Kosyrev.  On 8