Security Incidents mailing list archives
Re: Discovering and Stopping Phishing/Scam Attacks
From: Andrew Kopp <andrew.kopp () kuehne-nagel com>
Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2005 12:25:19 -0400
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I have an idea that will blow this one out of the water! Are you ready for it?!?! a FOURTH login field!!! The question should be: "Who invented this authentication scheme?!?!?" And if that fails we'll just keep adding the fields until the user doesn't come back because he can't remember the answers. </sarcasm> Ok seriously, you really think a third field is going to protect ANY authentication scheme from phishing? Thats like saying: I'm going to tow a car up a steep hill with 4 ropes instead of 2 chains. Even though the chains would probably be stronger, BOTH have the capability of breaking just as easy. (and don't start on the thickness of the ropes/chains, thats not the point) The reason this won't work, and proof of it: That three/four digit security code on the back of your credit cards that everyone and their mother asks for.... hasn't helped at all. Credit card fraud is at an all time high, hell even Visa and Mastercard are profiting off it while advertising their "no liability on online purchases" crap. Authentication schemes today are screwed up. There isn't one that is 100% secure. Not even biometric systems. Its not the scheme that needs to change, its the idea of authentication that needs to change. Whats lacking? EDUCATION. People don't care, everyone thinks "It won't happen, to me, what did I do wrong?" Educate the users, don't assume they'll be able to figure it out. Because they won't. Regards, Andrew Kopp/TorZWE key: 86EC5112 fingerprint: 514D 86EA 0A02 EF26 13D8 9663 BE6A 5DE5 86EC 5112 webcenter () sapo pt wrote:
ok mr. moderator... i think the real problem to phishing exists is the weak process of
login systems
today... anyone just needs a login and password, to be authenticated, i think web aplications needs to change login systems... to be more tight... and the phishers maybe loose there hope to grep information very easy with just a username and password... my idea and solution to a new login system is this... creating a 3rd field, this 3rd field the user will choose... it will
work like
saying yes this is the real bank system welcome back mr. user insert your password... the process... 1rst page user -> puts the username... second page.. 3rd field -> what is your cat name? now the user knows that this was the question that he have put int the 3rdfield from the real bank site (he
can put
what he want)... password ?? -> user puts the password.. he is athenticated. now the phishers they have more work, needs two process to gain access
to the
bank user account... first they need to colect the username to get the 3rd field... and
they need to
put the 3rdfield in the false website... to get the password... but
this is the
deal... when a user or anyone, puts the username in this login system needs to
proceed
with a password, if not, if the user close the browser, if he tries
3times and
can't login, the system will block the username and send a email to
the real
user, a code to unblock the username and force the user to change the
username
and 3rd field... and now the phishers don't know again what will be
the new
username and 3rdfield... this system, is nothing from other planet and i think that help a lot
the users,
and will stop a litle or a big % this phisher mans... regards Nuno Costa -----Original Message----- From: Krul Thomas [mailto:Thomas.Krul () psepc-sppcc gc ca] Sent: April 27, 2005 10:31 AM To: 'Alex'; incidents () securityfocus com Subject: RE: Discovering and Stopping Phishing/Scam Attacks I received a phishing scam email for RBC Bank literally moments ago. The Web site is based in the Czech Republic with very little in the way to disguise the address of the site. (At last check, the site was still up at: http://updatestatus.webz.cz/rbc/cgi-bin/rbaccess/login.html) Odd, either there are some newbie phishers out there, or they are starting to realise that no matter how much they disguise their sites someone will be having them shut down soon enough so catching the uninformed in the few moments they have is paramount. Will we be seeing an increase in the diversity of referring addresses in a flooding attempt to catch the last remaining moms and pops who don't know better versus well-crafted addresses that don't arouse suspicions? -----Original Message----- From: Alex [mailto:incidents () alex gotdns org] Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2005 7:51 PM To: incidents () securityfocus com Subject: Re: Discovering and Stopping Phishing/Scam Attacks I agree that checking by referer addresses is a powerful way to detect phishing sites, but such logs can easily be adverted? Doesn't some anti-popup software remove referer fields? Simple use of javascript can allow a page to fetch anything without showing up in referer logs. While we are on the subject, has anyone come across commercial and/or government websites being (illegally?) mirrored? For example, I recently came a website located on a (Asian?) hosting provider where the content of the website was EXACTLY that of a well-known US govt website. (It appeared that they ran the equivalent of a recursive "wget" on the real site and hosted the files). It appeared to be several layers deep. Why would anyone want to do that? -Alex ------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- Test Your IDS Is your IDS deployed correctly? Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from CORE IMPACT. Go to http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/CoreSecurity_focus-ids_040708 to learn more. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- Test Your IDS Is your IDS deployed correctly? Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from CORE IMPACT. Go to http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/CoreSecurity_focus-ids_040708 to learn more. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Test Your IDS Is your IDS deployed correctly? Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from CORE IMPACT. Go to http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/CoreSecurity_focus-ids_040708 to learn more. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- SMS GRÁTIS do seu PC para qualquer rede nacional (TMN, Vodafone,
Optimus e PTC). Basta instalar o SAPO Messenger e adicionar amigos!
Vá agora a : http://messenger.sapo.pt/sms/ -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Test Your IDS Is your IDS deployed correctly? Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from CORE IMPACT. Go to http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/CoreSecurity_focus-ids_040708 to learn more. --------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.2.5 (MingW32) Comment: . iD8DBQFCcQ5vvmpd5YbsURIRAoU/AJ0eCO9f0j965CyloSYYoTdHo/yfmQCdH6Az 1yrHsQZ4Ed6aoPOj96zM2R4= =JCSO -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Test Your IDS Is your IDS deployed correctly? Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from CORE IMPACT. Go to http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/CoreSecurity_focus-ids_040708 to learn more. --------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current thread:
- RE: Discovering and Stopping Phishing/Scam Attacks, (continued)
- RE: Discovering and Stopping Phishing/Scam Attacks Randy (Apr 28)
- RE: Discovering and Stopping Phishing/Scam Attacks Nuno Costa (Apr 28)
- Re: Discovering and Stopping Phishing/Scam Attacks Dave Greer (Apr 28)
- Re: Discovering and Stopping Phishing/Scam Attacks Rainer Duffner (Apr 28)
- Message not available
- Administrivia: RE: Discovering and Stopping Phishing/Scam Attacks Daniel Hanson (Apr 28)
- Re: Administrivia: RE: Discovering and Stopping Phishing/Scam Attacks Valdis . Kletnieks (Apr 29)
- Re: Discovering and Stopping Phishing/Scam Attacks Steven (Apr 28)
- RE: Discovering and Stopping Phishing/Scam Attacks Alex (Apr 28)
- RE: Discovering and Stopping Phishing/Scam Attacks webcenter (Apr 28)
- RE: Discovering and Stopping Phishing/Scam Attacks Michael J. Pomraning (Apr 28)
- Re: Discovering and Stopping Phishing/Scam Attacks Andrew Kopp (Apr 28)