Security Incidents mailing list archives

RE: Nimda et.al. versus ISP responsibility


From: woods () weird com (Greg A. Woods)
Date: Thu, 27 Sep 2001 19:41:55 -0400 (EDT)

[ On Thursday, September 27, 2001 at 17:10:50 (-0400), ahoward () noerrors com wrote: ]
Subject: RE: Nimda et.al. versus ISP responsibility

I think there is a mid-ground wherein all ISPs are responsible
for both ingress and egress filtering of all traffic on their
network to ensure it is valid traffic (e.g.., making sure that 
customer A cannot inject traffic into the network with a source
IP that doesn't belong to them...nearly eliminating spoofing) 
but stopping short of scanning payloads of packets.

Come on!  Get real!

Any properly formed IP packet is valid traffic!

You cannot expect ISPs to stay on top of every protocol and every
network application.

The ONLY people responsible here are the operators of vulnerable servers
and the people who release the vulnerable software they use.  Even
though Microsoft have released fixes in these cases, they have not
corrected the flaw in their business which causes them to release buggy
vulnerable software.  Until Microsoft and other software vendors always
put security at the forefront, no matter whether users ask for it or
not, these problems will continue to cause wide-spread harm.

Systems and network security must not be an option and it must not be
off by default.  Customers must not even have to ask for security.
Until software vendors take this position their users, and all of us who
provide related services, will continue to suffer.

Additionally, ISPs should allow customers to choose filtered
connections if they wish.  Customers should be able to work
with ISPs to create traffic shaping rules as to what is and
is not OK on the pipe they are paying for.

In some cases this is in fact done.  However very few customers,
especially those on *DSL, cable, or other high-speed connections are
willing or able to pay for this level of service.

-- 
                                                        Greg A. Woods

+1 416 218-0098      VE3TCP      <gwoods () acm org>     <woods () robohack ca>
Planix, Inc. <woods () planix com>;   Secrets of the Weird <woods () weird com>

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