Re: ? - I don't know where to send this one, so I'm sending i t here...

[Nick FitzGerald <nick () virus-l demon co uk>]

Valdis Kletnieks to me:

> >    Why are our "protection" systems based on the obviously absurd
> >    notion that it is somehow more useful/efficient/whatever to detect
> >    more known bad stuff (which is a form of default allow) than simply
> >    to detect and allow only the known good stuff (default deny)?
>
> Because Willy Wonka never *did* figure out how to sell somebody a
> second Ever-Lasting Gobstopper.

Of course I know that, but you are absolutely correct to focus on the 
_suppliers'_ needs.  The supplier wants an income stream.  Long ago MS 
realized that the way to achieve the best income stream was to 
regularly update the software.  The contemporary anti-virus (and then 
"anti-Trojan and now anti-spyware) industry recognized it could achieve 
this even better than MS with an enduring avalanche of VERY regular 
updates.

Of course, why this has NEVER changed through force of pressure from 
intelligent, informed, diligent system admins at large corporate and 
government clients is actually the important question.  The answer is, 
in short, there are actually incredibly few intelligent, informed and 
diligent sys-admins able to (or at least willing to try to) wield any 
useful amount of economic pressure.

The reasons for that are multitudinous, with some intelligent, informed 
and diligent sys-admins being ham-strung by ludicrous policies and 
other entirely internally developed and enforced (within their 
employing organizations) mechanisms, but it's not entirely incorrect to 
say that a large part of the problem is that there are actually very 
few intelligent and informed sys-admins, due to the dominant IT culture 
being one of "it's right if it works" rather than one of "make this 
work right".

The latter means businessmen like Dr Solly get rich supporting the 
"need" of others to keep their systems stupid and ill-run...

Of course, SOHO is an entirely different kettle of fish, with "stupid 
and ill-run" being a given and requiring a different approach.  In 
fact, current AV practices probably are the best approach for such 
users, but that is no reason to adopt it or even _allow_ it in properly 
designed and run corporate IT systems...


Regards,

Nick FitzGerald

_______________________________________________
Fun and Misc security discussion for OT posts.
https://linuxbox.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/funsec
Note: funsec is a public and open mailing list.