Full Disclosure mailing list archives

Re: Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC


From: antisnatchor <antisnatchor () gmail com>
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 2014 18:03:10 +0000

Ahah, I don't want to loose my time with public bug bounties, it's not
even cost-effective.

Sei proprio un nabbo

Nicholas Lemonias. wrote:
You can't even find a cross site scripting on google.
 
Find a vuln on Google seems like a dream to some script kiddies.


On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:00 PM, Nicholas Lemonias.
<lem.nikolas () googlemail com <mailto:lem.nikolas () googlemail com>> wrote:

    The full-disclosure mailing list has really changed. It's full of
    lamers nowdays aiming high.
     
     
     


    On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM, Nicholas Lemonias.
    <lem.nikolas () googlemail com <mailto:lem.nikolas () googlemail com>>
    wrote:

        Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers
        are FTSE 100.

        ---------- Forwarded message ----------
        From: *Nicholas Lemonias.* <lem.nikolas () googlemail com
        <mailto:lem.nikolas () googlemail com>>
        Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM
        Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities
        with PoC
        To: antisnatchor <antisnatchor () gmail com
        <mailto:antisnatchor () gmail com>>


        Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers
        are FTSE 100.
         
         


        On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:55 PM, antisnatchor
        <antisnatchor () gmail com <mailto:antisnatchor () gmail com>> wrote:

            LOL you're hopeless.
            Good luck with your business. Brave customers!

            Cheers
            antisnatchor

            Nicholas Lemonias. wrote:

            People can read the report if they like. Can't you even
            do basic things like reading a vulnerability report?
             
            Can't you see that the advisory is about writing
            arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you.
            ---------- Forwarded message ----------
            From: *Nicholas Lemonias.* <lem.nikolas () googlemail com
            <mailto:lem.nikolas () googlemail com>>
            Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:43 PM
            Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Google vulnerabilities
            with PoC
            To: Mario Vilas <mvilas () gmail com <mailto:mvilas () gmail com>>


            People can read the report if they like. Can't you even
            do basic things like reading a vulnerability report?
             
            Can't you see that the advisory is about writing
            arbitrary files. If I was your boss I would fire you,
            with a good kick outta the door.
             
             
             
             


            On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 3:55 PM, Mario Vilas
            <mvilas () gmail com <mailto:mvilas () gmail com>> wrote:

                On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Nicholas Lemonias.
                <lem.nikolas () googlemail com
                <mailto:lem.nikolas () googlemail com>> wrote:

                    Jerome of Mcafee has made a very valid point on
                    revisiting  separation of duties in this security
                    instance.
                     
                    Happy to see more professionals with some
                    skills.  Some others have also mentioned the
                    feasibility for Denial of Service attacks. Remote
                    code execution by Social Engineering is also a
                    prominent scenario.


                Actually, people have been pointing out exactly the
                opposite. But if you insist on believing you can DoS
                an EC2 by uploading files, good luck to you then...
                 

                     
                    If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability
                    (probably coming from a bunch of CEH's), I feel
                    sorry for those consultants.


                You're the only one throwing around certifications
                here. I can no longer tell if you're being serious or
                this is a massive prank.
                 

                     
                    Nicholas.


                    On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Nicholas
                    Lemonias. <lem.nikolas () googlemail com
                    <mailto:lem.nikolas () googlemail com>> wrote:

                        We are on a different level perhaps. We do
                        certainly disagree on those points.
                        I wouldn't hire you as a consultant, if you
                        can't tell if that is a valid vulnerability..
                         
                         
                        Best Regards,
                        Nicholas Lemonias.
                         
                        On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Mario Vilas
                        <mvilas () gmail com <mailto:mvilas () gmail com>>
                        wrote:

                            But do you have all the required EH
                            certifications? Try this one from the
                            Institute for 
                            Certified Application Security
                            Specialists: http://www.asscert.com/


                            On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Nicholas
                            Lemonias. <lem.nikolas () googlemail com
                            <mailto:lem.nikolas () googlemail com>> wrote:

                                Thanks Michal,
                                 
                                We are just trying to improve
                                Google's security and contribute to
                                the research community after all. If
                                you are still on EFNet give me a
                                shout some time.
                                 
                                 We have done so and consulted to
                                hundreds of clients including
                                Microsoft, Nokia, Adobe and some of
                                the world's biggest corporations. We
                                are also strict supporters of the ACM
                                code of conduct.
                                 
                                Regards,
                                Nicholas Lemonias.
                                AISec


                                On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:29 AM,
                                Nicholas Lemonias.
                                <lem.nikolas () googlemail com
                                <mailto:lem.nikolas () googlemail com>>
                                wrote:

                                    Hi Jerome,
                                     
                                    Thank you for agreeing on access
                                    control, and separation of duties.
                                     
                                    However successful exploitation
                                    permits arbitrary write() of any
                                    file of choice.
                                     
                                    I could release an exploit code
                                    in C Sharp or Python that permits
                                    multiple file uploads of any
                                    file/types, if the Google
                                    security team feels that this
                                    would be necessary. This is
                                    unpaid work, so we are not so
                                    keen on that job. 
                                    || 


                                    On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 AM,
                                    Jerome Athias
                                    <athiasjerome () gmail com
                                    <mailto:athiasjerome () gmail com>>
                                    wrote:

                                        Hi

                                        I concur that we are mainly
                                        discussing a terminology problem.

                                        In the context of a
                                        Penetration Test or WAPT,
                                        this is a Finding.
                                        Reporting this finding makes
                                        sense in this context.

                                        As a professional, you would
                                        have to explain if/how this
                                        finding is a
                                        Weakness*, a Violation
                                        (/Regulations, Compliance,
                                        Policies or
                                        Requirements[1])
                                        * I would say Weakness +
                                        Exposure = Vulnerability.
                                        Vulnerability +
                                        Exploitability (PoC) =
                                        Confirmed Vulnerability that
                                        needs Business
                                        Impact and Risk Analysis

                                        So I would probably have
                                        reported this Finding as a
                                        Weakness (and not
                                        Vulnerability. See: OWASP,
                                        WASC-TC, CWE), explaining
                                        that it is not
                                        Best Practice (your OWASP
                                        link and Cheat Sheets), and
                                        even if
                                        mitigative/compensative
                                        security controls (Ref Orange
                                        Book), security
                                        controls like white listing
                                        (or at least black listing.
                                        see also
                                        ESAPI) should be 1) part of
                                        the [1]security requirements
                                        of a proper
                                        SDLC (Build security in) as
                                        per Defense-in-Depth security
                                        principles
                                        and 2) used and implemented
                                        correctly.
                                        NB: A simple Threat Model
                                        (i.e. list of CAPEC) would be
                                        a solid
                                        support to your report
                                        This would help to
                                        evaluate/measure the risk
                                        (e.g. CVSS).
                                        Helping the decision/actions
                                        around this risk

                                        PS: interestingly, in this
                                        case, I'm not sure that the
                                        Separation of
                                        Duties security principle was
                                        applied correctly by Google
                                        in term of
                                        Risk Acceptance (which could
                                        be another Finding)

                                        So in few words, be careful
                                        with the terminology. (don't
                                        always say
                                        vulnerability like the media
                                        say hacker, see RFC1392) Use
                                        a CWE ID
                                        (e.g. CWE-434, CWE-183,
                                        CWE-184 vs. CWE-616)

                                        My 2 bitcents
                                        Sorry if it is not edible :)
                                        Happy Hacking!

                                        /JA
                                        https://github.com/athiasjerome/XORCISM

                                        2014-03-14 7:19 GMT+03:00
                                        Michal Zalewski
                                        <lcamtuf () coredump cx
                                        <mailto:lcamtuf () coredump cx>>:
                                        > Nicholas,
                                        >
                                        > I remember my early years
                                        in the infosec community -
                                        and sadly, so do
                                        > some of the more seasoned
                                        readers of this list :-) Back
                                        then, I
                                        > thought that the only thing
                                        that mattered is the ability
                                        to find bugs.
                                        > But after some 18 years in
                                        the industry, I now know that
                                        there's an
                                        > even more important and
                                        elusive skill.
                                        >
                                        > That skill boils down to
                                        having a robust mental model
                                        of what
                                        > constitutes a security flaw
                                        - and being able to explain
                                        your thinking
                                        > to others in a precise and
                                        internally consistent manner
                                        that convinces
                                        > others to act. We need this
                                        because the security of a
                                        system can't be
                                        > usefully described using
                                        abstract terms: even the
                                        academic definitions
                                        > ultimately boil down to
                                        saying "the system is secure
                                        if it doesn't do
                                        > the things we *really*
                                        don't want it to do".
                                        >
                                        > In this spirit, the term
                                        "vulnerability" is generally
                                        reserved for
                                        > behaviors that meet all of
                                        the following criteria:
                                        >
                                        > 1) The behavior must have
                                        negative consequences for at
                                        least one of
                                        > the legitimate stakeholders
                                        (users, service owners, etc),
                                        >
                                        > 2) The consequences must be
                                        widely seen as unexpected and
                                        unacceptable,
                                        >
                                        > 3) There must be a
                                        realistic chance of such a
                                        negative outcome,
                                        >
                                        > 4) The behavior must
                                        introduce substantial new
                                        risks that go beyond
                                        > the previously accepted
                                        trade-offs.
                                        >
                                        > If we don't have that, we
                                        usually don't have a case, no
                                        matter how
                                        > clever the bug is.
                                        >
                                        > Cheers (and happy hunting!),
                                        > /mz
                                        >
                                        >
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                            -- 
                            "There's a reason we separate military
                            and the police: one fights the enemy of
                            the state, the other serves and protects
                            the people. When the military becomes
                            both, then the enemies of the state tend
                            to become the people."

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                            Charter:
                            http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
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                -- 
                "There's a reason we separate military and the
                police: one fights the enemy of the state, the other
                serves and protects the people. When the military
                becomes both, then the enemies of the state tend to
                become the people."



            _______________________________________________
            Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
            Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
            Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

            -- 
            Cheers
            Michele






-- 
Cheers
Michele

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