Full Disclosure mailing list archives

Re: Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC


From: antisnatchor <antisnatchor () gmail com>
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 2014 17:55:20 +0000

LOL you're hopeless.
Good luck with your business. Brave customers!

Cheers
antisnatchor

Nicholas Lemonias. wrote:

People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic
things like reading a vulnerability report?
 
Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I
was your boss I would fire you.
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: *Nicholas Lemonias.* <lem.nikolas () googlemail com
<mailto:lem.nikolas () googlemail com>>
Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:43 PM
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Google vulnerabilities with PoC
To: Mario Vilas <mvilas () gmail com <mailto:mvilas () gmail com>>


People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic
things like reading a vulnerability report?
 
Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I
was your boss I would fire you, with a good kick outta the door.
 
 
 
 


On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 3:55 PM, Mario Vilas <mvilas () gmail com
<mailto:mvilas () gmail com>> wrote:

    On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Nicholas Lemonias.
    <lem.nikolas () googlemail com <mailto:lem.nikolas () googlemail com>>
    wrote:

        Jerome of Mcafee has made a very valid point on
        revisiting  separation of duties in this security instance.
         
        Happy to see more professionals with some skills.  Some others
        have also mentioned the feasibility for Denial of Service
        attacks. Remote code execution by Social Engineering is also a
        prominent scenario.


    Actually, people have been pointing out exactly the opposite. But
    if you insist on believing you can DoS an EC2 by uploading files,
    good luck to you then...
     

         
        If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability (probably
        coming from a bunch of CEH's), I feel sorry for those consultants.


    You're the only one throwing around certifications here. I can no
    longer tell if you're being serious or this is a massive prank.
     

         
        Nicholas.


        On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Nicholas Lemonias.
        <lem.nikolas () googlemail com
        <mailto:lem.nikolas () googlemail com>> wrote:

            We are on a different level perhaps. We do certainly
            disagree on those points.
            I wouldn't hire you as a consultant, if you can't tell if
            that is a valid vulnerability..
             
             
            Best Regards,
            Nicholas Lemonias.
             
            On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Mario Vilas
            <mvilas () gmail com <mailto:mvilas () gmail com>> wrote:

                But do you have all the required EH certifications?
                Try this one from the Institute for 
                Certified Application Security
                Specialists: http://www.asscert.com/


                On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Nicholas Lemonias.
                <lem.nikolas () googlemail com
                <mailto:lem.nikolas () googlemail com>> wrote:

                    Thanks Michal,
                     
                    We are just trying to improve Google's security
                    and contribute to the research community after
                    all. If you are still on EFNet give me a shout
                    some time.
                     
                     We have done so and consulted to hundreds of
                    clients including Microsoft, Nokia, Adobe and some
                    of the world's biggest corporations. We are also
                    strict supporters of the ACM code of conduct.
                     
                    Regards,
                    Nicholas Lemonias.
                    AISec


                    On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Nicholas
                    Lemonias. <lem.nikolas () googlemail com
                    <mailto:lem.nikolas () googlemail com>> wrote:

                        Hi Jerome,
                         
                        Thank you for agreeing on access control, and
                        separation of duties.
                         
                        However successful exploitation permits
                        arbitrary write() of any file of choice.
                         
                        I could release an exploit code in C Sharp or
                        Python that permits multiple file uploads of
                        any file/types, if the Google security team
                        feels that this would be necessary. This is
                        unpaid work, so we are not so keen on that job. 
                        || 


                        On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Jerome Athias
                        <athiasjerome () gmail com
                        <mailto:athiasjerome () gmail com>> wrote:

                            Hi

                            I concur that we are mainly discussing a
                            terminology problem.

                            In the context of a Penetration Test or
                            WAPT, this is a Finding.
                            Reporting this finding makes sense in this
                            context.

                            As a professional, you would have to
                            explain if/how this finding is a
                            Weakness*, a Violation (/Regulations,
                            Compliance, Policies or
                            Requirements[1])
                            * I would say Weakness + Exposure =
                            Vulnerability. Vulnerability +
                            Exploitability (PoC) = Confirmed
                            Vulnerability that needs Business
                            Impact and Risk Analysis

                            So I would probably have reported this
                            Finding as a Weakness (and not
                            Vulnerability. See: OWASP, WASC-TC, CWE),
                            explaining that it is not
                            Best Practice (your OWASP link and Cheat
                            Sheets), and even if
                            mitigative/compensative security controls
                            (Ref Orange Book), security
                            controls like white listing (or at least
                            black listing. see also
                            ESAPI) should be 1) part of the
                            [1]security requirements of a proper
                            SDLC (Build security in) as per
                            Defense-in-Depth security principles
                            and 2) used and implemented correctly.
                            NB: A simple Threat Model (i.e. list of
                            CAPEC) would be a solid
                            support to your report
                            This would help to evaluate/measure the
                            risk (e.g. CVSS).
                            Helping the decision/actions around this risk

                            PS: interestingly, in this case, I'm not
                            sure that the Separation of
                            Duties security principle was applied
                            correctly by Google in term of
                            Risk Acceptance (which could be another
                            Finding)

                            So in few words, be careful with the
                            terminology. (don't always say
                            vulnerability like the media say hacker,
                            see RFC1392) Use a CWE ID
                            (e.g. CWE-434, CWE-183, CWE-184 vs. CWE-616)

                            My 2 bitcents
                            Sorry if it is not edible :)
                            Happy Hacking!

                            /JA
                            https://github.com/athiasjerome/XORCISM

                            2014-03-14 7:19 GMT+03:00 Michal Zalewski
                            <lcamtuf () coredump cx
                            <mailto:lcamtuf () coredump cx>>:
                            > Nicholas,
                            >
                            > I remember my early years in the infosec
                            community - and sadly, so do
                            > some of the more seasoned readers of
                            this list :-) Back then, I
                            > thought that the only thing that
                            mattered is the ability to find bugs.
                            > But after some 18 years in the industry,
                            I now know that there's an
                            > even more important and elusive skill.
                            >
                            > That skill boils down to having a robust
                            mental model of what
                            > constitutes a security flaw - and being
                            able to explain your thinking
                            > to others in a precise and internally
                            consistent manner that convinces
                            > others to act. We need this because the
                            security of a system can't be
                            > usefully described using abstract terms:
                            even the academic definitions
                            > ultimately boil down to saying "the
                            system is secure if it doesn't do
                            > the things we *really* don't want it to do".
                            >
                            > In this spirit, the term "vulnerability"
                            is generally reserved for
                            > behaviors that meet all of the following
                            criteria:
                            >
                            > 1) The behavior must have negative
                            consequences for at least one of
                            > the legitimate stakeholders (users,
                            service owners, etc),
                            >
                            > 2) The consequences must be widely seen
                            as unexpected and unacceptable,
                            >
                            > 3) There must be a realistic chance of
                            such a negative outcome,
                            >
                            > 4) The behavior must introduce
                            substantial new risks that go beyond
                            > the previously accepted trade-offs.
                            >
                            > If we don't have that, we usually don't
                            have a case, no matter how
                            > clever the bug is.
                            >
                            > Cheers (and happy hunting!),
                            > /mz
                            >
                            >
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                -- 
                "There's a reason we separate military and the police:
                one fights the enemy of the state, the other serves
                and protects the people. When the military becomes
                both, then the enemies of the state tend to become the
                people."

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    -- 
    "There's a reason we separate military and the police: one fights
    the enemy of the state, the other serves and protects the people.
    When the military becomes both, then the enemies of the state tend
    to become the people."



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Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
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-- 
Cheers
Michele

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