Re: Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC

["Nicholas Lemonias." <lem.nikolas () googlemail com>]

Enough with this thread.


On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 2:37 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. <
lem.nikolas () googlemail com> wrote:

> I am too buy researching satellite security. Been doing that since the
> times of TESO, probably before you were born.
>
> Have a good night's sleep.
>
>
> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 2:33 PM, Sergio 'shadown' Alvarez <
> shadown () gmail com> wrote:
>
> > I will, it's late here, but I'm enjoying the show way too much. xD
> >
> > Instead of discussing why don't you show a client side attack with that
> > thing that you call a vulnerability and make every one shut up?, oh
> > wait...because you can't! ;-)
> >
> > "A fail has thousand excuses, but success doesn't require any
> > explaination".
> >
> > In this context a working client side exploit or a Server Shell proof is
> > a success, any other thing is crap.
> >
> > Talking, complaining and showing certification don't work against a
> > computer, a working exploit that gives you a shell does.
> >
> > Cheers,
> >
> > -- Sergio
> >
> > On Mar 14, 2014, "Nicholas Lemonias." <lem.nikolas () googlemail com> wrote:
> > > Go to sleep.
> > > ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> > > From: Nicholas Lemonias. <lem.nikolas () googlemail com>
> > > Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 2:16 PM
> > > Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Google vulnerabilities with PoC
> > > To: Sergio 'shadown' Alvarez <shadown () gmail com>
> > >
> > >
> > > Go to sleep....
> > >
> > >
> > > On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 1:50 PM, Sergio 'shadown' Alvarez <
> > > shadown () gmail com> wrote:
> > >
> > > > Dear Nicholas Lemonias,
> > > >
> > > > I don't use to get in these scrapy discussions, but yeah you are in a
> > > > completetly different level if you compare yourself with Mario.
> > > > You are definitely a Web app/metasploit-user guy and pick up a
> > > > discussion with a binary and memory corruption ninja exploit writter like
> > > > Mario. You should know your place and shut up. Period.
> > > >
> > > > Btw, if you dare discussing with a beast like lcamtuf, you are
> > > > definitely out of your mind.
> > > >
> > > > Cheers,
> > > >   Sergio.
> > > > -- Sergio
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Mar 14, 2014, "Nicholas Lemonias." <lem.nikolas () googlemail com>
> > > > wrote:
> > > > > We are on a different level perhaps. We do certainly disagree on those
> > > > > points.
> > > > > I wouldn't hire you as a consultant, if you can't tell if that is a
> > > > > valid vulnerability..
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Best Regards,
> > > > > Nicholas Lemonias.
> > > > >
> > > > > On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Mario Vilas <mvilas () gmail com>wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > But do you have all the required EH certifications? Try this one from
> > > > > > the Institute for
> > > > > > Certified Application Security Specialists: http://www.asscert.com/
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. <
> > > > > > lem.nikolas () googlemail com> wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > Thanks Michal,
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > We are just trying to improve Google's security and contribute to
> > > > > > > the research community after all. If you are still on EFNet give me a shout
> > > > > > > some time.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >  We have done so and consulted to hundreds of clients including
> > > > > > > Microsoft, Nokia, Adobe and some of the world's biggest corporations. We
> > > > > > > are also strict supporters of the ACM code of conduct.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Regards,
> > > > > > > Nicholas Lemonias.
> > > > > > > AISec
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. <
> > > > > > > lem.nikolas () googlemail com> wrote:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Hi Jerome,
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Thank you for agreeing on access control, and separation of duties.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > However successful exploitation permits arbitrary write() of any
> > > > > > > > file of choice.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > I could release an exploit code in C Sharp or Python that permits
> > > > > > > > multiple file uploads of any file/types, if the Google security team feels
> > > > > > > > that this would be necessary. This is unpaid work, so we are not so keen on
> > > > > > > > that job.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Jerome Athias <
> > > > > > > > athiasjerome () gmail com> wrote:
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Hi
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > I concur that we are mainly discussing a terminology problem.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > In the context of a Penetration Test or WAPT, this is a Finding.
> > > > > > > > > Reporting this finding makes sense in this context.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > As a professional, you would have to explain if/how this finding
> > > > > > > > > is a
> > > > > > > > > Weakness*, a Violation (/Regulations, Compliance, Policies or
> > > > > > > > > Requirements[1])
> > > > > > > > > * I would say Weakness + Exposure = Vulnerability. Vulnerability +
> > > > > > > > > Exploitability (PoC) = Confirmed Vulnerability that needs Business
> > > > > > > > > Impact and Risk Analysis
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > So I would probably have reported this Finding as a Weakness (and
> > > > > > > > > not
> > > > > > > > > Vulnerability. See: OWASP, WASC-TC, CWE), explaining that it is not
> > > > > > > > > Best Practice (your OWASP link and Cheat Sheets), and even if
> > > > > > > > > mitigative/compensative security controls (Ref Orange Book),
> > > > > > > > > security
> > > > > > > > > controls like white listing (or at least black listing. see also
> > > > > > > > > ESAPI) should be 1) part of the [1]security requirements of a
> > > > > > > > > proper
> > > > > > > > > SDLC (Build security in) as per Defense-in-Depth security
> > > > > > > > > principles
> > > > > > > > > and 2) used and implemented correctly.
> > > > > > > > > NB: A simple Threat Model (i.e. list of CAPEC) would be a solid
> > > > > > > > > support to your report
> > > > > > > > > This would help to evaluate/measure the risk (e.g. CVSS).
> > > > > > > > > Helping the decision/actions around this risk
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > PS: interestingly, in this case, I'm not sure that the Separation
> > > > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > Duties security principle was applied correctly by Google in term
> > > > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > Risk Acceptance (which could be another Finding)
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > So in few words, be careful with the terminology. (don't always say
> > > > > > > > > vulnerability like the media say hacker, see RFC1392) Use a CWE ID
> > > > > > > > > (e.g. CWE-434, CWE-183, CWE-184 vs. CWE-616)
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > My 2 bitcents
> > > > > > > > > Sorry if it is not edible :)
> > > > > > > > > Happy Hacking!
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > /JA
> > > > > > > > > https://github.com/athiasjerome/XORCISM
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > 2014-03-14 7:19 GMT+03:00 Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf () coredump cx>:
> > > > > > > > > > Nicholas,
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > I remember my early years in the infosec community - and sadly,
> > > > > > > > > so do
> > > > > > > > > > some of the more seasoned readers of this list :-) Back then, I
> > > > > > > > > > thought that the only thing that mattered is the ability to find
> > > > > > > > > bugs.
> > > > > > > > > > But after some 18 years in the industry, I now know that there's
> > > > > > > > > an
> > > > > > > > > > even more important and elusive skill.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > That skill boils down to having a robust mental model of what
> > > > > > > > > > constitutes a security flaw - and being able to explain your
> > > > > > > > > thinking
> > > > > > > > > > to others in a precise and internally consistent manner that
> > > > > > > > > convinces
> > > > > > > > > > others to act. We need this because the security of a system
> > > > > > > > > can't be
> > > > > > > > > > usefully described using abstract terms: even the academic
> > > > > > > > > definitions
> > > > > > > > > > ultimately boil down to saying "the system is secure if it
> > > > > > > > > doesn't do
> > > > > > > > > > the things we *really* don't want it to do".
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > In this spirit, the term "vulnerability" is generally reserved
> > > > > > > > > for
> > > > > > > > > > behaviors that meet all of the following criteria:
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > 1) The behavior must have negative consequences for at least one
> > > > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > > the legitimate stakeholders (users, service owners, etc),
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > 2) The consequences must be widely seen as unexpected and
> > > > > > > > > unacceptable,
> > > > > > > > > > 3) There must be a realistic chance of such a negative outcome,
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > 4) The behavior must introduce substantial new risks that go
> > > > > > > > > beyond
> > > > > > > > > > the previously accepted trade-offs.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > If we don't have that, we usually don't have a case, no matter
> > > > > > > > > how
> > > > > > > > > > clever the bug is.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > Cheers (and happy hunting!),
> > > > > > > > > > /mz
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________
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> > > > > > >
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> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > --
> > > > > > "There's a reason we separate military and the police: one fights
> > > > > > the enemy of the state, the other serves and protects the people. When
> > > > > > the military becomes both, then the enemies of the state tend to become the
> > > > > > people."
> > > > > >
> > > > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > > > Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> > > > > > Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> > > > > > Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/