Re: heartbleed OpenSSL bug CVE-2014-0160

[Afonso Araújo Neto <afonso.araujo () gmail com>]

The Heartbleed Challenge was solved, so no more mistery about the
possibility of private key compromise.

https://www.cloudflarechallenge.com/heartbleed

The Heartbleed Challenge
Can you steal the keys from this server?
Has the challenge been solved yet? YES
So far, two people have independently solved the Heartbleed Challenge.
The first was submitted at 4:22:01PST by Fedor Indutny (@indutny). He sent
at least 2.5 million requests over the span of the challenge, this was
approximately 30% of all the requests we saw. The second was submitted at
5:12:19PST by Illkka Mattila of NCSC-FI using around 100 thousand requests.
We confirmed that both of these individuals have the private key and that
it was obtained through Heartbleed exploits. We rebooted the server at
3:08PST, which may have contributed to the key being available in memory,
but we can't be certain.


On Fri, Apr 11, 2014 at 5:14 PM, Schmidt, Michael <
michael.schmidt () walgreens com> wrote:

> They are talking about their servers...
>
> And, we have reason to believe based on the data structures used by
> OpenSSL and the modified version of NGINX that we use, that it may in fact
> be impossible.
>
> "modified version of NGINX that we use"
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Fulldisclosure [mailto:fulldisclosure-bounces () seclists org] On
> Behalf Of Manuel Tiago Pereira
> Sent: Friday, April 11, 2014 7:31 AM
> Cc: fulldisclosure () seclists org
> Subject: Re: [FD] heartbleed OpenSSL bug CVE-2014-0160
>
> Hi,
>
> CloudFlare has a very interesting article on their attempts to get a SSL
> private key, explaining why they find it very unlikely to be able to get
> it. Here it is:
>
> http://blog.cloudflare.com/answering-the-critical-question-can-you-get-private-ssl-keys-using-heartbleed
>
>
> On Fri, Apr 11, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Paul Vixie <paul () redbarn org> wrote:
>
> > Juergen Christoffel wrote:
> > > On Thu, Apr 10, 2014 at 11:32:21PM -0700, Paul Vixie wrote:
> > > > [...]
> > > > really bruce? on a scale of doesn't-matter-at-all to
> > > > worst-thing-you-could-have-previously-imagined, a read only exploit
> > > > is even worse than that?
> > >
> > > With all due respect to your ego Paul, I think you might
> > > under-estimate the long term effects: private keys get stolen, this
> > > allows people to play man-in-the-middle, people (the masses) will
> > > renew their certificates but might re-use their generated private
> > > keys because the don't know exactly what they are doing, etc.
> >
> > thanks for whatever respect may be due, but bruce is still wrong. the
> > cost to fix this is:
> >
> > 1. replace all private keys
> > 2. replace all passwords
> > 3. upgrade all SSL software
> >
> > that rates 9 out of 10, where 10 is the worst thing i could have
> > imagined pre-heartbleed, which is remote file modification and/or
> > remote code execution, because the costs in that case would be:
> >
> > 1. inclusive of [1..3] above
> > 2. replace all operating systems
> > 3. audit or replace all user data
> >
> > > As the EFF's traces back into 2013 might tell us, some bad guys
> > > exploited this for some time now. If this is the case, we might soon
> > > arrive at the conclusion that we need to exchange all certificates
> > > which had been created in the last two years.
> >
> > we already have to do that, since we have to assume the worst whenever
> > we don't have log files which somehow prove a negative.
> >
> > > While I hope it tends to your interpretation, I fear a bit that it
> > > might be Bruces in the long run.
> >
> > bruce was spouting nonsense. heartbleed's costs will not be higher
> > than previously imaginable.
> >
> > vixie
> >
> > _______________________________________________
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>
>
>
> --
> Manuel Tiago Pereira
>
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