Re: Leveraging pam_env to steal DSA keys

[Peter van Dijk <peter () 7bits nl>]

On May 31, 2011, at 12:48 AM, paul.szabo () sydney edu au wrote:

> > ... http://7bits.nl/projects/pamenv-dsakeys/pamenv-dsakeys.html
>
> Seems to me that CVE-2010-3435 may allow users to determine also:
>  password in /etc/lilo.conf
>  secret in /etc/bind/named.conf /etc/bind/rndc.conf /etc/bind/rndc.key
>  bits of /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
> which should all be protected.

- lilo.conf commonly has whitespace around '=', pam_env does not tolerate that
- bind configs don't even use '=' and are often indented, pam_env does not tolerate indents
- RSA appears to be uninteresting in that the amount of bits we can lift is not sufficient to make an attack feasible 
(this is in the article!)
- the DSA host key certainly is a target

If I understand correctly, Debian (and, I presume, Ubuntu) put this bug on low priority precisely because there were 
very few practical applications that they knew of.

Cheers, Peter
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