Full Disclosure mailing list archives
Re: Public Review of OIS Security Vulnerability Reporting and ResponseGuidelines
From: ET LoWNOISE <et () cyberspace org>
Date: Wed, 7 Jul 2004 22:56:35 -0400 (EDT)
Instead of publishing personal opinions over the OIS, its better to focus on the Guideline again. The Process is based entirely on the vendor but not on the customers, going against the "efforts to safeguard customers". Even the participants group doesnt include them as active part of the process. Its so vendor oriented that doesnt address the case where they find security vulnerabilities on their own products. It should be the same process, but in this case the vendor is the finder. In reality many companies doesnt disclosure their own vulnerabilities (and dont create a fix, just release the next "new" version, leaving the customers unprotected). The process assumes that nobody knows about the vulnerability discovered by the "finder". If someone discovers a vulnerabiluity theres a big chance that someone else has allready discover it in the past and that has been actively exploited. In the end the vendor will protect his comercial interest instead of protecting the customers. And becouse is the owner of the process it can delay, or stop the process at any phase without producing any results (fix, advisory etc). Efrain 'ET' Torres [LoWNOISE] Colombia 2004 et () cyberspace org On Sun, 4 Jul 2004, Fred Mobach wrote:
OIS wrote:The Organization for Internet Safety (OIS) extends an invitation to the readers of the BugTraq, NTBugtraq, and Full-Disclosure mailing lists to participate in the ongoing public review of the OIS Security Vulnerability Reporting and Response Guidelines.I have problems with the OIS guidelines as I distrust at least one member of OIS since it won't publish verifiable information on Bugtraq since some years. When I combine the policy of that company with the next statement from OIS's about.html page "Does OIS support pre-disclosure of vulnerability information to select groups? No. We believe the software author should be given a chance to create a fix before vulnerability information is made public, but that there should be no further distribution of that information until the fix is complete. This priniciple can be very difficult to adhere to in certain situations, such as dealing with the open source community where there aren't protections to keep vulnerability information secret." I am afraid that that company might take years to supply a fix or even to never supply that. A limit of at most four weeks before disclosure seems reasonable to me. If that company cannot live with that it can opt to die. Another interesting point for me is the statement about the open source community in the same paragraph. Some organizations still have problems with that community, which is reflected by adopters.html webpage of OIS. No representation of the open source community as far as I can see. But please correct me if I am wrong. -- Fred Mobach - fred () mobach nl - postmaster () mobach nl Systemhouse Mobach bv - The Netherlands - since 1976 website : http://fred.mobach.nl Q: servos ad pileum vocare ? A: servos fenestrae ad pileum rubrem vocare !
_______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
Current thread:
- Public Review of OIS Security Vulnerability Reporting and Response Guidelines OIS (Jul 02)
- Re: Public Review of OIS Security Vulnerability Reporting and Response Guidelines dave (Jul 04)
- RE: [Dailydave] Re: Public Review of OIS Security Vulnerability Reporting and Response Guidelines Steve W. Manzuik (Jul 04)
- Re: [Dailydave] Re: Public Review of OIS Security Vulnerability Reporting and Response Guidelines Halvar Flake (Jul 05)
- Re: Public Review of OIS Security Vulnerability Reporting and Response Guidelines Pete Herzog (Jul 05)
- Re: Public Review of OIS Security Vulnerability Reporting and Response Guidelines rsh (Jul 06)
- Re: Public Review of OIS Security Vulnerability Reporting and Response Guidelines Nigel Stepp (Jul 08)
- Re: Public Review of OIS Security Vulnerability Reporting and ResponseGuidelines Fred Mobach (Jul 04)
- Re: Public Review of OIS Security Vulnerability Reporting and ResponseGuidelines Randy Bush (Jul 05)
- RE: Public Review of OIS Security Vulnerability Reporting and ResponseGuidelines Thomas48 (Jul 06)
- Re: Public Review of OIS Security Vulnerability Reporting and ResponseGuidelines ET LoWNOISE (Jul 08)
- Re: Public Review of OIS Security Vulnerability Reporting and Response Guidelines Georgi Guninski (Jul 05)
- Re: Public Review of OIS Security Vulnerability Reporting and Response Guidelines Valdis . Kletnieks (Jul 08)
- Re: Public Review of OIS Security Vulnerability Reporting and Response Guidelines Florian Weimer (Jul 05)
- Re: Public Review of OIS Security Vulnerability Reporting and Response Guidelines dave (Jul 04)