Re: Re: January 15 is Personal Firewall Day, help the cause

[Valdis.Kletnieks () vt edu]

On Mon, 19 Jan 2004 20:02:19 +0100, Michal Zalewski said:

> How is it an issue? I think it is a feature - it is noexec that is pretty
> badly broken by design, and nearly impossible to render secure... and what
> does Linux kernel have to do with addressing it?

Well, if you consider noexec to be a feature, the /lib/ld-linux trick was a bug in it.

In what way is it "badly broken"?

> Disclaimer: I don't have 2.6 sources at hand, maybe this is the case
> (although I somehow doubt there is a reasonable way to fix it kernel -
> how, by refusing PROT_EXEC mappings from files on noexec partitions? hope
> not).

Here's Ulrich Drepper's patch, as Linus took it:

        struct rb_node ** rb_link, * rb_parent;
        unsigned long charged = 0;
 
-       if (file && (!file->f_op || !file->f_op->mmap))
-               return -ENODEV;
+       if (file) {     
+               if (!file->f_op || !file->f_op->mmap)
+                       return -ENODEV;
+                       
+               if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC))
+                       return -EPERM;
+       }
 
        if (!len)
                return addr;

So yes, they're stomping on PROT_EXEC.  The same code is also in 2.4.25-pre6.

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