Full Disclosure mailing list archives

Re: openssh exploit code?


From: Daniel <deadbeat () sdf lonestar org>
Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2003 16:29:35 +0000 (UTC)

touchy..


On Mon, 13 Oct 2003, Henning Brauer wrote:

Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2003 17:16:10 +0200
From: Henning Brauer <hb-fulldisclosure () bsws de>
To: full-disclosure () lists netsys com
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] openssh exploit code?

It's pretty clear that you are wasting our time, I will not go down to
the level of personal attacks. come back when you have something to
say.

On Mon, Oct 13, 2003 at 07:09:03AM -0700, security snot wrote:
You seriously don't have any idea how, with proper heap manipulation, a
nul overflow can be exploited?  You should stick to writing exploitable
code and leave vuln analysis to the real hackers.

Also your arrogance shows in the same flaming fashion as Theo's homosexual
nature throughout your post.  Again the question of, why is asking for
proof that it is not exploitable any different than demanding proof that
it is exploitable?  I've got nothing to prove to you, and nowhere did I
even claim that I exploited this bug (although, I would be willing to sell
an exploit for the right price).

What're your comments about "with a reasonable malloc" suggesting?  That
under different malloc implementations than the phkmalloc (not written by
your team, hide behind what you cannot do on your own) the bug becomes
exploitable?

Even if that were true (that it's only exploitable under dlmalloc and not
phkmalloc), it's still your bug, and your bug that's being exploitable.
The use of someone elses code as your security buffer hardly seems like
a respectable defense to me.  Not sure about how anyone else on this list
would look at your argument, but then again a lot of subscribers are
idiots who'll be sure to jump to protect your honor.

Under reasonable memcpy implementations, negative length memcpy's aren't
exploitable, but that didn't save you winners did it?

Please, go back to "coding" and let security be in the hands of those who
know what they're doing.  Not you.  Definately not Theo.

I look forward to pissing on the OpenBSD tent at the next security
conference I'm forced to attend (need to get laid once in a while, you
know).  Great tradition more people need to participate in.

You unskilled, clueless little punkass bitch.

-----------------------------------------------------------
"Whitehat by day, booger at night - I'm the security snot."
- CISSP / CCNA / A+ Certified - www.unixclan.net/~booger/ -
-----------------------------------------------------------

On Mon, 13 Oct 2003, Henning Brauer wrote:

On Mon, Oct 13, 2003 at 12:13:14AM -0700, security snot wrote:
Can you provide any sort of technical argument as to why this bug is not
exploitable?

sure. look what happens:

  buffer->alloc += len + 32768;
  if (buffer->alloc > 0xa00000)
          fatal("buffer_append_space: alloc %u not supported",
              buffer->alloc);
  buffer->buf = xrealloc(buffer->buf, buffer->alloc);

the error condition is xrealloc failing.
xrealloc is a wrapper for realloc, which does proper error checking,
and calls fatal() on error.
there is the bug - fatal uses the buffer.
what happens is basically
  bzero(buffer->buf, buffer->alloc);
as buffer->alloc is already increased, but buffer->buf is still the
old len, we bzero too much.
now please explain me how this is exploitable.

Or are you going to simply stand behind the typical OpenBSD
zealot view and say it can't be exploited, only because there is not
public "proof of concept" code available?

"I have an exploit but I don't show it", yeah, sure.

we analyzed the bug of course.

don't get me wrong: This is a bug, our action of re-building all
release sets with the fix was absolutely the way to go (even given it
was a major PITA and a _lot_ od work), and this is a
bad bug that should be fixed ASAP, and everybody out there running
sshd should upgrade/patch asap if not done yet.

However, I absolutely fail to see how this should lead to arbitary
code execution on a unix system with a reasonable malloc implementation.
It's a remote DoS.

ISS' X-Forces claim to have created a working proof-of-concept code for
the bug.  Are you calling those respectable young men and woman liars?

if they claim they have an exploit that leads to arbitary code
execution: yes I do, until we get proof.

I won't answer the rest of your mail which is entirely FUD.

You ask for proof? WHat about YOU proving your statements? Just
claiming something without any proof is nothing but FUD.

ps: provide an adequate technical discussion against the exploitability of
this particular bug, and if it proves to be sound I'll release an exploit
for a different unpublished OpenSSH bug for you guys to write up some
advisories on!  (err, must be FUD:)

please do.
this way it is just FUD.
prove your claims.

--
Henning Brauer, BS Web Services, http://bsws.de
hb () bsws de - henning () openbsd org
Unix is very simple, but it takes a genius to understand the simplicity.
(Dennis Ritchie)

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--
Henning Brauer, BS Web Services, http://bsws.de
hb () bsws de - henning () openbsd org
Unix is very simple, but it takes a genius to understand the simplicity.
(Dennis Ritchie)

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html


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