Re: Linux (in)security (Was: Re: Re: No Subject)

[Gary Flynn <flynngn () jmu edu>]

Bruce Ediger wrote:

> The real questions go something like:
>
> "Source code for Unix viruses has been available for years, from sources
> almost too numerous to mention.  Why haven't Unix viruses become epidemic
> the way that Windows viruses have?"
Not sure the source has anything to do with viruses. But your statement 
certainly says
something about the concept that publishing source magically makes 
software that is
secure. ;)

> "Security problems of the same magnitude as .ida buffer overflows, or
> MSRPC buffer overflows exist in unix programs like Sendmail and others.
> Why hasn't a worm materialized for this problem?"
>
> "The scalper worm didn't effect nearly as many hosts as msblast did.
> Why not?  Why did the scalper worm seem to die out, yet wormwatch.org
> still records many hits from much older worms like SQLSpida and Nimda?"
>
> And I guess you can generalize and ask why the Windows "culture" generates
> so many problems of such a magnitude, that last so long?  My home office
> web server got a Code Red hit on Sept 19th 2003, for example.  Other computing
> cultures (Unix, Mac, etc) don't seem to exhibit this.  Why not?  Shouldn't
> we focus our efforts on figuring out what aspects of Linux or Mac cultures
> keep epidemics from occuring?  It's certainly a waste of breath to point out
> that OS X has horrendous security flaws when none of them turn into grotesque
> epidemics like Sobig.f.
>
> To extend your "wooden house" analogy a bit:
> In a city made entirely of wooden houses, a single house fire is way more
> likely to level the city than a in a city where a mix of wooden, brick
> and vinly-sided houses.  Having the occasional brick house mixed in with
> the wooden houses provides a lot of resistance to a whole-city conflagration.
> It doesn't provide absolute immunity from fires for every house in the
> city.
Three things come immediately to my mind:

1) Make up of user base. Generally not understanding the nature and 
aspects of a programmable,
    general  purpose computer connected to a world-wide network.
2) Size of target. If you're going to cause havoc, why not cause havoc 
in the largest population?
   If you're going to study how to break into safes, why not study the 
ones in most common use?
   I don't buy  the monoculture argument. Sure, it has some validity 
but can you imagine explaining
   to users of 40 different platforms and applications how to secure 
their systems? While we might
   not have worms, we'll  have worse...silent parasites. Besides, there 
are very strong advantages
   to a standard platform. TCP/IP is a monoculture. HTTP/HTML  is a 
monoculture. i86 is a
   monoculture. We had the BSD/SystemV/POSIX wars. We're having the BSD 
and linux wars.
  Do you  really want to live in a world with completely fragmented 
platforms...one without the
  common APIs we've been trying for decades to achieve?
3) Microsoft's steadfast refusal to ship systems in a "NO listening 
ports configuration"
   by default. Cripe, now we've got anonymous, distributed file storage 
on how many
   Windows XP Shared Documents folders all over the Internet available 
to anyone
   that wants it not to mention a hack or infection in waiting with 
every new install of 2000
   or XP because netbios/RPC is shipped in the open state. This isn't a 
problem of not having
   a firewall. Its a problem of shipping a system in a state presenting 
unnecessary risk for the
   vast population of users of that system. Bad, nay, irresponsible, 
business decision IMHO.

>  



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