IDS mailing list archives
Re: 10Gbps IPS - what you need to know
From: Ravi Chunduru <ravi.is.chunduru () gmail com>
Date: Thu, 5 Mar 2009 10:12:19 -0800
I understand that there is no need for sending the traffic through inspection if there are no signatures/rules for the traffic. I also can understand if user is given choice of skipping the traffic through IPS inspection via configuration for certain protocols or network segments. I feel it is fooling buyers if same traffic with attack pattern is stopped when there is less load and passed when the system is under load. Do you think that it is known to end users from vendors' documentation? Thanks Ravi On Thu, Mar 5, 2009 at 9:18 AM, Jeremy Bennett <jeremyfb () mac com> wrote:
Ravi, What you ask is a two-phase question. I can speak from experience, having worked for a vendor, that (at least at the time) NSS had a strict policy that the same signature/detection set be used for all tests. This means that if a particular signature is enabled for the coverage tests then it must also be enabled for the performance tests. This is really the only believable way to test. The reason I say it is a two-phase question is that just because a signature is enabled does not necessarily mean it is always applied. Most high-speed IPS devices have a 'fast path' or 'push-through' or similarly named no-inspection channel that pulls packets from interface and pushes them out another. The cases when these channels are used, in my mind, separates the security-centric IPS devices from the performance-centric IPS devices. Those that tout performance often have aggressive algorithms for moving packets to fast path, packet rate, packet size, destination port, previous history, are all used to bypass inspection under load. I know of one device at the time that would simply push through all small UDP packets if the system were under load. The vendor, then, spent a lot on advertising how good their small UDP packet performance was. Now, just because there is a fast-path does not make the product a piece of crap. There are intelligent ways to minimize the applied set of signatures that do not harm security correctness. For example, if you can determine that a data stream is encrypted then you can't inspect it. Also, if you watch control traffic on a multi-media exchange (eg, watch the SIP traffic on a video call) and you have not signatures for that particular media codec then don't bother applying any others to the media stream. So, I think the testers set out to do a good job. I also like to think that the vendors do not set out to cheat on the tests. Instead vendors make a choice between preferring performance versus security and the test results show that. -J On 3/4/09 9:47 PM, "Ravi Chunduru" <ravi.is.chunduru () gmail com> wrote:I was hoping either NSS or vendors who had gone through the certification to say that all sessions/packets go through the IPS detection in all cases as part of performance measurement. There is absolute silence on my previous email. Silence is enforcing the points made in earlier email that IPS devices skip Intrusion analysis upon very small load on the system. I was hoping that somebody is going to speak out and prove otherwise. Ravi On Sat, Feb 28, 2009 at 4:15 PM, Ravi Chunduru <ravi.is.chunduru () gmail com> wrote:Hi, This concerns many people I am sure. I hope certification agencies are reporting performance numbers where all packets are going through complete inspection. If what you said is happening, then certification agencies would lose their credibility. Any comments from NSS? Thanks Ravi On Fri, Feb 27, 2009 at 9:18 AM, Trygve Aasheim <trygve () pogostick net> wrote:Sure. But to clearify; it didn't bring throughput down to 15mbit, but we where seeing signatures/filters that started to fail when the traffic was at about 15mbit, with less that 2000 sessions. Now this isn't unusual with an IDS solution that uses pure regex signatures. But some IPS vendors claim that their solutions ain't running anything near regex, and their performance are way up there...sure. Many IPS solution has a max latency threshold. So if the IPS uses more than X amount of ms before it has analyzed the traffic, the traffic is passed through. This is so that the IPS doesn't become a bottleneck under heavy load. But if you have (which many companies does) different service segments (like one segment with databases, one with webserver etc) you might end up with an IPS where a policy for one segment is a lot of different http, https, sql injection, xss signatures/filters that all try to analyze the same traffic. Add to these the filters for protecting apache, iis, SunOne and so on, and the different version on different operating systems - and you end up with one massiv policy if you're in a big company. Then I promiss...gbit performance where all the filters that you really want to run are on...fails. NSSlabs are more than welcome to ask for more detailed information of course, so that their certifications might show more than just throughput with a policy on, but also maybe throughput with a policy running, where the policy is actually being applied to the data at gbit speed. The traffic pattern was customer traffic btw. Real world traffic. T Ravi Chunduru skrev:We've seen gbit certified solutions starting to fail at 15mbit with <2000 sessions during PoC's....This is really interesting. Can you throw some more light on traffic pattern which brings down the performance to 15Mbps? Ravi On Mon, Feb 23, 2009 at 9:16 AM, Trygve Aasheim <trygve () pogostick net> wrote:Another question would be: - How big is the rule base? - Any exceptions - How many filters/signatures/detection features failed to analyze the traffic before the latency treshold was exceeded? - Is the rule base based on a scenario where you for example pretend to protect a windows server and workstation network, and therefor enable all signatures for this - and turn off all *nix signatures? Or the other way around? Or a pure web-/app-/database server network? A lot of these tests fail to test the devices in a "near real world scenario" where the IPS is configured with an adjusted rule base based on typical assets, risks, firewall rules, exceptions, vlan tags etc. We've seen gbit certified solutions starting to fail at 15mbit with <2000 sessions during PoC's.... T C-Info skrev:The question I would also ask is was this complete capture or sampling of the traffic? Curt -----Original Message----- From: listbounce () securityfocus com [mailto:listbounce () securityfocus com] On Behalf Of Addepalli Srini-B22160 Sent: Thursday, February 19, 2009 1:57 PM To: Ravi Chunduru; rmoy () nsslabs com Cc: focus-ids () securityfocus com Subject: RE: 10Gbps IPS - what you need to know Copied from the test report: "The device ably supported over 11Gbps of traffic with the larger HTTP response sizes (21KB) and lower connections per second (5,000 CPS per Gigabit of traffic) found on typical corporate networks". It appears to be some calcualtion mistake! It comes to around 820-830Mbps (21Kbytes * 5000 ), not 11Gbps throughput!I think you missed "5000 CPS per gigabit of traffic". Since it is 10Gbox, I would assume that there was 50000 CPS in total which gives around 8.5Gbps. If you add usual overheads TCP header, IP header, Ethernet header, the total throughput might go beyond 8.5Gbps. Regards Srini
Current thread:
- Re: 10Gbps IPS - what you need to know Ravi Chunduru (Mar 02)
- Re: 10Gbps IPS - what you need to know Ravi Chunduru (Mar 05)
- Re: 10Gbps IPS - what you need to know Joel M Snyder (Mar 05)
- Re: 10Gbps IPS - what you need to know Jeremy Bennett (Mar 05)
- Re: 10Gbps IPS - what you need to know Ravi Chunduru (Mar 05)
- RE: 10Gbps IPS - what you need to know Addepalli Srini-B22160 (Mar 06)
- RE: 10Gbps IPS - what you need to know Vikram Phatak (Mar 06)
- Re: 10Gbps IPS - what you need to know Ravi Chunduru (Mar 05)