IDS mailing list archives
RE: detecting network crowd surges
From: "Craig Chamberlain" <craig.chamberlain () Q1Labs com>
Date: Tue, 29 Aug 2006 17:40:56 -0300
I've seen use of HTTP by bots on the rise a bit and have seen two implementations in some detail. Much of it is fairly trivial to detect, like IRC protocol running on port 80. I've seen a couple examples I've seen were harder to spot. One was a request for a page that looked like most any normal auth form for webmail services. It was hosted on a compromised box belonging to a major website so it the traffic we had looked mostly harmless. I showed it to some engineers at an IDS vendor and the consensus was that it was pretty tough to write a signature against; the traffic it produced was pretty small and what we had looked pretty normal. We ended up detecting it by the user agent which was a bit different owing to the use of some HTTP library for Delphi used by the bot developer. We used a simple snort rule (only useful in this specific case, but the approach was somewhat interesting): alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET 80 (msg:"Trojan control get??? command"; content:"User-Agent: UtilMind HTTPGet|0D 0A|"; ) Another clever example was a bot which issued a GET for a normal looking page and parsed for base64 encoded commands contained in HTML comments. There were three commands: sleep, download & execute file, and reverse shell. This isn't hard to spot once you know the pattern but there's bound to be better stuff out there. Looking for misshapen traffic symmetry, like HTTP sessions with large outbound data streams, is one technique I've heard people have some success with. Regular expressions can spot data outbound if you're looking for structured data like account numbers. Some products also look for high outbound HTTP connection rates that are too fast to be human or HTTP sessions that cross a time threshold. Simple data volume thresholds are too easily triggered by streaming apps, in my experience, unless you consider the direction and traffic shape as in the misshapen symmetry example above. Craig Chamberlain craig () q1labs com
-----Original Message----- From: Jose Nazario [mailto:jose () monkey org] Sent: Tuesday, August 08, 2006 1:11 PM To: mikeiscool Cc: Ron Gula; focus-ids () securityfocus com Subject: Re: detecting network crowd surges On Tue, 8 Aug 2006, mikeiscool wrote:I wonder, though, is this how real botnets are controlled?based on our measurements and observations, IRC is the dominant method for botnet control at this time. but HTTP methods, similar to the ones you described, are coming on in popularity. poll frequencies range from 5 seconds to 1 hour or more. ________ jose nazario, ph.d. jose () monkey org http://monkey.org/~jose/ http://monkey.org/~jose/secnews.html http://www.wormblog.com/ -------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- Test Your IDS Is your IDS deployed correctly? Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from CORE IMPACT. Go to http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/CoreSecurity_focus-ids_040708 to learn more. -------------------------------------------------------------- ----------
------------------------------------------------------------------------ Test Your IDS Is your IDS deployed correctly? Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from CORE IMPACT. Go to http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/CoreSecurity_focus-ids_040708 to learn more. ------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current thread:
- detecting network crowd surges Ron Gula (Aug 04)
- Re: detecting network crowd surges mikeiscool (Aug 08)
- Re: detecting network crowd surges Jose Nazario (Aug 11)
- RE: detecting network crowd surges Craig Chamberlain (Aug 30)
- Re: detecting network crowd surges Jose Nazario (Aug 11)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- Re: detecting network crowd surges rgula () tenablesecurity com (Aug 08)
- Re: detecting network crowd surges mikeiscool (Aug 08)