IDS mailing list archives

RE: Need some information on HIDS!


From: "Ofer Shezaf" <Ofer.Shezaf () breach com>
Date: Sun, 13 Mar 2005 13:20:17 -0500


There are solutions for passively decrypting sniffed SSL traffic (I'm
not aware of any SSH solution though - doesn't seem to be enough
demand):
- You could tweak SSLdump for that.
- IntruShield from MacAfee includes such a feature if this is your
Network IDS of choice 
- We make a plug-in for most major IDS sensors that decrypt SSL.

~ Ofer

Ofer Shezaf
CTO, Breach Security

Tel: +972.9.956.0036 ext.212
Cell: +972.54.443.1119
ofers () breach com
http://www.breach.com 

-----Original Message-----
From: SecurIT Informatique Inc. [mailto:securit () iquebec com]
Sent: Friday, March 04, 2005 4:29 PM
To: Frank Knobbe
Cc: SecurIT Informatique Inc.; peng xuena; focus-ids () securityfocus com
Subject: Re: Need some information on HIDS!

At 10:43 PM 01/03/2005, Frank Knobbe wrote:

On Mon, 2005-02-28 at 13:48 -0500, SecurIT Informatique Inc. wrote:
Hello.  I have already invoked such a scenario in some of my
previous
IDS
work/articles.  What I had in mind is something like encrypting
the
whole
network traffic, to prevent sniffing from intruders (let's say
wall-to-wall
SSH, for example).  In such an environment, if you still wanted to
keep
some NIDS capabilities, you'd actually have to install NIDS
software
(Snort
comes to mind) on every host on the network, in non-promiscuous
mode
(since
sniffing the rest of the network traffic is useless, since it is
encrypted).

Non-promiscuous mode shouldn't matter. If you sniff on the network
interface, you are still only sniffing encrypted traffic.

The only way I can see this work, which may be the direction you're
heading and what you are proposing here, is to sniff traffic on the
loop-back adapter.

I have not implemented this, so in my mind it is still theoretical,
but
what I had in mind is that sniffing local data should be done in the
IP
stack after it's been dealt with by the encryption layer.  This is
what I
had in mind with "non-promiscuous", since the local IP stack will be
unable
to decrypt the traffic not pertaining to it.  Maybe SSH was not the
best
example, but I think you got the idea.

(snip)
But since you are already on the host, why not monitor syscalls and
applications directly?

That's what I'm currently doing/planning to do with some of my own
software.  The suggested setup I mentionned here was in relation to
the
original question in this list.

Adam

Cheers,
Frank



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