IDS mailing list archives

Re: IDS alerts / second - Correlation - Virtualization


From: william taft <willtaft () gmail com>
Date: Thu, 28 Jul 2005 21:10:04 -0400

On 7/26/05, Swift, David <dswift () ipolicynetworks com> wrote:
And how would you propose to block something you can't detect?

IPS actions are always on patterns of data, either packet level, or
based on anomalous behavior (statistical, historical, protocol...).

To argue otherwise is incomprehensible.


why -not- block something you can't understand?  why are we giving up
on using tools other than firwewalls/IPS (i prefer 'layer 7 firewall'
to 'ips')?  handshaking does exist beyond TCP...applications,
authentication protocols, etc. all have 'handshakes'.  if you
authorize enough basic application traffic (i'll bet most of us use
only a handful of applications anyway), i think you'll probably close
many gaps.  IPS/layer7 firewall isn't the answer, but something must
be out there for this purpose.

On 7/26/05, Swift, David <dswift () ipolicynetworks com> continues:
RDP is an allowed protocol to Windows. A Null Session is perfectly
legitimate to Windows operating system.  CAT /ETC/PASSWD is a
perfectly valid Unix command.

you've lost me here...are you saying that just to jam a square
technology into a round role?  you'd allow any access to /etc/passwd
from the outside into your DMZ?  from a non-administrative workstation
to a server?  i wouldn't.  why not block traffic you're not supposed
to see?  yes, block requests to /etc/passwd (and other naughty
actions) across all ports from the outside world into your dmz.  why
wouldn't you?

/will

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