IDS mailing list archives

Re: Cisco CTR


From: liranil () optonline net
Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2003 22:00:11 -0500


Hey Joe 

yes... I have heard about passive monitoring. 
My concern is that it will reduce the performance of the sensor due to the new forensics job that the RNA archtecture 
will imply.

What are your thouhgs?
----- Original Message -----
From: Joe Bowling <joebowling () comcast net>
Date: Saturday, November 8, 2003 1:06 am
Subject: Re: Cisco CTR


You will love the new RNA technology that sourcefire is coming out 
with in
December



think a solution
would be for the IDS to keep a record of the patch levels of 
every system
in
the network and allow those patch levels to be updated only 
through an
administrative interface (requiring additional authentication 
and of
course
increasing the administrative workload).  Then the system 
wouldn't be
fooled
by this technique.






----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Michael Marziani" <marziani () oasis com>
To: "Rob Shein" <shoten () starpower net>; "'Gary Flynn'" 
<flynngn () jmu edu>Cc: "'Liran Chen'" <liranil () optonline net>; 
<focus-ids () securityfocus com>
Sent: Friday, November 07, 2003 10:47 AM
Subject: RE: Cisco CTR


-----Original Message-----
From: Rob Shein [shoten () starpower net]

Yes, but nobody patches it THAT quickly.  CTR acts 
immediately, not a
half-hour later...it would have started scanning by the time 
the hacker
at
the other end notices that he has a shell...

Please don't make unsubstantiated blanket statements like that.  
Hackersare
skilled sysadmins and programmers who create packaged hacking 
tools that
not
only search for and exploit flaws to get them onto a system, but 
also> install programs, disable security features, and yes, patch 
servers> *immediately* once they get inside.

A system like Cisco CTR might very well detect the attack before the
hacker's program has time to patch, but that all depends on how 
good the
hacker's program is, the state of the network, etc.  I'd like to 
see the
results of a live test of such an event.

If this type of attack can succeed as I think it could, I think 
a solution
would be for the IDS to keep a record of the patch levels of 
every system
in
the network and allow those patch levels to be updated only 
through an
administrative interface (requiring additional authentication 
and of
course
increasing the administrative workload).  Then the system 
wouldn't be
fooled
by this technique.

-Michael

Michael Marziani
IT Consultant
Entercede Consulting, Inc.


-----Original Message-----
From: Gary Flynn [flynngn () jmu edu]
Sent: Thursday, November 06, 2003 5:58 PM
To: Rob Shein
Cc: 'Liran Chen'; focus-ids () securityfocus com
Subject: Re: Cisco CTR




Rob Shein wrote:

I think this largely relates to the earlier discussion
about how there
is a difference between a "false positive" and an actual
attack that
fails to succeed.  Ask yourself this: are you going to 
want to know
about all attacks or just those that have a chance of 
success?  If
someone throws IIS attacks at your apache web server, do
you want to
know about it...or do you want to wait until they start using
apache-compatible exploits?

There's a good summary of what CTR does here:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/secursw/ps5054/

Another thing to think about - some folks have a habit of
patching the hole they came in through. Just because a
vulnerability scan shows no vulnerability it does not mean an
attack was unsuccessful.

--
Gary Flynn
Security Engineer - Technical Services
James Madison University

Please R.U.N.S.A.F.E.
http://www.jmu.edu/computing/runsafe





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-----------------------------------------------------------------
---------
-
Network with over 10,000 of the brightest minds in information 
security> at the largest, most highly-anticipated industry event 
of the year.
Don't miss RSA Conference 2004! Choose from over 200 class 
sessions and
see demos from more than 250 industry vendors. If your job touches
security, you need to be here. Learn more or register at
http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/RSA_focus-ids_031023
and use priority code SF4.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
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-------------------------------------------------------------------
--------
Network with over 10,000 of the brightest minds in information 
securityat the largest, most highly-anticipated industry event of 
the year.
Don't miss RSA Conference 2004! Choose from over 200 class 
sessions and
see demos from more than 250 industry vendors. If your job touches
security, you need to be here. Learn more or register at
http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/RSA_focus-ids_031023 
and use priority code SF4.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
--------




---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Network with over 10,000 of the brightest minds in information security
at the largest, most highly-anticipated industry event of the year.
Don't miss RSA Conference 2004! Choose from over 200 class sessions and
see demos from more than 250 industry vendors. If your job touches
security, you need to be here. Learn more or register at
http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/RSA_focus-ids_031023 
and use priority code SF4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


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