IDS mailing list archives

RE: True definition of Intrusion Prevention


From: Frank Knobbe <frank () knobbe us>
Date: Tue, 30 Dec 2003 10:27:33 -0600

On Tue, 2003-12-30 at 09:25, Teicher, Mark (Mark) wrote:
Except that most seasoned Intrusion Detection Protects have had the
ability to "shun" based on a policy.  Intrusion Prevention has not
been
clearly defined as what it is supposed to do and what actual attacks
are
Intrusion Prevention class..


Howdy Mark,

couldn't let that discussion about IPS die, huh? ;)

You realize that you ask for the definition of the term Intrusion
Prevention, yet at the same time use that word to describe a class? Or
are you moving from a classification to a definition? Semantics
perhaps...

Intrusion Prevention means a lot of different things to a lot of
different people (sales speak vs technical). Confusing the issue
further, I heard of folks describe their product as Intrusion Protection
products/services. Argh! But perhaps that fits in better with Richards
security process concept. After all, most IPS's out there are Inline (or
Gateway) IDS's, or firewalls with "deep packet inspection" capabilities,
so they fall squarely under the Protect column. Other IPS are more
reactionary as Richard mentions.

I strongly believe that we should abandon the term in favor of more
detailed and clearer definitions, such as:

- Inline IDS (an IDS which can pass traffic, a la Hogwash).

- Firewall with signature based policy rule sets (that "deep packet"
thingy... gosh... who came up with that term? Sounds more like deep
pocket to me :)

- Host-based firewalls.

- Application wrappers (i.e. SecureIIS)

- Kernel wrappers (i.e. systrace)

- Reactionary IDS (i.e. Snortsam... sorry, couldn't resist the shameless
plug)

- Application proxies and data relays.


I was tempted to continue with Anti-virus/Anti-spam products, but
realize that we could then list ALL security products. After all, they
all Prevent Intrusions, right?

I hereby call upon the security community to abandon the term Intrusion
Prevention System! Let's be more specific. (Otherwise Mark will continue
his quest through the next decade ;)


Cheers, and a Happy New Year to all. May your systems be safe and
secure, and the malware decline next year (hey, we can at least wish for
it...)

Frank

Attachment: signature.asc
Description: This is a digitally signed message part


Current thread: