Re: The Outgoing Traffic Problem --

["Paul D. Robertson" <paul () compuwar net>]

On Tue, 11 Jul 2006, Marcus J. Ranum wrote:

> "After the State Department break-ins, many employees were instructed to
> change their passwords. The department also temporarily disabled a
> technology known as secure sockets layer, used to transmit encrypted
> information over the Internet. Hackers can exploit weaknesses in this
> technology to break into computers, and they can use the same technology
> to transmit stolen information covertly off a victim's network.

It'd be interesting to know if it was protective or reactive blocking -- 
it may just be that the IPS couldn't deal with that traffic so they 
decided to punt it, or it may be they finally have the authority to block 
something they've wanted to block-- we used to have a state.gov poster, if 
he's still around it'd be nice to know if we're at the event horizon 
yet...

 
> Many diplomats were unable to access their online bank accounts using
> government computers because most financial institutions require the
> security technology to be turned on."
>
> So, reading between the lines, it would appear that the bad guys were
> using SSL egress as a conduit. Some of us (me, Paul, Fred..) were
> predicting back in the mid-1990's that this would eventually be a problem.

I hate it when we're right...

> So perhaps a bit of this message is "I told you so!" but it does raise an
> interesting question. Once you've got a user base that is accustomed
> be being able to send arbitrary encrypted streams out through your firewall,
> what ARE you going to do when the bad guys start tunnelling in with your
> "authorized" data?

IDS!  No IPS!  No SSL Firewalls!!!!!

We're way beyond the generic protection mechanism stage, simply because 
HTTP tunnels have driven us there.  SSL tunnels won't change that, so 
here's your next big great market opportunity...

> In Marcus-land, it seems an act of insanity to allow
> (anyone inside) -> (anyplace outside)
> SSL connectivity. For exactly the reasons that State appears to be
> in the process of discovering.
>
> What are most organizations doing about this?? Do most security
> managers have their heads still firmly in the sand on this topic?
> I trust that everyone realizes that it's going to get worse, not better,
> right?

Most security managers have their heads firmly planted somewhere- normally 
it's in a vendor's sandpile ;)

> As far as I can see, the endgame is going to be one of two
> things.
> - Organizations are going to try to add signature-style
> controls to SSL transactions and are going to rely on "man
> in the middle" style interception tricks and (call 'em what
> you want) signatures to detect malicious traffic
> - Organizations are going to have to positively identify
> sites with which it is necessary/appropriate to do SSL
> transactions
>
> I don't see a lot of future in EITHER of those options. The first
> one falls apart really fast if anyone ever fixes SSL's certificate
> trust model (not highly likely) but since it's signature-based
> it'll fail when the hackers add superencryption to their command
> streams. The second option would have worked if it had been
> approached 10 years ago but ironically there's finally enough
> SSL being used that it's probably too late. And reining it in
> would be bad, anyhow. So what happens? Is the long term
> prognosis as bad as I think it is? I'm just afraid that the
> hackers, malcode-writers, and botnetters of the world are going
> to have an impact on the entire Internet that is comparable to
> the impact that the spammers have had on Email systems:
> namely, they have degraded the value and raised the costs
> of the system to the point where it's worth 1/100th of what it
> should be. As many of you have noticed, this boils my
> blood.
>
> Someone, please - tell me I am wrong and that somehow
> it'll get fixed soon.

I dunno- wanna form a software start-up?  I've got a couple of ideas.  Our 
motto could be "We sell you expensive stuff because your were too stupid 
to listen to us when it was a cheap problem to fix."

Paul "I should probably be running to the patent office" Robertson
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paul D. Robertson      "My statements in this message are personal opinions
paul () compuwar net       which may have no basis whatsoever in fact."
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