Firewall Wizards mailing list archives
Re: risk level associated with VPNs?
From: hermit921 <hermit921 () yahoo com>
Date: Mon, 07 Feb 2005 12:28:31 -0800
My view has been that if the remote system is controlled by the business, with the same protection as the local systems, I don't care (much) where the VPN terminates. But when the remote system has less protection, I don't care if the VPN client software makes sure the current connection is "safe" or not. That computer has been exposed to malware a local system has not. To be on the safe side, I recommend terminating VPN's in the DMZ. I can easily set the DMZ rules to allow complete internal access if I want to. When someone changes the policies for remote systems later, I don't have to worry about changing the VPN endpoint at all, just the firewall rules.
hermit921 At 02:55 PM 2/3/2005, Avishai Wool wrote:
Dear all, While doing firewall policy analyses for customers, I very often come across rules that allow any ip traffic from anywhere outside the primeter into big portions of the inside networks but over a VPN link (i.e., encrypted & authenticated). let's put aside the question of whether the authentication is sufficient, and assume that nobody is cracking the passwords. I tend to trust the encryption and believe that noone can snoop the traffic in flight. My claim is that these rules are very risky and a wonderful vector for all kinds of malware. All those home computers, laptops on the road etc, are much more at risk of infection than inside computers are. Plus the VPN has the nice side-effect that filters can't see though the encryption and control (or even log) where the connection is going and what it is doing. Left to my own devices, I would recommend terminating the VPNs in a DMZ, and putting all the usual controls (anti-virus/mail filter/etc) between the DMZ and the inside, and I would flag these raw VPN connections as risky, maybe even very risky. However, customers uniformly disagree with this argument, and tell me that "traffic coming over a VPN is not perceived as a risk so shut up about it." Thoughts anyone? Any credible war stories about malware/abuse traveling over VPNs? Or are the customers right and I'm being paranoid? (please don't respond that "the customer is always right" :-) Thanks, Avishai ===== Avishai Wool, Ph.D., http://www.algosec.com http://www.eng.tau.ac.il/~yash yash () acm org Tel: +972-3-640-6316 Fax: +972-3-640-7095 __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around http://mail.yahoo.com _______________________________________________ firewall-wizards mailing list firewall-wizards () honor icsalabs com http://honor.icsalabs.com/mailman/listinfo/firewall-wizards
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Current thread:
- risk level associated with VPNs? Avishai Wool (Feb 05)
- Re: risk level associated with VPNs? Marcus J. Ranum (Feb 06)
- RE: risk level associated with VPNs? Bruce Smith (Feb 06)
- Re: risk level associated with VPNs? R. DuFresne (Feb 06)
- Re: risk level associated with VPNs? Paul D. Robertson (Feb 06)
- Re: risk level associated with VPNs? hermit921 (Feb 11)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- RE: risk level associated with VPNs? rlmieth (Feb 06)
- Re: risk level associated with VPNs? Shimon Silberschlag (Feb 11)
- RE: risk level associated with VPNs? Desai, Ashish (Feb 11)
- RE: risk level associated with VPNs? Paul D. Robertson (Feb 11)
- RE: risk level associated with VPNs? Michael Surkan (Feb 11)
- RE: risk level associated with VPNs? Paul D. Robertson (Feb 11)
- RE: risk level associated with VPNs? Richards, Jim (Feb 11)