Re: "Who else picked this one up?"

["Paul D. Robertson" <proberts () clark net>]

On Sat, 1 May 1999, R. DuFresne wrote:

> > Nobody should be "testing" a scanner against a network I administer 
> > without my express permission.  The idea that scanning a foreign network 
> > for potential vulnerabilities without permission is valid behaviour is 
> > just plain wrong.
>
> In theory, yes, I agree.  Yet, I have watched over the years and learned
> that it is merely a theory, practice, capability, and legalities show this
> to be something that at this point is merely theory.

So where do you find a problem with folks who like to test scanners from
their networks being listed as such?  Surely if I don't want traffic from
a particular AS to reach my network that's up to me?  Surely if I find a
particular behaviour counter-productive to my connectivity, I should have
a resource that lets me identify sites that exhibit that behaviour and do
what I feel is right to protect my networks?

> > > scanners, to get a feel for the SW just brought up, those door knockers
> > > just testing, they will not muddie up the waters too much, will they?  The
> > > NFR SW also, knows how to track down spoofed scans, so as to not logs the
> >
> > Spoofing is a fact of life on a packet switched network.  Guess what?  
> > It's a solvable problem if upstreams did source filtering on their 
> > downstreams and providers did the same.  There's absolutely no impetus 
> > for anyone to do that at the moment.  So instead of trying to solve the 
> > problem, we should all just decide that business as usual is ok?  I think 
> > not.
>
> Ahh, I see, so, since things are the way they now are, and since those
> responsible for enacting legislation that would make it a federal
> misdemeanor for such door knocking and window rattling have not reacted in
> a mannner enforcable, *another* small mob of internet vigilanties will?

Call it what you wish, I have no impetus to peer with the entire planet if
the risk is higher than I'm willing to accept.  Whatever means I chose to
use to achive that end is up to me, just as it is to every network
operator.  It's called self-policing, and it's about the only recourse we
have.  I haven't seen a better idea, what's your solution, or is it just
status quo?

> > In most of the world, the current situation in Singapore withstanding, 
> > the only people scanning to "document broken networks" should be the 
> > network operators of those networks.  This means that they need to know 
> > they're being abused so that they can start the process of fixing them.  
> > Notification of apparent sources of packets fulfills that.  If the 
> > packets are spoofed, then a network operator can filter packets at their 
> > ingress point to ensure that they're only sourced at legitimate 
> > addresses.  You don't get that in the current environment.
>
> Again, a nice theory, but, not a fact at all, considering the legalities,
> the capabilities and prcatice...But, I recall there being a database,
> built by outsiders not too long ago, that documented broken networks that
> can be usde to amplify smurfs and such, and the goal of that database<s?> 
> was to let those folks know that they in fact had broken networks, how
> well did that effort workout?  Exposure has forced all those networks to
> be fixed, yes?

I'm not sure how well it worked out, since I wasn't watching that one too
closely, but if I'm given the ability to blackhole smurf amplifiers until
they fix their networks, then why are you so upset at my choice of who to
accept traffic from?  That's between me and the amplifier, and if you're
them, then you're in the loop, if you aren't, then what do you care?
Abusive networks need to curtail their abuse.  For that there needs to be
an impetus for them to do so.

> The fact remains, that the capbility is there and the legailties do *not*
> make this tweaking a crime with true potential of redress.  Even legit

It may or may not be a crime, that's dependent on jurisdiction.  

> operators use this.  Many networks I work and play in see telnet probes
> launched by IRC admins per client connections to their servers <we have
> also seen ftp sites do similar, defending thier actions on the fact that
> if you like it not, no not use their service, what they are truely seeking 
> in these actions, one can only guess.  Hell, I recall being probed by

That's fine, because my stance is that if they do that, I won't exchange
traffic with them.  

> sites because I sent e-mail to a user there, same justification>. Does
> this consistute *abuse* or "misuse" of current capabilities and
> legailities, and their own sense of 'protection' is weighted against this?

Abuse and misuse are in the eye of the beholder.  I don't see why you're
against me wanting to exchange abuse information with my peers to make
choices about the operation of my networks.

> > How can data be abused?  It's real packets hitting a real network.  
> > Fortunately, networks aren't transient like customers, so a known 
> > quantity can be established and metrics given to providers of the data.  
> > Given logs, a network operator can be responsible about cleaning up 
> > abuse.  It's the same issue that ISP's abuse departments face every day 
> > with USENET and SMTP reports.  Spoofing is possible, and network 
> > operators can mostly determine the validity of a report.  If networks are 
> > overly abusive, then the rest of the world can agree not to peer with 
> > them until they solve their problems.  It's the same principle that 
> > governs USENET, USENET II, and RBL.  Without data there's no way to start 
> > the process of accountability.  
>
> The potential of abuse is easy to comprehend here, very easy to see, once
> a network makes the list, the site in question, on the posted database are
> blacklisted, or for our purposes, blackholed, by those 'reading' the

And it's completely up to anyone who wishes to read the database to do so.
Once again I ask what purpose you have in trying to tell me what sorts of
sites I should accept traffic from?  

> database.  Nevermind how obvious the disclamers posted concerning
> this data, we all know how much attention folks pay to disclaimers and
> documentation.  Once listed, those 'offenders' have what recourse to
> be removed from such a list?  How does a network go about getting
> themselves unlisted should they be misrepresented in this database?  To

When we get to that point, I'm sure we'll have a process.

> what body do those 'offender' seek redress?  Are we now, not talking about
> the creation of another arbitrary body of database maintainers that sit as
> judge and jury, adding and removing networks and addresses based upon an
> as yet unwritten set of criteria that will gain the 'offenders' a *pardon*

For the scope of their database yes.  Just like if I don't want e-mail
from you, I'm free bto add you to my procmail scripts, and I'm free to
share those with other peoplw who share the same views of acceptable
electronic mail.  That group of people is free to do as they wish with the
data, and make any analysis they want with it.  If it's bad for the
market, then the market will move to mail systems without procmail.

> or a *probation*?  How many scans document a network as being particularly
> abusive?  One scan a day to one outside network per, what, 100, 1,000
> users?  Two scans?  10?  How many ports do they need to hit, 1, 2,

That's a damn good question, and the reason we need the data we're talking
about.  Because right now, we don't even know what the norm is.

> 10, 100?  Hell, let's just do it like the leet scripts in
> IRC, set all the routers ACL's to block *@*.home.com *@*.aol.com and such
> right now.  Of course, that in itself will have some ramifications for
> this list itself and some of it's users.

Just like it has traditionally had ramifications as far as the resources
AOL has contributed to the IRC networks and the effectiveness of their
abuse department.

> > RBL works, UDP works, to some extent UCE reporting works.  Anarchy 
> > doesn't work because there are too many people willing to victimize others.
>
> As concerns RBL, once listed there, who does one see and who does one go
> about getting their site removed from the listing?  Assuming that spamming
> has been curtailed from the abuing site and all...

There's a pointer on the RBL Web page, http://maps.vix.com/rbl/

> Being that the sites I work and play in are probed multiple time daily,
> yes, I'm well aware that their is a problem out here <yes, I log it, and
> use that information, but, it's not available publically, it's an
> arbitrary decision to assess the risk, and an abitrary decision is used
> to place actual *value* on the *assests* I feel I'm in possesion of and
> protecting (keep your gigo away from *my* gigo)>. This might well be the
> last frontier on this planet. But, I'm not so sure that the way to tame it
> is via another *mob of internet vigilanties* promoting their own agenda is
> the way to go.

Like all good schemes, it's ipt-in, so it's not vigilantism since there's
no co-option of non-volunteer networks.  Better we police ourselves than
have it done for us.

Paul
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paul D. Robertson      "My statements in this message are personal opinions
proberts () clark net      which may have no basis whatsoever in fact."
                                                                     PSB#9280