Firewall Wizards mailing list archives
Re: ipchains FW, monitoring for scans, & how to react to them
From: Crispin Cowan <crispin () cse ogi edu>
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 1999 07:44:17 +0000
Danny Rathjens wrote:
My conjecture was that disallowing any access to port 80 from an address that has in the near past attempted to connect to a port such as 1(indicitave of a port scan) would increase the security of my web server.
This is: * simple intrusion detection (if they port scanned me, it's an intrusion attempt) * simple reaction to intrusion (deny *all* access to the offending IP)
I don't think this point is very debatable(although, as someone pointed out, the DOS possibiities could be significant if I implement it improperly)
Yes, the DoS implications are significant. If an attacker were to detect this behavior, they could easily trash your web server by spoofing source addresses on lots of port scans. It seems to be a violation of one of Andy Tanenbaum's great pithy quotes: "Never check for an error condition you don't know how to handle :-)" Since the attacker is (obviously) poorly authenticated, a reaction that denies service to the attacer's putative identity seems ill-advised. Running a port scan detector is certainly a reasonable intrusion detection plan. The problem is in the adaptive response.
As to responding to ports other than 80, I don't believe either of my two implementation suggestions fall in that category since the ipchains DENY rule drops the packet(e.g. headed for port 1) on the ground and portsentry configured properly remains mute as well.
So you're detecting intrusions that won't actually affect you. Not only do we not know how to handle this error condition, we also don't care :-) Why scan for intrusions that won't affect the web server, if it doesn't matter *and* you can't do anything effective about it? If you really want to persue this line of investigation, I think it would be effective to: 1. Purchase a commercial intrusion detection system, which will be much more effective than a hand-crafted hack like some ipchains rules and a log sniffer. 2. Formulate a policy for what your site will do when intrusion attempts are detected. Cutting off all service to the offending source IP address is problematic :-) Robo-e-mail to the offending source is probably less intrusive. Crispin ----- Crispin Cowan, CTO, WireX Communications, Inc. http://wirex.com Free Hardened Linux Distribution: http://immunix.org
Current thread:
- ipchains FW, monitoring for scans, & how to react to them Danny Rathjens (Dec 20)
- Re: ipchains FW, monitoring for scans, & how to react to them R. DuFresne (Dec 21)
- Re: ipchains FW, monitoring for scans, & how to react to them Danny Rathjens (Dec 21)
- Re: ipchains FW, monitoring for scans, & how to react to them R. DuFresne (Dec 21)
- Re: ipchains FW, monitoring for scans, & how to react to them Danny Rathjens (Dec 21)
- Re: ipchains FW, monitoring for scans, & how to react to them Crispin Cowan (Dec 21)
- Re: ipchains FW, monitoring for scans, & how to react to them Danny Rathjens (Dec 21)
- Re: ipchains FW, monitoring for scans, & how to react to them Crispin Cowan (Dec 21)
- Re: ipchains FW, monitoring for scans, & how to react to them Danny Rathjens (Dec 21)
- war dialers, are they a current threat? R. DuFresne (Dec 22)
- Re: war dialers, are they a current threat? S. Jonah Pressman (Dec 24)
- RE: war dialers, are they a current threat? Joseph Judge (Dec 26)
- Re: war dialers, are they a current threat? Dorian Moore (Dec 28)
- Re: ipchains FW, monitoring for scans, & how to react to them Danny Rathjens (Dec 21)
- Message not available
- Re: war dialers, are they a current threat? Eric Budke (Dec 24)
- Re: ipchains FW, monitoring for scans, & how to react to them R. DuFresne (Dec 21)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- Re: ipchains FW, monitoring for scans, & how to react to them Thom Dyson (Dec 21)
- Re: ipchains FW, monitoring for scans, & how to react to them cbrenton (Dec 23)
- Re: ipchains FW, monitoring for scans, & how to react to them Robert Graham (Dec 22)