Educause Security Discussion mailing list archives

Re: Java vs. Banner


From: Kevin Wilcox <wilcoxkm () APPSTATE EDU>
Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2013 13:52:10 -0500

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On Thu, Feb 21, 2013 at 06:30:45PM +0000, Ludwig, David C. wrote:

   We've had some discussions around limiting access to Banner
   INB from a set of VMs on a specific subnet.  Those machine would be built
   with IE8, Java 6 etc and would be limited to only access Banner and a
   handful of other systems on campus (document management for example). 
   Users could then do whatever they needed on their location machines as far
   as Java/IE upgrades and web browsing.  But the access to Banner could only
   occur once logged into the a secured VM.  

We've had similar discussions but I would like to point something out
about your phrasing -- "once logged into the/a secured VM".

If you let the physical machine do what it will, and rely on the virtual
infrastructure to be the secure component, you're going to win the
battle with users but lose the war with the bad guys.

Once the physical host is compromised, account credentials typed into
the VM are going to be leaked. Screenshots are going to be leaked. If
it's a sophisticated attacker, he/she will come back and access the
virtual environment through the compromised workstation.

I would suggest, if you're really able to get buy-in, inverting the
model. Allow the physical machine access to your on-campus resources and
then permit general web use through something like VDI/Citrix/Xen
desktops or through a tightly controlled content filtering effort (with
access policies determined by the business units, NOT mandated by IT, we
generally don't know what our users really need). A "voluntary" squid
cluster to proxy (and filter) http and https is *very* cheap -- and
certainly cheaper than a compromise in key areas.

I know this is practically impossible to push *everywhere* but
if you can get buy-in from sensitive areas and protect those key spots,
you're already making the environment more difficult to penetrate than
your neighbour.

At least, that's what I've heard...

kmw

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