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Re: Quick Review: Cyberwar as a Confidence Game by Martin C. Libicki


From: Ron Gula <rgula () tenable com>
Date: Mon, 21 Mar 2011 13:48:58 -0400

I'm not sure I agree. Technically, sure, you can hack into things and
take them out. However, comparing hacking to a cruise missile is a
stretch. I can patch my systems today and your cyber-attack tomorrow is
foiled. Or maybe I switch from Mac to Windows. A Tomahawk cruise missile
is just as effective against a Russian radar system or a French one.

Don't get me wrong - hacking, backdoors, denial of service, altering
messages, decrypting sensitive messages .etc all have their place. I
just think the categories are cyber intelligence, terrorism, espionage,
sabotage or crime but not "warfare".

We've been doing intel, terror, spying, sabotage and crime for a long
time and the tools have just changed with the introduction of
hyper-connected computers and targets.

-- Ron Gula, CEO Tenable Network Security http://www.tenable.com

On 3/20/2011 10:52 PM, greg hoglund wrote:
I agree with you Dave.  Cyberwar is technical.  Granted, like any war,
it must be backed by intel and psyops.  But, like any war, the kills
people see in the press are kinetic.  Cruise missiles are technical,
and kinetic.  But, everything is backed by intel.  Even missiles.  In
cyber, the importance of HUMINT far outweighs that of kinetic damage.
The technology is new and different, but the classic principle
applies.  This war is not new.

-Greg


On Sunday, March 20, 2011, Dave Aitel <dave.aitel () gmail com> wrote:
Paper Review
Cyberwar as a Confidence Game
Martin C. Libicki
http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2011/spring/libicki.pdf

Here's the last line, which sums it up nicely:
"""
Building up our offensive
capabilities is a confidence game. It says to those who would
compete in
our league: are you confident enough in your cyberwar skills that
you can
build your military to rely on information systems and the
machines that
take their orders?
"""

One thing missing from this paper is any evidence that this kind of
logic (aka, Fear Uncertainty and Doubt in military information systems
as applied to network centric warfare) has any real-world effect.
Militaries (including our own) simply don't take these things into
account when deploying new systems.

But the main anomaly in the paper is simple: He treats Stuxnet as an
aberration, rather than the tip of the iceberg that finally made the
newspapers. And this leads him (and most other strategic analysts) to
conclude that hacking does not have real world effects. I have to
assume this is the WWII legacy of Enigma - where in order to take
advantage of intelligence you had to go out and order your sub killers
to go sink a boat. But just because hacking is tied to intelligence
bodies in most countries, and staffed with people who look and act a
lot like intelligence officers, does not make it the same thing.
Hacking is as kinetic as a cruise missile when you do it right.

-dave
(This is a first in a series of posts where-in we all get to review
the Strategic Studies Quarterly's Spring Cyber-War papers -
http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/ ).
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