Security Basics mailing list archives

Re: What can WPA/WPA2 use for Encryption


From: martin <martiniscool () gmail com>
Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2009 22:36:52 +0100

Guys

Thanks once again for all the replies. I've glanced through all of them but not had a chance to read them all (and links) in-depth yet

One final thing however, escentially this circuit will be just the 2 AP's - there will be no clients on this "microwave" network. So the authentication will only be done between the 2 AP's - if we did go for a RADIUS solution, how would this work ? Would one AP act as "master" & the second AP would be authenticated by the first ? How do AP's in a "traditional" corporate environment authenticate each other & ensure they are not communicating with a rogue AP ?

Thanks again
M

On 25 Aug 2009, at 20:05, Chris Brenton <cbrenton () chrisbrenton org> wrote:

On Tue, 2009-08-25 at 18:18 +0100, martin wrote:

Thanks very much for the speedy reply Chris.

Always glad to help. :)

Regarding WPA, I take it that PSK & TKIP are just authentication
methods then ?

WPA comes in two flavors, home and enterprise. WPA-PSK is the home or
"personal" implementation, and to the best of my knowledge it only
supports a pre-shared secret (or key). WPA enterprise is the hardcore
version with a RADIUS interface that supports a wide range of
authentication options. There is a pretty cool write up on it here:
http://wiki.freeradius.org/WPA_HOWTO

TKIP is a different animal. Once we knew WEP was hosed we needed
something better. The problem was we had a ton of access points already
deployed with processors optimized for RC4 encryption. You could field
upgrade to change the code, but you could not do much about the
processors without replacing the whole AP.

This is where TKIP came from. Its designed to be compatible with older
(but field upgraded) APs that will not work with AES. Today however, if
you have all modern APs, you are suppose to be using CCMP with support
for AES.

With that said, I *hate* WPA in the enterprise. It creates an additional point of management and limits you to AES for data privacy. IMHO AES is
never going to last the intended 30 years like DES. I have a write up
here:

http://www.chrisbrenton.org/2009/07/aes-is-becoming-very-close-to-broken/

So what to do? In my previous post I gave a link to where I explain you are better off linking wireless in with your VPN solution. Single point
of management, better security options, same people tend to use VPN &
wireless, plus a bunch of other reasons. See that link if this sounds
interesting.

In this case, what other authentication methods are
available ?  Does 802.1x fall into this category ?  Or is this
something additional to WPA entirely ?

Yup. 802.1x describes the RADIUS interface I described above.

Also, what would AES use to encrypt the payload ?  Is there always a
shared secret of some kind, akin to a users' password in AD ?

Actually, the AES keys get changed over time. The AP uses the session
key to create an EAP key message to the client. Nice thing about this
setup is that brute forcing one key does not compromise all data, just
the data protected with that one key.

Cheers,
Chris
--
www.chrisbrenton.org


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