RE: Concepts: Security and Obscurity

["Ken Kousky" <kkousky () ip3inc com>]

But we're missing the policy implications that I tried to introduce. If you
establish obscurity as a control you must undertake overt actions to protect
obscurity. It is these very actions that prevent adequate vetting and review
of the control and thus allow weak or even corrupt practices to infiltrate
your control portfolio. Please review the use of National Security Letters
by the FBI and the corrupting impact of the binding gag order claimed
necessary to protect the security control. Obscurity frequently corrupts and
should be seen as a control of last resort and not part of in depth
portfolio.

KWK

-----Original Message-----
From: listbounce () securityfocus com [mailto:listbounce () securityfocus com] On
Behalf Of Young, Randy
Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2007 6:03 PM
To: Joe Yong; security-basics () securityfocus com
Subject: RE: Concepts: Security and Obscurity

I agree heavily with you Joe.  Security in DEPTH means multiple layers,
and obscurity certainly does add one more dimension.  Thank you for the
well written response to clear up the misunderstandings going on.
 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: listbounce () securityfocus com 
> [mailto:listbounce () securityfocus com] On Behalf Of Joe Yong
> Sent: Tuesday, April 10, 2007 10:59 PM
> To: security-basics () securityfocus com
> Subject: Re: Concepts: Security and Obscurity
>
> I'm really curious to know if some of the folks who responded 
> to this thread really gave the article a fair and honest 
> chance by reading objectively or just jumped in and started 
> hammering as soon as they saw the words security and 
> obscurity in the same line.
>
> Half the responses are slamming security that is dependent 
> exclusively or heavily on obscurity. Was that really what the 
> article proposed?
> Show me where. It's been a while since high school English 
> classes so I will be the first to admit I can misread things at times.
>
> From what I can tell, the article proposes that adding 
> obscurity to an already well secured system can add benefits. 
> While I think the analogy used in the article is pretty weak, 
> the idea is not.
>
> Quite a few security researchers have done this but feel free 
> to try it for yourself. Setup some server application that is 
> a common target for attacks (just so you'll get some quick 
> responses) using standard secure configuration and setup 
> another one in exactly the same secure way but listening on 
> some completely off-the-wall port and non-default protocol. 
> Track how many attempts you get on each.
>
> Again, security that is heavily or solely dependent on 
> obscurity is bad - I don't think there'll be a lot of 
> contention there. However, Mr. Miessler is proposing that if 
> you already have reasonable security measures in place, 
> obscurity can provided an added layer. This actually does 
> help in many situations. Is it a security cure-all?
> Well, is anything?