Penetration Testing mailing list archives
Re: EXAMPLE: Why OOO is *BAD* [WAS: Re: OOO FLAME]
From: Tim March <march.tim () gmail com>
Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2008 08:22:18 +0930
I didn't miss the point -- just found the story questionable. T. Pablo Cardoso wrote:
Tim, I'm guessing you missed the point. The secretary called the tech-support of Joe's company, she was the one requesting the /etc/shadow file from the server :P!!! Excellent scenario, Jon, thanks for sharing! Regards, Pablo Cardoso On Mon, Sep 15, 2008 at 2:39 AM, Tim March <march.tim () gmail com> wrote:A secretary with access to the '/etc/shadow' file... and the means to pull it off of the machine and in to her email client... *giggles to self* T. Jon Kibler wrote:-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Erin Carroll wrote:List, Let's take Ray's tangent and run with it. What (if any) ways are OOO messages useful from a pen-test perspective? How would you use the knowledge that someone is away/on vacation in a pen-test? Would you alter your techniques or target those accounts specifically in the hopes that brute force or other account specific techniques might have a window to go unnoticed? I'm just trying to get a conversational ball rolling here. I know where I would modify my tactics but I'm curious to see what members say. I know that one area many companies are historically weak is in logging of security events. Or rather, in having someone actually pay attention to all those alerts.Okay, since I started this, you're on! Real world example... I was teaching a pen-test bootcamp several years ago. One of the students (who I will call 'Joe') pooh-poohed the whole OOO message issue. He even indicated that he used them all the time, that they were harmless, and they saved him from getting calls to his cell phone at roaming rates when he was out of town. (This was back in the days before nationwide calling plans.) I then sent Joe a test email message at his work email address. I got back an OOO message saying that he would be out of the office for two weeks of training and would only have very limited email at night. His signature line showed that he was the dep-CSO for his organization. I then displayed the email for the whole class to discuss. Next, I proposed that we demonstrate why OOO messages are an issue. What I proposed was to social engineer the help desk into providing sensitive information. Rather arrogantly, he said, "Sure, why not? Those guys are well trained and would never fall for anything you could contrive." We then got permission (in writing) from the CIO, the CSO, and the organization's legal department to do the social engineering attack. Next, I wrote up a script for a secretary (who I will call 'Sue') at that ed center to use to call the organization's help desk. It basically went as follows: Sue: "Hi, I'm Sue with abc training company. One of your employees, Joe, is taking a security course from us and he forgot that he was supposed to bring the /etc/shadow file from the user file store server. He needs it to use in class to test password cracking. He asked that you please gzip it and email it to him." Help Desk: "Okay, but I will have to check with his manager first." Sue: "Oh, Joe said that if you needed to verify that he was taking a course from us, just send him an email and the OOO reply it will have everything you need to know." Help Desk: "Alright, give me a minute. (Pause) Okay, I guess this has everything I need. But, it says that he has limited email access; does he want it sent to his office email address?" (This just shows that help desks are trained to be helpful!!! Despite continual security awareness training, the possibility that this might be social engineering attack never even occurred to this guy!) Sue: "No, I was just about to tell you that he asked to have you it send to his Hotmail address, which is: joe.... () hotmail com." Help Desk: "Okay, no problem, he should have it in about 5 minutes." Needless to say, we had just created the hotmail account a few minutes prior to the phone call. In just a couple of minutes, we owned the shadow file from the file server where all user accounts have their data stored. In other words, we now pwned the passwords for every one of his users. After that b-slap with a clue-by-4, Joe started singing a different tune. Jon K. - -- Jon R. Kibler Chief Technical Officer Advanced Systems Engineering Technology, Inc. Charleston, SC USA o: 843-849-8214 c: 843-224-2494 s: 843-564-4224 http://www.linkedin.com/in/jonrkibler My PGP Fingerprint is: BAA2 1F2C 5543 5D25 4636 A392 515C 5045 CF39 4253 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.8 (Darwin) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iEYEARECAAYFAkjNccsACgkQUVxQRc85QlOwCwCgl54SNlQMmB6/USWoYaKXTGiz 74kAoIuGzu3M2pYIcOuiQNiVewO478Rd =BBer -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ================================================== Filtered by: TRUSTEM.COM's Email Filtering Service http://www.trustem.com/ No Spam. No Viruses. Just Good Clean Email. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ This list is sponsored by: Cenzic Top 5 Common Mistakes in Securing Web Applications Get 45 Min Video and PPT Slides www.cenzic.com/landing/securityfocus/hackinar -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Tim March P: +61 (0)406 577 276 E: march.tim () gmail com ------------------------------------------------------------------------ This list is sponsored by: Cenzic Top 5 Common Mistakes in Securing Web Applications Get 45 Min Video and PPT Slides www.cenzic.com/landing/securityfocus/hackinar ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ This list is sponsored by: CenzicTop 5 Common Mistakes in Securing Web ApplicationsGet 45 Min Video and PPT Slides www.cenzic.com/landing/securityfocus/hackinar ------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------ This list is sponsored by: CenzicTop 5 Common Mistakes in Securing Web Applications
Get 45 Min Video and PPT Slides www.cenzic.com/landing/securityfocus/hackinar ------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current thread:
- Re: OOO FLAME, (continued)
- Re: OOO FLAME ray . hawkins (Sep 14)
- RE: OOO FLAME Erin Carroll (Sep 14)
- EXAMPLE: Why OOO is *BAD* [WAS: Re: OOO FLAME] Jon Kibler (Sep 14)
- Re: EXAMPLE: Why OOO is *BAD* [WAS: Re: OOO FLAME] Michael Boman (Sep 14)
- Re: EXAMPLE: Why OOO is *BAD* [WAS: Re: OOO FLAME] Trygve Aasheim (Sep 15)
- Re: EXAMPLE: Why OOO is *BAD* [WAS: Re: OOO FLAME] Jon Kibler (Sep 16)
- RE: OOO FLAME Erin Carroll (Sep 14)
- Re: EXAMPLE: Why OOO is *BAD* [WAS: Re: OOO FLAME] Tim March (Sep 14)
- Re: EXAMPLE: Why OOO is *BAD* [WAS: Re: OOO FLAME] R. DuFresne (Sep 15)
- Re: EXAMPLE: Why OOO is *BAD* [WAS: Re: OOO FLAME] David Howe (Sep 16)
- Re: OOO FLAME ray . hawkins (Sep 14)
- Message not available
- EXAMPLE: Why OOO is *BAD* [WAS: Re: OOO FLAME] Pablo Cardoso (Sep 15)
- Re: EXAMPLE: Why OOO is *BAD* [WAS: Re: OOO FLAME] Tim March (Sep 15)
- RE: EXAMPLE: Why OOO is *BAD* [WAS: Re: OOO FLAME] Ashvin Oogorah (Sep 16)
- Questionable Security Policy [WAS: EXAMPLE: Why OOO is *BAD* [WAS: Re: OOO FLAME]] Veal, Richard (Sep 16)
- RE: EXAMPLE: Why OOO is *BAD* [WAS: Re: OOO FLAME] Hill, Pete (Sep 16)
- Re: EXAMPLE: Why OOO is *BAD* [WAS: Re: OOO FLAME] Tim March (Sep 16)
- Re: EXAMPLE: Why OOO is *BAD* [WAS: Re: OOO FLAME] Pablo Cardoso (Sep 16)
- RE: EXAMPLE: Why OOO is *BAD* [WAS: Re: OOO FLAME] Oftedahl, Douglas (Sep 16)
- Re: EXAMPLE: Why OOO is *BAD* [WAS: Re: OOO FLAME] Pete Herzog (Sep 16)
- RE: EXAMPLE: Why OOO is *BAD* [WAS: Re: OOO FLAME] Alexandru Bradescu-Popa (Sep 15)
- Re: EXAMPLE: Why OOO is *BAD* [WAS: Re: OOO FLAME] Michael Boman (Sep 15)
- RE: EXAMPLE: Why OOO is *BAD* [WAS: Re: OOO FLAME] Alexandru Bradescu-Popa (Sep 16)