Re: upstream source code authenticity checking

[Alistair Crooks <agc () pkgsrc org>]

On Thu, Apr 25, 2013 at 01:30:23AM -0600, Kurt Seifried wrote:
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> On 04/24/2013 11:55 PM, Alistair Crooks wrote:
> > I'm not sure what using PGP gains us?
> >
> > Regards, Alistair
>
> So some possible outcomes are:
>
> 1) They do PGP/GPG and don't get compromised. Long term outcome: we
> come out way ahead.
>
> 2) They do PGP/GPG and do get compromised. Long term outcome: we trust
> bad things and lose, hopefully this gets spotted quickly and dealt with.

Sure.  I actually agree with you.  But I'd also like it if we could
bear in mind that, with PGP, trust is earned, trust signatures are
snapshots in time, and trust levels are private, best guessses by
people.  All people can see from a key listing is who trusted them and
when, not how much, or whether the trust was warranted.
 
> At a minimum this raises the bar for attackers when trying to insert a
> fake release/whatever. The real problem however is the cost of doing
> this. Key creation/storage/management/backup/etc is all non trivial
> and not free. Is the cost of this worth it?
>
> I think if we are going to push this we need to come up with a pretty
> good set of guidelines that are easy to follow and implement. Things
> like creation of keys, usage, storage, how to handle key roll overs,
> lost keys, etc. Maybe even have a trusted party signs packages sent to
> them, confirms the package with the project through some other trusted
> channel like secure email or because they know the guy in real life/etc.

I do like this idea, although think there should be more than one "trusted"
party. But the tools we have don't do that kind of third-party verification;
it would be good to get that in there.

Regards,
Alistair