oss-sec mailing list archives
Re: upstream source code authenticity checking
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried () redhat com>
Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2013 01:30:23 -0600
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 04/24/2013 11:55 PM, Alistair Crooks wrote:
I'm not sure what using PGP gains us? Regards, Alistair
So some possible outcomes are: 1) They do PGP/GPG and don't get compromised. Long term outcome: we come out way ahead. 2) They do PGP/GPG and do get compromised. Long term outcome: we trust bad things and lose, hopefully this gets spotted quickly and dealt with. At a minimum this raises the bar for attackers when trying to insert a fake release/whatever. The real problem however is the cost of doing this. Key creation/storage/management/backup/etc is all non trivial and not free. Is the cost of this worth it? I think if we are going to push this we need to come up with a pretty good set of guidelines that are easy to follow and implement. Things like creation of keys, usage, storage, how to handle key roll overs, lost keys, etc. Maybe even have a trusted party signs packages sent to them, confirms the package with the project through some other trusted channel like secure email or because they know the guy in real life/etc. - -- Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT) PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.13 (GNU/Linux) iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJReNuPAAoJEBYNRVNeJnmTLXQQAKpQNKy4ABZcJz6H2TJQNk00 sVKFtBAhMh8reAG4eTzsoIs3LmMpca0XaOsgdWp/HeUBUUZ6L7ru0C7vtJIFy2FE lx+os7UoR8SJpOddXkx94lgwx1dN/lzqJahWLdIUwJ569ezVqyloQkPUEDXym9Rt qPkRCbHyrH4yQKrL0/gwKOOyVchS223pRzuvl0EkoQN3FvugBQvAIgUPUXve2S8L +QLTmyf6KxDHR9S9E6HZwsc68XzgJgljzcZtb9TZ9Wx4njrKezx/Tm/npxq+/DGr AfOG1/7ojXzACeuen0FBw8xjHrIX0ok6VX8bo+jIsPTYq7vaKnaZQDwDqpkq7Qwo XR+n665+4gjlNkyc+GP2RK4HBwpyivu7gUpAlmxlum1KGLKihCYWT2zOVn5YYbNL 0hQWq0KvN5YaUrcqlIxtWnOdz1yeqNpIR1+aMfzGNFSVzMq7Z91MtOn3HEb2v4Nu wQt4ARUU4dK+viXT8uFCuZQmSF6EvaK9Q4EXfZujuZQxB4s1bhRHxoSIySQksNPZ A9nm3OKHXlKGaGx/iYOHX7S4m9cBTwmiqS44WzrijGDHRwMtll4Of+9algBNFXda AUAsXtm+fgow02AfKMJuPYW7cMZLbn7qNLi6PT/E9Zsoqcs+ZEZwvv6LRR2I83uH IcPFjgi4UUUBJOgLl0aw =695G -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Current thread:
- Re: upstream source code authenticity checking, (continued)
- Re: upstream source code authenticity checking Marcus Meissner (Apr 21)
- Re: upstream source code authenticity checking Jeremy Stanley (Apr 21)
- Re: upstream source code authenticity checking Allan McRae (Apr 21)
- Re: upstream source code authenticity checking Alistair Crooks (Apr 21)
- Re: upstream source code authenticity checking Allan McRae (Apr 21)
- Re: upstream source code authenticity checking Alistair Crooks (Apr 21)
- Re: upstream source code authenticity checking Stuart Henderson (Apr 22)
- Re: upstream source code authenticity checking Allan McRae (Apr 21)
- Re: upstream source code authenticity checking Eric H. Christensen (Apr 24)
- Re: upstream source code authenticity checking Alistair Crooks (Apr 24)
- Re: upstream source code authenticity checking Allan McRae (Apr 24)
- Re: upstream source code authenticity checking Kurt Seifried (Apr 25)
- Re: upstream source code authenticity checking Daniel Kahn Gillmor (Apr 25)
- Re: upstream source code authenticity checking Alistair Crooks (Apr 25)
- Re: upstream source code authenticity checking Kurt Seifried (Apr 25)
- Re: upstream source code authenticity checking Dag-Erling Smørgrav (Apr 26)
- Re: upstream source code authenticity checking Kurt Seifried (Apr 26)
- Re: upstream source code authenticity checking Dag-Erling Smørgrav (Apr 26)
- Re: upstream source code authenticity checking Alistair Crooks (Apr 24)
- Re: upstream source code authenticity checking Alistair Crooks (Apr 26)
- Re: upstream source code authenticity checking Kurt Seifried (Apr 26)
- Re: upstream source code authenticity checking Eric H. Christensen (Apr 29)
- Re: upstream source code authenticity checking Daniel Kahn Gillmor (Apr 30)