Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990

[Mike Hammett <nanog () ics-il net>]

They solve a need that isn't reasonably solved any other way that doesn't have similar drawbacks. 


Some optimizers need to be redesigned to be safer by default. 


Some networks need to be safer by default as well. 




----- 
Mike Hammett 
Intelligent Computing Solutions 
http://www.ics-il.com 

Midwest-IX 
http://www.midwest-ix.com 

----- Original Message -----

From: "Mark Tinka" <mark.tinka () seacom com> 
To: nanog () nanog org 
Sent: Friday, July 31, 2020 8:59:51 AM 
Subject: Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 



On 30/Jul/20 19:44, Tom Beecher wrote: 
> It's not like there are scorecards, but there's a lot of fault to go 
> around. 
>
> However, again, BGP "Optimizers" are bad. The conditions by which the 
> inadvertent leak occur need to be fixed , no question. But in 
> scenarios like this, as-path length generally limits impact to "Oh 
> crap, I'll fix that, sorry!." Once you start squirting out more 
> specifics, you get to own some of the egg on the face. 

For about a year or so, I've been saying that the next generation of 
network engineers are being trained for a GUI-based point & click world, 
as opposed to understanding what protocols and CLI do. 

There is no shortage of annual workshops that teach BGP Multi-Homing. 

Despite the horror BGP optimizers have displayed in recent years, they 
seem to be flying off the shelves, still. Is this a clear example of the 
next generation of network engineers that we are breeding? 

Mark.