Re: DOs and DONTs for small ISP

[Mehmet Akcin <mehmet () akcin net>]

This Gem is fantastic by the way,

https://nsrc.org/workshops/2015/apricot2015/raw-attachment/wiki/Track1Agenda/01-ISP-Network-Design.pdf

On Tue, Jun 4, 2019 at 5:57 AM Warren Kumari <warren () kumari net> wrote:

> On Mon, Jun 3, 2019 at 11:34 PM Brandon Martin <lists.nanog () monmotha net>
> wrote:
> > On 6/3/19 9:56 AM, Jon Lewis wrote:
> > > 3) Don't advertise one transit provider's routes to another.  Each
> should
> > >     be filtering your routes, but you never know.  Come up with, and
> use
> > >     BGP communities to control route propagation.  As you grow, it
> sucks
> > >     having to update prefix-list filters in multiple places every time
> > >     something changes...like a new customer with their own IPs.
> >
> > To reiterate all this, FILTER EVERYTHING.
> >
> > To start with, explicitly specify in a route-map or similar everything
> > you want to advertise.  I usually create a separate route-map for each
> > transit/peer and include what I want to advertise via prefix lists (for
> > my IP space) and/or communities (for downstream BGP-speaking customers
> > if anticipated).
>
> I think a related *principle* is: "Build everything as though you are
> expecting to scale."
>
> This doesn't mean "spend lots of money to buy huge
> [routers|servers|commercial software|<etc>], but rather "when you plan
> your addressing structure and routing policies and monitoring and
> device config generation and... keep the in mind the question "If this
> suddenly takes off, and I hire N more people to run this, can I
> explain to them how it works? Do I have documentation I can point them
> at or is it stuck in my head / on the devices? If I need to add
> another M customers in the next month, can I do that easily?".
>
> This is related to the FILTER EVERYTHING -- when you turn up a new
> customer / peer / transit / whatever, you shouldn't be sitting around
> trying to figure out how you will write their route-map /
> policy-options -- this leads to weird one-offs, and quick hacks.
> Instead you should have policies already largely designed and simply
> plug in their prefixes (or, better yet, use bgpq3 or similar to build
> and populate these). Obviously there will be some cases where a new
> connection does require some special handling, but that *should* just
> be a plugin/chain in an existing policy-statement. Related to this is
> how you end up naming things -- I recently found 9 variants of
> firewall-filters which basically do:
>
> filter ACCEPT {
>    term ACCEPT {
>     then accept;
>   }
> }
> named things like: ACCEPT, ACEPT, Accept, Allow, Permit_all,
> AcceptAll, dontdrop [0].
>
> Obviously, there is a tension in the "design for scale" - while it
> would be great to design a complete automation system so that
> everything from installing a new customer to a new sites is simply
> typing 'make <thing>' and having everything pull from a database, at
> some point you will need to actually build a network, or you'll never
> have customers :-) Just keep in mind that "Am I building myself into a
> corner here?". E.g it only takes 10 or 15 minutes to install something
> like NetBox to keep track of addresses (and prefixes and racks and
> connections and ...) -- stuffing this in a spreadsheet might save you
> a few minutes *now*, but will this scale? Can $new_person easily
> figure it out?
>
>
> W
> [0]: My personal favorite is:
> filter Accept_All {
>     term Accept {
>         then {
>             count dropped;
>             reject;
>         }
>     }
>     term filter_<customer> {
>         from {
>             prefix-list {
>                 <customer>;
>            }
>         }
>         then accept;
>     }
>     term NEXT {
>         then log;
>     }
> }
>
> Presumably this all made sense to <name_removed_to_protect_inoccent>
> when they stuck it in at 3AM to deal with some crazy issue, but...
>
>
>
> > When you turn on the session, check what you're squawking AND WHAT
> > YOU'RE FILTERING.  You shouldn't be filtering anything you don't expect.
> >   Belt + suspenders.
> >
> > The same goes for anything you accept.  Obviously for a blended full
> > transit BGP edge router, you're probably going to accept almost
> > everything.  But if you only want default + on-net, try to filter using
> > communities from the peer, etc.  Again, right when you turn on the
> > session, "sh ip bgp ... filtered" of whatever's equivalent on your
> > platform.  If you're filtering something you don't expect to be
> > receiving at all, figure out where the misunderstanding or
> > misconfiguration lies.
> >
> > And of course it goes without saying that, if you've got BGP speaking
> > customers, you filter the heck out of them.  Use ROAs and/or RPKI if you
> > can to automatically generate filter lists.  Encourage your upstreams to
> > do the same if they're filtering you (and they probably are, or at least
> > should be, if you're new).  Remember that you are responsible for every
> > route you advertise, at the end of the day, even if you only advertised
> > it because a downstream network made a boo-boo and you didn't filter it.
> >
> > Filters are useful on your IGP, too, but there's so many ways to set all
> > that up that it's a bit more difficult to come up with nearly universal
> > best practices.  Generally speaking, be careful with redistribution,
> > never distribute BGP into IGP or vice versa unless you have a really,
> > really good reason to, and consider filters between both IGP
> > areas/regions or protocols (e.g. RIP coming into OSPF) as well as on
> > redistributions of static/connected to prevent simple typos on a static
> > route or interface configuration from taking down more than just local
> > stuff.
> >
> > It's way, way easier to remove or relax filters later if they prove more
> > of an operational hazard than asset than it is to add or tighten them if
> > they prove insufficient.
> > --
> > Brandon Martin
>
>
>
> --
> I don't think the execution is relevant when it was obviously a bad
> idea in the first place.
> This is like putting rabid weasels in your pants, and later expressing
> regret at having chosen those particular rabid weasels and that pair
> of pants.
>    ---maf