nanog mailing list archives

Re: deploying RPKI based Origin Validation


From: Joshua Vijsma / True <Joshua.Vijsma () true nl>
Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2018 20:47:56 +0000

Hi all,

Just wanted to share our (AS15703, True B.V.) experience as a hosting provider with enabling RPKI invalid filtering 
(invalid == reject). We've secured (most of) our routes since 2014 with ROAs but last Tuesday we have deployed filters 
which reject RPKI invalid routes. We have had two tickets regarding users in one certain RPKI invalid prefix not being 
able to reach our network, but those people quickly understood that this wasn't our problem but a problem with their 
hosting partner. They took it up with their hosting partner and it was fixed within a day. Overal, I would certainly 
recommend filtering RPKI invalids (and create ROAs for your prefixes!!) to prevent hijacks.

-- 
Met vriendelijke groet / Best regards,

Joshua Vijsma


On 13 Jul 2018, at 14:00, nanog-request () nanog org wrote:


------------------------------

Message: 2
Date: Thu, 12 Jul 2018 17:50:29 +0000
From: Job Snijders <job () ntt net>
To: nanog () nanog org
Subject: deploying RPKI based Origin Validation
Message-ID: <20180712175029.GC3037 () vurt meerval net>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii

Hi all,

I wanted to share with you that a ton of activity is taking place in the
Dutch networker community to deploy RPKI based BGP Origin Validation.
The mantra is "invalid == reject" on all EBGP sessions.

What's of note here is that we're now seeing the first commercial ISPs
doing Origin Validation. This is a significant step forward compared to
what we observed so far (it seemed OV was mostly limited to academic
institutions & toy networks). But six months ago Amsio (https://www.amsio.com/en/)
made the jump, and today Fusix deployed (https://fusix.nl/deploying-rpki/).

We've also seen an uptake of Origin Validation at Internet Exchange
route servers: AMS-IX and FranceIX have already deployed. I've read that
RPKI OV is under consideration at a number of other exchanges.

Other cool news is that Cloudflare launched a Certificate Transparency
initiative to help keep everyone honest. Announcement at:
https://twitter.com/grittygrease/status/1017224762542587907
Certificate Transparency is a fascinating tool, really a necessity to
build confidence in any PKI systems.

Anyone here working to deploy RPKI based Origin Validation in their
network and reject invalid announcements? Anything of note to share?

Kind regards,

Job





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