Re: A top-down RPKI model a threat to human freedom? (was Re: Level 3's IRR Database)

["Carlos M. Martinez" <carlosm3011 () gmail com>]

Although I support Rpki as a technology, there are legitimate concerns that it could be abused. I now believe that Rpki 
needs work in this area at IETF level so the concerns are adressed.

I imagine some form of secret sharing among different parties or sme form of key escrow. I am sure that it is not an 
easy problem, but maybe some progress can be made in this direction.

Regards

Carlos

On Feb 1, 2011, at 7:33 PM, Michael Hallgren <m.hallgren () free fr> wrote:

> Le mardi 01 février 2011 à 12:14 -0500, Christopher Morrow a écrit : 
> > On Sun, Jan 30, 2011 at 2:55 PM, Martin Millnert <millnert () gmail com> wrote:
> > > Here be dragons,
> > <snip>
> > > It should be fairly obvious, by most recently what's going on in
> > > Egypt, why allowing a government to control the Internet is a Really
> > > Bad Idea.
> >
> > how is the egypt thing related to rPKI?
> > How is the propsed rPKI work related to gov't control?
> >
> > > architecturally/technologically *impossible* for a entity from country
> > > A to via-the-hierarchical-trust-model block a prefix assigned to some
> > > entity in country B, that is assigned by B's RIR and in full
> > > accordance with the RIR policies and in no breach of any contract.
> >
> > countries do not have RIR's, countries have NIR's... regions have RIR's.
>
> In this context, at least, perhaps the NIR should be considered
> superfluous or redundant? What is the operational rationale behind the
> NIR level? Wouldn't a flatter RIR-LIR structure do just fine?
>
> mh
>
> >