nanog mailing list archives
Re: fixing insecure email infrastructure (was: Re: [eweek article] Window of "anonym
From: Eric Brunner-Williams in Portland Maine <brunner () nic-naa net>
Date: Fri, 14 Jan 2005 07:59:18 +0000
Because there is no data protection on many databases (such as ".com" registrars who are forced to sell the data if requested), people lie when registering, because it is the only tool they have to protect their privacy.
Yup. Our ICANN contracts both require us to sell bulk registrant data, and require us to maintain :42 and :80 (FORM+POST) whois servers, both unconditionally, to satisfy the trademarks interest group. The "perfect open whois to fight spam" claim exchanges 40,000,000 valid (or not dysfunctional in this particular context) for two or more orders of magintude smaller invalid and dysfunctional (in this partuclar context) addresses. Because registrar-registrar predation via whois data mining is a reality, registrars rate limit or otherwise attempt an ACL on both :43 and :80 whois service, and data format variation is a form of defense. It prevents the marginals who can't write a simple parser from theft via slamming the registrants. And since no one who wants whois data who isn't stealing registrants is paying us, grand unifying schemes aren't a registrar insterest. Again, look to the marks people, now accompanied by the new "total information" law enforcement people for the primary actors. As I've previously pointed out, neither of those two interest groups is fundamentally interested in SMTP.
Fix the data protection problem and you'll have a better case to force people to register proper information.
Bingo!
Current thread:
- Re: fixing insecure email infrastructure (was: Re: [eweek article] Window of "an, (continued)
- Re: fixing insecure email infrastructure (was: Re: [eweek article] Window of "an Barry Shein (Jan 13)
- Re: fixing insecure email infrastructure (was: Re: [eweek article] Window of "anonym Owen DeLong (Jan 13)
- Re: fixing insecure email infrastructure (was: Re: [eweek article] Window of "anonym Valdis . Kletnieks (Jan 13)
- Re: fixing insecure email infrastructure (was: Re: [eweek article] Window of "anonym Steven Champeon (Jan 13)
- Re: fixing insecure email infrastructure (was: Re: [eweek article] Window of "anonym Stephane Bortzmeyer (Jan 13)
- /24 route propagation, how long is reasonable? Michael Airhart (Jan 13)
- Re: /24 route propagation, how long is reasonable? bmanning (Jan 13)
- Re: /24 route propagation, how long is reasonable? Jon Lewis (Jan 13)
- Re: fixing insecure email infrastructure (was: Re: [eweek article] Window of "anonym Rich Kulawiec (Jan 13)
- Re: fixing insecure email infrastructure (was: Re: [eweek article] Window of "anonym Eric Brunner-Williams in Portland Maine (Jan 14)
- Re: fixing insecure email infrastructure (was: Re: [eweek article] Window of "anonym Eric Brunner-Williams in Portland Maine (Jan 14)
- Re: [eweek article] Window of "anonymity" when domain exists, whois not updated yet Owen DeLong (Jan 12)
- Re: [eweek article] Window of "anonymity" when domain exists, whois not updated yet Owen DeLong (Jan 12)
- Re: [eweek article] Window of "anonymity" when domain exists, whois not updated yet Steven Champeon (Jan 12)
- Re: [eweek article] Window of "anonymity" when domain exists, whois not updated yet Valdis . Kletnieks (Jan 12)
- Re: [eweek article] Window of "anonymity" when domain exists, whois not updated yet Dave Crocker (Jan 13)
- Re: [eweek article] Window of "anonymity" when domain exists, whois not updated yet Nils Ketelsen (Jan 11)