RE: AT&T NYC

[alex () yuriev com]

> You keep referring to the problem of OSPF causing the outage
> for AT&T and unaffected customers.  The AT&T released RFO simply states
> that OSPF network statements were removed.  That can happen just as easy
> with static routes and BGP network/neighbor statements.
>
> OSPF did what it was instructed to do, just as BGP would have done if it
> were told to drop neighbors, or networks.


OSPF network statements were removed, according to RFO, which I have
received, on one router. Can you please explain to me why customers in other
*cities* which clearly were terminated into different routers were affected?

Since we know based on our emprirical observation that it did happen, it can
be concluded that AT&T has bad network design. It does not matter *why*
customers who were not terminated into the affected routers could not use
AT&T network. What matters is that they *could* b not use AT&T's network
because AT&T's engineering made a choice of using a broken design. This
broken design is going to cost AT&T a couple of million. Hopefully, at some
point a VP of Engineering for AT&T is going to realize that his job is going
to be on the line if stuff like this keeps happening, at which point certain
engineers within AT&T are going to get their heads handed back to them on a
platter. Again, hopefully at that point, those who remain at AT&T will
realize that their existing design is broken and another outage is going to
cost them their jobs and redo it. At the end we are going to have a lot more
stability on the internet.

As far as BGP would have done the same thing: would you mind desciring a
configuration of BGP where deletion of a network statement in one router
would cause unreachability across paths that do not *realy* on that network
statement?


Alex