re Top Voting Machine Vendor Admits It Installed Remote-Access Software on Systems Sold to States

["Dave Farber" <farber () gmail com>]

Begin forwarded message:

> From: "J.M. Porup" <jm () porup com>
> Date: July 18, 2018 at 11:52:12 PM GMT+9
> To: dave () farber net
> Subject: Re: [IP] re Top Voting Machine Vendor Admits It Installed Remote-Access Software on Systems Sold to States
>
> Dave,
>
> [for IP]
>
> Have to agree with Jonathan. My recent reporting took a closer look at
> the issue of vendor security:
>
> Want to hack a voting machine? Hack the voting machine vendor first
> https://www.csoonline.com/article/3267625/security/want-to-hack-a-voting-machine-hack-the-voting-machine-vendor-first.html
>
> best,
>
> jmp
>
> -- 
> J.M. Porup
> www.JMPorup.com
>
> > On Wed, Jul 18, 2018 at 11:39:53PM +0900, Dave Farber wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > Begin forwarded message:
> >
> > > From: "Jonathan S. Shapiro" <jonathan.s.shapiro () gmail com>
> > > Date: July 18, 2018 at 10:36:48 PM GMT+9
> > > To: dave () farber net
> > > Cc: ip <ip () listbox com>
> > > Subject: Re: [IP] re Top Voting Machine Vendor Admits It Installed Remote-Access Software on Systems Sold to States
> > >
> > > [for IP]
> > >
> > > Dave:
> > >
> > > I read with interest Joly MacFie’s note regarding the State of New York’s well-founded suspicion of electronic 
> > > voting machines. I’d add several points to his comments:
> > >
> > > 1. Because the software that *runs* the voting machine is not created or maintained in a secure environment, the 
> > > absence of networking does not render a voting machine secure. Further: there have been multiple demonstrations of 
> > > successful on-site compromises of non-connected machines.
> > >
> > > 2. Of even greater concern, there is considerable evidence that the vote TABULATING machines have been compromised 
> > > in close jurisdictions. This means that paper ballots can’t be trusted in those jurisdictions without a thorough 
> > > audit.
> > >
> > > 3. The very close votes in key jurisdictions mean that statistical sampling is not sufficient to audit the vote in 
> > > those jurisdictions. Each ballot must be individually confirmed.
> > >
> > > 4. The overwhelming vulnerability of our election process, coupled with the time limits on certification and the 
> > > obstruction (both by political means and technical means) of vote validation means that we cannot have well-founded 
> > > confidence in the results of recent elections. 
> > >
> > > 5. The Russian compromise of voter databases severely hampered Democratic efforts to get out the vote in 2016. I 
> > > can say from personal experience that a staggering percentage of allegedly Democratic residents in door-to-door 
> > > canvassing during the 2016 election turned out to be Republicans. While the database is never perfect, our 
> > > experience suggests a 25%-30% error rate. That’s un-heard of.
> > >
> > > Best regards,
> > >
> > >
> > > Jonathan Shapiro



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