Interesting People mailing list archives

Re: A QUERY Credit Default Swap (CDS) question and answer


From: David Farber <dave () farber net>
Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2008 16:40:58 -0400



Begin forwarded message:

From: Tom Gray <tom_gray_grc () yahoo com>
Date: October 19, 2008 3:57:16 PM EDT
To: ip <ip () v2 listbox com>, dave () farber net, tom_gray_grc () yahoo com
Subject: Re: [IP] Re: must read Credit Default Swap (CDS) question and answer

Prof Farber

I hope that you can post this question to your list. The explanation below discusses the pricing of CDOs and their related CDSs. It mentions an unsurprising result that the price of a derivative is related to the hedge for its risk. So the price of a CDS should be related to the risk inherent in the underlying CDO. This is not a result which will surprise many people. So the question is about the pricing of CDSs on the CDOs for mortgages that were sold to people who had no possibility of paying them off. The only way that these mortgages would work was if the housing market rose without interruption forever. This unlikely assumption has been empirically denied.

So the question is about how the risk of these CDOs ere estimated. I have read that the people holding the CDOs were indifferent to the risk since they had swapped the risk with the sellers of CDSs.

How did these CDS investors assess the risk of these mortgages when they had no relationship with the people paying the mortgages?

The deep mathematics that surrounded these instruments would seem depend on this sort of knowledge and be useless without it

Tom Gray


--- On Mon, 10/20/08, David Farber <dave () farber net> wrote:
From: David Farber <dave () farber net>
Subject: [IP] Re: must read Credit Default Swap (CDS) question and answer
To: "ip" <ip () v2 listbox com>
Date: Monday, October 20, 2008, 12:08 AM



Begin forwarded message:

From: Simon Clift <ssclift () gmail com>
Date: October 19, 2008 2:14:53 PM EDT
To: dave () farber net
Subject: Re: [IP] Credit Default Swap (CDS) question and answer
Reply-To: ssclift () gmail com

Hi Dave,

At the risk of advertising my scum-of-the-earth status as a quant, here
goes an explanation of why CDS's should not be banned or set aside.

On Sat, 2008-10-18 at 20:03 -0400, David Farber wrote:
From: "David P. Reed" <dpreed () reed com>
Date: October 18, 2008 11:39:44 AM EDT
Revoking gamblers' lottery tickets?  Nice move, unless the gamblers
fund your campaigns, as they do in this case.

Hedge, please, not lottery ticket. :)

Without an instrument which represents a given risk you have two
problems.  The first is that you have no mechanism for comparing your
estimate of risk against someone else's. No publically visible price leads to a lack of information in the market. Second, when you buy an
instrument like a CDO and think there may be a pricing error (in the
pricing of risk), or if the market develops in a nasty way, you need
instruments like CDS's to hedge, or transfer, risk. No hedge leads to
inefficiency and costs everyone money.

In theory, this comes down to Debaen and Schachermayer's work
demonstrating that (and I'm sure I'm butchering this) the existence of a unique price for a derivative is equivalent to the existence of a hedge for its risk. A derivative, in theory, trades a risk from someone who
wants rid of it, to someone who can actively manage it.  The cost of
management supplies the price.

For example, the recent mortatorium on short selling had an immediate,
and costly effect on the derivatives market.  The first thing traders
asked me that morning was "how do we hedge our Puts?", which are
contracts that pay when prices drop.  Sure enough, the spread between
bid and ask prices went up and it became more expensive for everyone to hedge their risks. The U.S. government had removed a fundamental market
mechanism and driven up costs.  Guess who made money? (Hint: not the
purchasers of derivatives.)

What would be very useful, IMHO, is a better exchange mechanism for
commonly traded "exotic" derivatives like CDS's.  The backing of the
exchange would ensure both that prices are visible and that payments are
guaranteed.  Fortunately, the financial world is tending to move this
way.

and lots of "evidence" that "prediction markets" "always work".

There have been a number of studies, actually, indicating that risks
implied in the market aren't particulary good (or bad) estimates.
Sometimes you can actually extract the pricing model and coefficients
that a market participant is using by looking at their quoted prices.

It's a career limiting move for anyone entering the math side
of US economics profession to be skeptical of the idea that price
doesn't reflect information perfectly.

The biggest piece of horses**t that goes into any of my models is a
single estimate of future volatility taken from the market. My personal
preference is to attach an estimate of error in valuation inputs then
get a price range.  That's considerably trickier to do, however, than
the usual valuation procedures.  On the other hand, since the quoted
market price is also the price at which you can offload a risk to
someone else, it is inherently the "correct" price.

-- Simon




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