IP: Another take on Microsoft-specific worms

[Dave Farber <farber () cis upenn edu>]

> From: "Kevin G. Barkes" <kgb () kgb com>
> To: <farber () cis upenn edu>
>
>
> Hi Dave,
>
> With the release of yet another Microsoft worm, I thought you might find the
> following from my May 22 newsletter of interest:
> .
> .
> .
> Ok, say we get lucky. No hurricanes, tsunamis or heat waves, and the power
> grid holds together. The world's economy can still be brought to its knees
> in a few hours by disturbingly simple code delivered via email to computers
> running Microsoft applications and operating systems.
>
> The prospect is especially frightening because last year's Melissa virus and
> the recent "Love Bug" worm and its variants were, frankly, badly-written
> programs created by rank amateurs.
>
> Imagine the chaos that would result if a truly skilled programmer with
> particularly malicious intent actually crafted a well-written,
> self-propagating email worm targeted at Microsoft Outlook and Outlook
> Express users.
>
> What would happen to the international business community if some dot snot
> wunderkind gets peeved because he misses out on an IPO and unleashes a bug
> that wipes out hard drives and bios settings on PCs around the world? The
> wonder is not that such an event is possible, but rather that it hasn't
> happened already.
>
> Another wonder is why the world allows itself to be victimized by
> Microsoft's cavalier attitude about the gaping security holes in its systems
> and applications.
>
> Technically speaking, the recent "Love Bug" wasn't a software bug at all. It
> was a feature. Boot up a new, out-of-the-box Windows98 machine and the odds
> are pretty good there's a chunk of code called Windows Scripting Host that
> activates automatically and eagerly awaits the chance to transparently
> execute surreptitiously invoked virus code.
>
> Anti-virus software? Fahgeddaboutit. Consider a real-world implementation of
> the virus checking concept. There's a knock at the door. The virus checker
> looks through the peephole and sees someone standing there. He scans a book
> that contains the pictures and descriptions of a couple thousand known
> miscreants. If none match, the unknown person is allowed in.
>
> Try implementing that security model in a Manhattan office building and see
> how far you get.
>
> Or consider Microsoft's typical defensive argument, that the problem is
> actually stupid users and system administrators.
>
> Another real-world analogy: you're tooling down the Interstate in your Chevy
> and hit a bump in the road. The doors fall off and the engine explodes. You
> have the ambulance driver stop at the dealership on the way to the trauma
> center so you can chew out the service manager. He sneers at you
> condescendingly and points to a paragraph of six-point type buried in a
> totally unrelated portion of the owners' manual:
>
> "The doors of your car will fall off and the engine will explode when you
> hit a bump while traveling on an Interstate highway. One of our engineers
> thought this feature would be neat and we have added it at no extra charge
> to you. If you disagree (you weenie), you can disable this feature by
> performing the following procedure. First, obtain three chickens, two brown
> recluse spiders, a length of nylon rope and a virgin..."
> .
> .
> .
>
> Regards,
>
> KGB
>
> -----
> Kevin G. Barkes
> Email: kgb () kgb com | Web: www.kgb.com
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