Re: Stick DOS

[Cortez <coretez () 8THPORT COM>]

Stick will not be released anytime soon for the exception of IDS vendors.
Snort causes a problem because releasing the code to snort is basically
releasing the code openly.  The posting I am responding to was the result of
a FOUO that was sent out.

I have had a talk with a friend of mine and agreed to release "stick" openly
in a couple of month in order to allow vendors to make code modifications
they see fit.  This FOUO was caused by a pre-release before testing was
completed.

During testing it was discovered that ISS Real Secure v5.5 would turn itself
off via error.  I have sent the code to ISS (Chris Rollard) via a friend to
insure that it went to a knowledgeable group in ISS.  I have on my own
accord contacted other vendors, some of which are not affected by this
technique.

The attack is aimed at stateless IDS and not firewalls.  Though I have not
tested it against firewalls.  The following is a posting that was made
yesterday and posted this morning on IDS-Focus.

The original posting I was responding to and the referred to paper should
give enough description on design and methodology.  As pointed out in the
IDS Focus group there are a couple of tools that also generate packets and I
have not had time to compare their technique to my own.



---------- Posting from IDS-FOCUS -------------

Over the last couple months I've been finishing up work on a tool called
stick.  I was planning to release a paper in the coming week and the tool in
a month or two from now when IDS vendors have had time to make modifications
to handle it.

The tool uses the Snort rule set and produces a C program via lex that when
compiled will produce an IP packet capable of triggering that rule from a
spoofed IP range (or all possible IP addresses) into a target IP range.  A
function is produced for each rule and a loop then executes these rules in a
random order.  The tool currently produces these at about 250 alarms per
second.

A Linux based snort will hit 100% CPU and start dropping packets.  The
stress on recording and disk IO is another problem.

ISS Real Secure dies two seconds after the attack begins.  This was tested
numerous times.

Other IDS and even sniffers (especially with DNS lookups) had problems of
their own.

I will be trying to release the code to IDS vendors over the next couple of
months in order for them to make changes they see fit.  The tool was
initially designed to test bandwidth and stress on IDS, but it obviously can
be used in a malicious manner and that is not my intent.

A draft paper can be seen at http://www.eurocompton.net/stick/ ... please
ignore the spelling and grammar changes.  A more technical paper and
analysis will hopefully be briefed at Blackhat if DT approves it.



Coretez G.