Security Incidents mailing list archives
Re: Cracked; rootkit - entrapment question?
From: JNelson () CMCCONTROLS COM (CL: Nelson, Jeff)
Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2000 12:41:13 -0500
Is this all a load of crap from people who don't have a clue or are all
these
stories and quotes BS?
I have contacted the FBI regarding several issues. Some of those issues were scans from foreign countries not necessarily friendly to the U.S. We have one case pending with them for prosecution (stateside). Seth is correct. The FBI will not pursue a case if there is not a specific minimum dollar amount associated with the loss. The last I heard from them on this (over 1 year ago) that amount was $25,000. Our loss, per the FBI, is tallied based upon time and materials used to stop the attack and to repair. I calculated our loss for the case we have pending to be less than $15,000. I am expecting the agents in charge of this case to tell me they will not be able to go further. And, <soapbox = 1> I have to say this really pisses me off. It cost us almost $7,000 in software licensing, multiple hours through the normal business day and over 30 hours straight for two of my staff. Yet, the 'person' that did this gets away with absolutely no consequence. So, basically, I can start attacking and cracking away, causing massive amounts of lost time and money to thousands of companies and not suffer any repercussions. Half the time, during other of the attacks/scans we undergo, I'm able to get on the phone with the administrator of that IP block and we have the individual red-handed. But, I can't do anything and the ISP or whomever slaps them on the wrist and away they go. <soapbox = 0> As for the FBI's use of what they can do with the honey pot idea. Well, they can use that information for prosecution if it relates to a case underway. With some of the foreign scans we have been getting, it would be very interesting to find out exactly what they are trying to do. That way, if the FBI has any other similar activity elsewhere, they can better prepare for it. Cheers, Jeff
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Jeffrey L. Nelson | Cleveland Motion Controls Network Manager | 7550 Hub Parkway | Cleveland, Ohio 44125 jnelson () cmccontrols com | 216-642-5147
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-----Original Message----- From: Seth Georgion [mailto:sysadmin () SASSPRODUCTIONS COM] Sent: Sunday, March 12, 2000 12:41 AM To: INCIDENTS () SECURITYFOCUS COM Subject: Re: Cracked; rootkit - entrapment question? I keep reading various news articles that indicate that federal law currently states that the FBI is not allowed to investigate if they believe that the damage is under 5,000 dollars per computer and if they find out, during the course of the investigation, that the damages are less they must stop. I've seen a couple of articles on this on MSNBC, Yahoo and HNN over the past weeks with the DoS happening and all. They seem to all indicate it is part of Title 80 law but if so I ask this to the group then; Why is it that everyone talks about getting the authorities involved when almost all computer crime occurs state to state rather than intrastate? Doesn't a honey pot, by nature, eliminate the damage factor? Maybe all of these articles are completely bogus but I saw a quote from Janet Reno where she was urging the 5,000 dollar rule to be dismissed and most experts will tell you that the FBI will not investigate if the damage is under 10,000. So what's the deal? All I hear about is trapping someone for the authorities and "I always alert the Authorities!" and "It's a wiretap! be careful if you want a conviction!" Is this all a load of crap from people who don't have a clue or are all these stories and quotes BS? By the way our company investigated pursuing damages once, just for kicks, and our legal representatives informed us that damage can only be calculated as loss of critical business and whatever the dollar amount per hour of the employees involved amounts to. This would only include time spent fixing it not time BSing and investigating and stopping work just because you'd like to verify that all 24,000 company computers weren't subject to attack. -----Original Message----- From: Incidents Mailing List [mailto:INCIDENTS () SECURITYFOCUS COM]On Behalf Of Craig H. Rowland Sent: Thursday, March 09, 2000 8:25 PM To: INCIDENTS () SECURITYFOCUS COM Subject: Re: Cracked; rootkit - entrapment question? Hi Lamont On Fri, 3 Mar 2000 lamont () icopyright com wrote:On Thu, 2 Mar 2000, Craig H. Rowland wrote:If you are facing a serious compromise situation where anattacker hasgained full internal access, and you want to contain andanalyze thedamage, you may wish to deploy a honey pot. For mostcases though I thinkrunning a honey pot on your external border is not a good idea.I've pretty much shared your opinion about honey pots, butone idea I'vebeen toying with recently is deploying "canary" systemsinternally so thatif someone smarter than me does get through the perimeter,if they hit thecanary system it'll alert me. I'd probably use just adefault redhat 6.0install (got enough root holes there to make it east), callit somethingtempting like "cybercash" and then modify sh/bash andcsh/tcsh to e-mail awarning anytime they are run (and turn off cron jobs toeliminate thefalse positives).I know several people who do this, but they generally make the systems hard to crack and just put up a boatload of port monitoring software/sniffers to detect the probes. It seems to be a little more sane than leaving a vulnerable system hanging around. I just get edgy when people want to coax another person into performing a particular type of action. Unfortunately you just can't rule out the attacker doing something to surprise you that falls outside of the planned response that may have been established. Humans have a way of being unpredictable at times (or lucky -- as the case may have it). As I posted in a previous message and on my website, I think putting up honey pots before doing other tangible security measures (filters, patches, etc.) is just not a good plan of attack. Besides giving an attacker a potential toe-hold onto your network, you provide the positive feedback necessary to encourage them into looking further. The one key item I've found that differentiates a successful attacker from an unsuccessful one is time. The shorter amount of time you give an attacker to look/poke/prod your network the less chance they have to find success. Unfortunately, leaving a vulnerable system around affords an attacker more time. Not a good thing -- IMHO. -- Craig
Current thread:
- Re: Cracked; rootkit - entrapment question?, (continued)
- Re: Cracked; rootkit - entrapment question? Adam Pendleton (Mar 02)
- Re: Cracked; rootkit - entrapment question? Jason Lewis (Mar 02)
- Re: Cracked; rootkit - entrapment question? Roy Wilson (Mar 02)
- Re: Cracked; rootkit - entrapment question? Filip M. Gieszczykiewicz (Mar 03)
- Re: Cracked; rootkit - entrapment question? Chuck Phillips (Mar 03)
- Re: Cracked; rootkit - entrapment question? Chuck Phillips (Mar 03)
- Re: Cracked; rootkit - entrapment question? Lison, Nathan (Mar 03)
- Re: Cracked; rootkit - entrapment question? Chuck Phillips (Mar 04)
- Re: Cracked; rootkit - entrapment question? Hal Lockhart (Mar 15)
- Re: Cracked; rootkit - entrapment question? Bob (Mar 15)
- Re: Cracked; rootkit - entrapment question? CL: Nelson, Jeff (Mar 15)
- Re: Cracked; rootkit - entrapment question? Jon Lewis (Mar 16)
- Re: Cracked; rootkit - entrapment question? Michael Stone (Mar 17)
- Re: Cracked; rootkit - entrapment question? Robert G. Ferrell (Mar 15)
- Re: Cracked; rootkit - entrapment question? Eric the Fruitbat (Mar 17)
- Re: Cracked; rootkit - entrapment question? David Pick (Mar 20)
- Re: Cracked; rootkit - entrapment question? David Brumley (Mar 17)
- Re: Cracked; rootkit - entrapment question? Eric the Fruitbat (Mar 17)