Re: Filezilla's silent caching of user's credentials

[Valdis.Kletnieks () vt edu]

On Thu, 14 Oct 2010 17:13:04 +0200, Christian Sciberras said:

> Valdis, the thing is, if people want their password-keeping software secure,
> they ought to be limiting access to this said software.

Defense in Depth.  It's a Good Idea.

Yes, that guy who lost his house and got to watch it burn down because he
forgot to pay a $75 fee *should* have paid it.  That doesn't mean a policy
of "they should have paid, so let it burn if they didn't" is a good idea.

> Instead, what we are proposing here is limiting software capability.

File permissions also limit software capability.

So tell me - why is 'chmod -R 777 /' a bad idea? After all, /bin/login *should*
be stopping unauthorized people from logging in, and authorized users *should*
be exercising due diligence in accessing files, so under normal operation,
file permissions shouldn't ever reject an attempted access.  So why do we
have them?

> Why? I can't back up the password file reliably anymore, thanks to this
> "feature".

If you can't create a backup copy of the file, and then restore the exact same
pattern of bits when recovering the file, merely because the contents are
encrypted, there's something else wrong with your backup scheme.

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