IDS mailing list archives
Re: IDS detection approaches
From: Adam Powers <apowers () lancope com>
Date: Sat, 06 Oct 2007 16:54:47 -0400
I would completely go with a signature based IDS. Anomaly based IDS will not give you the greatest results.
Seems like this conversation just comes up over and over on this list. It's like a broken record. Anyway, Defend the above statement. What experience do you have with anomaly/behavior systems? I suspect not much. At least not with any of the modern ones such as that from Mazu or Lancope. Nowadays when you talk about "anomaly IDS" you're talking about NetFlow-based systems that absolutely smoke sig-based systems on cost vs. value. If you have 500 sites on an MPLS cloud, you need 500 SPAN/tap/mirror based probes. Not so with NetFlow-based systems. You need only a flow collector appliance and a management console. The routers at each of the sites provide a "virtual probe" of sorts that sends traffic accounting telemetry back to the centrally located collector. Far cheaper than anything you'll get out of a sig-based platform. I recommend sig-based systems at critical areas in the network (datacenter switch fabrics, Internet ingress/egress points, etc. and NetFlow technology everywhere else. Together they make a powerful combination. But simply saying "Anomaly based IDS will not give you the greatest results" is both an uninformed, dated, and inaccurate view of the way things really are. On 10/4/07 10:29 PM, "frankfrydrych () gmail com" <frankfrydrych () gmail com> wrote:
Hola, I would completely go with a signature based IDS. Anomaly based IDS will not give you the greatest results. For signature base I highly recommend SNORT. It is probably one of the best IDS out there. Now I'm not just saying this as a "ooh open source is the best". I truely believe this. I actually use to be a huge Cisco buff and just dealt with Cisco IDS. However, at my current job I am a security analyst and have to analyze events from Cisco, IIS, Juniper, etc, and SNORT beats them all. Mainly for the fact that you are able to see the packet payload and are able to make the decision if something is malicious based on the actual payload and not just the signature that is triggered (like some IDS). Also, when a new threat emerges usually SNORT users will create a signature to combat the threat. The other vendors create the signatures for you and it usually ends up to be like 3 months after the threat was actually a realistic threat. And on top of it the vendor signatures usually give out huge amount of false positves. Then again, an IDS is only as good as who tunes it. If you take ANY IDS and turn it on in a production network you will have so many false positives I garuntee you will miss actual threats. Every IDS (including SNORT) has to be tuned for the production network it is on. Finally, make sure to place the IDS behind the firewall. If you place it in front of the firewall you will receive so much traffic that it is just not valuable data. You have a firewall, so let the firewall do its job and block the already known bad activity, and catch what gets through the firewall with a IDS. -FF ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Test Your IDS Is your IDS deployed correctly? Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from CORE IMPACT. Go to http://www.coresecurity.com/index.php5?module=Form&action=impact&campaign=intr o_sfw to learn more. ------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- Adam Powers Chief Technology Officer Lancope, Inc. c. 678.725.1028 f. 678.302.8744 e. adam () lancope com ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Test Your IDS Is your IDS deployed correctly? Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from CORE IMPACT. Go to http://www.coresecurity.com/index.php5?module=Form&action=impact&campaign=intro_sfw to learn more. ------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current thread:
- IDS detection approaches snort user (Oct 04)
- RE: IDS detection approaches Srinivasa Addepalli (Oct 05)
- RE: IDS detection approaches Campa, Albert R. (Oct 05)
- Re: IDS detection approaches Stefano Zanero (Oct 10)
- Re: IDS detection approaches p1g (Oct 15)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- Re: IDS detection approaches frankfrydrych (Oct 05)
- Re: IDS detection approaches Gary Halleen (Oct 09)
- Re: IDS detection approaches Randal T. Rioux (Oct 12)
- Re: IDS detection approaches Gary Halleen (Oct 12)
- Re: IDS detection approaches Gary Halleen (Oct 09)
- Re: IDS detection approaches jean-philippe luiggi (Oct 09)
- Re: IDS detection approaches Adam Powers (Oct 09)
- RE: IDS detection approaches 'Merigoth' (Oct 09)
- Re: IDS detection approaches Liran Cohen (Oct 15)
- Oracle XDB FTP Kanagasingham, Prathaben (Oct 26)
- RE: IDS detection approaches Nelson Brito (Oct 09)
- Re: IDS detection approaches Sec urity (Oct 09)
- RE: IDS detection approaches Nelson Brito (Oct 10)
- Re: IDS detection approaches Sec urity (Oct 10)
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- Re: IDS detection approaches Sec urity (Oct 12)
- RE: IDS detection approaches Nelson Brito (Oct 12)
- Re: IDS detection approaches Sec urity (Oct 12)
- Re: IDS detection approaches Sec urity (Oct 09)