IDS mailing list archives

Re: SSL - Man-in-the-Middle filtering


From: "crazy frog crazy frog" <i.m.crazy.frog () gmail com>
Date: Wed, 12 Dec 2007 12:10:33 +0530

sorry but i got a question over here,wht if someone has already
spoofed the connection?what IPS will do in tht case?discard the
connection or will again decode the traffic and analyze tht?

On Dec 12, 2007 1:56 AM, Nelson Brito <nbrito () sekure org> wrote:
When you have a HIPS which has the capabilities to inspect SSL, IPSEC,
etc... traffic you do it in an upper level, so you just get the traffic
right after it is decrypted.

If you are looking for attacks against SSL, IPSEC, etc... you are using
their levels to sanitize the connection.

There are no penalties or broken law.

Nelson Brito (f.k.a. stderr)
Sekure SDI's Member since 1999


-----Original Message-----
From: listbounce () securityfocus com
[mailto:listbounce () securityfocus com] On Behalf Of Marian Ion
Sent: Tuesday, December 11, 2007 4:07 AM
To: focus-ids () securityfocus com

Subject: RE: SSL - Man-in-the-Middle filtering


Isn't this an interference in an encrypted communication,
penalized by the law? And ... as a user, how can you trust
the confidentiality this communication when you found out about?

marian



-----Original Message-----
From: listbounce () securityfocus com
[mailto:listbounce () securityfocus com] On Behalf Of Ravi Chunduru
Sent: 08 December 2007 18:33
To: focus-ids () securityfocus com
Subject: SSL - Man-in-the-Middle filtering

it seems that some network IPS devices and application
firewalls are not only providing SSL based HTTP inspection on
server side, but also on client side (i know  of one IPS
device which is in beta testing).
i understand that it is required as attacks can be sent in
SSL to avoid blocking.

when deployed on client side, these devices resign
certificates (of public servers) with local CA certificate. i
see two aspects to it - users need to trust local authority
(enterprise administrators) and second is users will have
false sense of security (that is users are no longer see the
actual CA of server certificate).

any comments on acceptance of this functionality in
enterprise deployments?

is there any standard mechanism (in SSL standard or in HTTP
standard) to send actual CA certificate to the browser by
forward proxies?

thanks
Ravi

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